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This manual is not intended to serve as legal advice on indi-
vidual cases, but to give a general overview of the immigration
consequences for criminal convictions to defense attorneys who are
working with non-citizen clients. On account of the ever-changing
nature of immigration law, almost weekly administrative immi-
gration appellate decisions, Federal court rulings and Congres-
sional whim, attorneys are strongly urged to contact an immigra-
tion attorney who works on criminal immigration cases in every
case involving a non-citizen defendant.
Introduction
This manual is intended to provide public defenders and
criminal defense attorneys with a basic overview of the immigra-
tion provisions that may have consequences for their non-citizen
clients in Minnesota criminal and civil courts. Where possible,
rulings by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Board directly relating to Minnesota stat-
utes have been noted. While this manual focuses on the immigra-
tion consequences of convictions under Minnesota law, it is hoped
that the manual may also be helpful to criminal defense attorneys
and legal advocates for immigrants in other states. The manual
focuses on the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
19961 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Respon-
sibility Act of 1996.2 Because of the important changes made by
these two federal laws, pre-plea advisals, Rule 15 motions, Rule 27
motions and post-conviction relief will make the difference for
many non-citizens who want to remain in the United States with
their families or avoid possible persecution (including torture and
death) in their countries of nationality.
1. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
2. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
[Vol. 17:567
DEFENDING NON-CITIZENS
I. Defending Non-Citizens in Minnesota Courts: An
Overview
With recent changes in the immigration law,3 non-citizens
and attorneys who defend non-citizens must become aware of the
immigration consequences of criminal convictions. The role of
public defenders and private criminal defense attorneys is critical
to the ultimate outcome of a non-citizen's criminal case and immi-
gration case. This manual is intended to assist public defenders
and criminal defense attorneys to become aware of the issues that
may affect their non-citizen clients and to provide resources for ob-
taining individual case evaluations and advice from immigration
attorneys.
A non-citizen is any person in the United States who is not a
United States citizen by birth or naturalization, i.e. legal perma-
nent residents (persons with "green cards"), persons in the United
States on temporary visas and undocumented persons. In ana-
lyzing a non-citizen's case relating to immigration, several ques-
tions must be asked:
1. Is your client a United States citizen?
2. If not a United States citizen, what is the non-citizen's
current immigration status?
3. Is your non-citizen client deportable or inadmissible?
4. Will a plea or admission of facts result in a "conviction"
for your non-citizen client?
5. Will a proposed disposition of your non-citizen client's
case render her deportable or inadmissible?
6. If the non-citizen is deportable or inadmissible, is she
eligible for relief from deportation or removal?
7. For final convictions, would post-conviction relief affect
deportability or inadmissibility and possible relief from
deportation or removal?
Each non-citizen's case should be discussed with an immigra-
tion attorney who works on criminal immigration issues before a
plea is entered. Plea bargains under different sections of the Min-
nesota statutes will have different consequences for immigration
purposes. For example, a conviction for fifth degree domestic vio-
3. For general discussions about changes in immigration law, see Helen Mor-
ris, Zero Tolerance: The Increasing Criminalization of Immigration Law, 74
INTERPRETER RELEASES 1317, 1317-26 (1997) and Juan P. Osuna, The 1996 Immni-




lence makes a non-citizen deportable whereas a conviction for dis-
orderly conduct should not make a non-citizen deportable. Crea-
tive strategies may ultimately save your non-citizen client's future
in the United States.
A. Non-Citizens in Minnesota
The numbers and nationalities of non-citizens in Minnesota
have dramatically increased since 1980. Today more than 80 lan-
guages are spoken by immigrant children in Minnesota. 4 The ex-
act number of non-citizens in Minnesota is unknown.
Non-citizens have come to Minnesota for a variety of reasons.
Foreign exchange students have come from many countries to
learn about life in the United States and to obtain high school and
advanced degrees. Mexican farmworkers have settled in Minne-
sota since the early 1920s to make better lives for themselves and
their children. United States companies also hire foreign workers
to fill the gaps in areas of business and industry where there are
not enough United States citizen workers. Non-citizens from
around the world, including Europe, come to the United States to
join their family members already here. Some non-citizens ini-
tially settle in other parts of the United States and later move to
Minnesota to join family members, to find better jobs, as well as to
live in safe communities. Many families are comprised of legal
permanent residents and United States citizen parents, spouses
and children. Non-citizens have become a part of Minnesota com-
munities in schools, churches, neighborhoods and workplaces.
Minnesota is home to a large number of political refugees and
asylees as well as asylum applicants. In the late 1970s and early
1980s, Hmong, Laotian, Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees were
resettled in Minnesota. Minnesota is home to the largest Somali
population 5 and second largest Hmong population in the United
States. 6 In the 1980s and early 1990s, Central Americans arrived
after escaping the civil wars and conflicts in their home countries
of El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Honduras. Since the
late 1980s and early 1990s, African refugees have resettled in the
Twin Cities area; the countries from which the refugees, asylees
and asylum applicants come include Liberia, Somalia, Ethiopia,
4. See Lourdes Medrano Leslie, Tailored Programs Help Schools Meet Bilin-
gual Needs, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), June 7, 1998, at lB.
5. See David Rathbun, Telling 'Secrets', STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), July 5,
1998, at 14F (estimating that 13,000 Somalis live in Minnesota).
6. See Rohan Preston, Soldiers of Misfortune, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Mar.
12, 1999, at 1E.
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Sudan, Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Algeria. Jewish refugees from
the former Soviet Union and eastern block countries have resettled
in the Twin Cities and other areas of Minnesota.
Working with non-citizens who find themselves in the Minne-
sota criminal justice system can be challenging. Many non-citizens
have a different frame of reference with respect to judicial systems
and the world around them. Often non-citizens have come from
countries where the justice system exists or existed in the form of
a brutal police or military force. For example, the Communist re-
gimes in Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia systematically killed attor-
neys and judges after taking over the countries and interned thou-
sands of people in "re-education" camps. Until recently, the police
were in charge of registering births and deaths as well as issuing
certificates for marriage and divorce. Bribery was a way of life in
dealing with the police in order to get birth certificates issued or to
report crimes. As a result, criminal defense attorneys may be seen
as working for or with the police and against the interests of their
non-citizen clients.
Non-citizen youth face numerous challenges in the juvenile
justice system. Many non-citizen youth have not known stability
in their lives. They may have fled civil war or chaos with their
families or traveled alone from one country to another in search of
safety. Some may have grown up in refugee camps. Others may
have been forcibly recruited to fight with rebel forces in civil wars
from which they later deserted. Post-traumatic stress disorder is
common among non-citizen youth who have come to the United
States seeking refuge.
In addition, many non-citizens have been previously arrested
in their home countries, imprisoned and tortured for political rea-
sons. They may have been denied the right to a trial in front of a
judge and held incommunicado in detention for weeks, months or
even years. As a result, they may suffer from post-traumatic
stress disorder and depression.
Based on their experiences with other judicial systems and
prisons and often understandably misguided perceptions about the
judicial and correctional systems in the United States, many non-
citizens may tell their defense attorneys that they will take any
deal that will get them out of jail or prison as quickly as possible or
will keep them out of jail, without knowing what the immigration
consequences will be for a particular criminal plea. In addition,
gender roles and differences may influence what information a
non-citizen reveals to his or her attorney. For example, a man
from Afghanistan may not directly answer the questions from a
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female defense attorney based on his perceptions about the role of
women in Afghanistan, where women generally do not have the
same opportunities to receive an education as women in the
United States. An indigenous Guatemalan woman who was raped
in a Guatemalan police station in retaliation for her political ac-
tivities may not want to discuss her fear of continued detention in
a Minnesota county jail with a male defense attorney.
In working with non-citizens from these countries, defense
attorneys may need to explain to their clients exactly what their
roles are and how the criminal justice system works in the United
States. Non-citizens need to understand how the criminal justice
system works, i.e. their responsibility to go to court and what will
happen at each court appearance. Clients may not ask many ques-
tions based on their past experiences with other justice systems in
which they could not ask questions out of fear for their lives. They
may tell their attorneys "yes" to avoid possible confrontation or
conflict even when they want to say "no." In addition, different
words in English may not exist in their native languages. For ex-
ample, the word "attorney" does not exist in the Hmong language.
Other foreign judicial systems do not have jury trials. Thus, non-
citizens may agree to waive their rights without fully under-
standing the rights that they are waiving or how their immigra-
tion status may be affected.
Resources are available to assist attorneys and their non-
citizen clients who suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder. The
Center for Victims of Torture (CVT) works with persons who have
suffered political torture.7 The licensed CVT psychiatrists, psy-
chologists and social workers will work with non-citizens to help
them rebuild their lives. The staff can also provide evaluations,
which can be used in court proceedings. These evaluations can be
instrumental in plea bargaining, trial and sentencing issues. The
CVT can also provide the names and phone numbers of similar
treatment providers in other areas of the country.
Pacer Center, Inc., a non-profit parent training center in
Minneapolis, has a special project, the Juvenile Justice Project,
which works with juveniles with disabilities in the juvenile justice
system.8 Juveniles with disabilities include youth with conduct
disorders, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, attention
7. The CVT is located in Minneapolis on the east bank of the Mississippi
River, near the University of Minnesota-Twin Cities campus. To refer a client to
the CVT, call 612/626-1400.
8. Pacer Center, Inc. is located at 4826 Chicago Avenue South in Minneapolis.
To contact the Juvenile Justice Project, call 612/827-2966.
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deficit/hyperactivity disorder, oppositional defiant disorder,
learning and developmental disabilities and mental retardation.
Pacer Center, Inc. also works with the families of the youth in the
juvenile justice system. The staff can provide assistance to par-
ents and public defenders as well as coordinate with other agen-
cies. Staff are fluent in Hmong, Lao, Spanish and Portuguese.
The Juvenile Justice Project has published a helpful resource enti-
tled Unique Challenges, Hopeful Responses. A Handbook for Pro-
fessionals Working with Youth with Disabilities in the Juvenile
Justice System.
The Minnesota Disability Law Center works with youth with
disabilities in educational settings, their families and attorneys
representing disabled youth in juvenile court proceedings. 9 Under
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 10 and Minnesota
statute section 125A (1996), it may be possible for a public de-
fender to move for dismissal of a juvenile court petition where the
non-citizen youth's behavior in an educational setting is based on a
disability.
B. Is Your Client a United States Citizen?
Confusion among non-citizens and United States citizens
arises around the question of whether a person is a United States
citizen. In general, a United States citizen is a person who was
born in the United States, a person born to two United States citi-
zens living outside of the United States, or a person who has natu-
ralized. 11 Persons born in Puerto Rico on or after January 13, 1941
and subject to the jurisdiction of the United States are United
States citizens at birth.12 Persons born in outlying United States
possessions are United States nationals but not United States citi-
zens at birth.13
A non-citizen can apply to naturalize to become a United
States citizen if she is a United States national or if she meets the
requirements for naturalization. In general, a non-citizen must be
a legal permanent resident for five years (or three years if legal
permanent residency was obtained based on marriage to a United
9. The Minnesota Disability Law Center is located at 430 First Avenue North,
Suite 300 in Minneapolis. To contact the Special Education Unit, call 612/332-
1441.
10. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (1997).
11. See the Immigration and Nationality Act (I.N.A.) Title III, section 301, for
law regarding a person born outside of the United States who has one parent who
is a United States citizen.
12. See I.N.A. § 302.
13. See I.N.A. § 308.
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States citizen), have good moral character, speak English and pass
an examination on United States government and civics (waivers
are available for elderly and disabled individuals), be willing to
take an oath of allegiance, pass a criminal investigation and pay a
$225 application fee to the Immigration and Naturalization Serv-
ice (I.N.S.).14 Even though a non-citizen who has applied for natu-
ralization may think that he is a United States citizen, he is not a
United States citizen until sworn in as a United States citizen by a
federal district court judge.
The following persons are not United States citizens: legal
permanent residents, non-citizens with Temporary Protected
Status (TPS), asylees, refugees, parolees, asylum applicants, Am-
nesty/Family Unity applicants, non-citizens with Hi-B labor visas,
foreign students with F-/M-1I/J-1 visas or their dependents with
F-2/M-2/J-2 visas, visitors with B-1/B-2 visas, visitors who entered
under the Visa Waiver Pilot Program, non-citizens who entered
with border crossing identification cards and non-citizens who en-
tered the United States without inspection by a United States offi-
cial (entered illegally).
The first question that a public defender or defense attorney
asks her client should be, "Are you a United States citizen ' The
stakes for a non-citizen with a criminal conviction are very high on
account of the changes in the immigration law and possible depor-
tation with lifetime bars. Many Canadians and Africans speak
with an accent similar to that of native Minnesotans and may ap-
pear to be United States citizens. In addition, Canadians are one
of the five largest "illegar' populations in the United States ac-
cording to the I.N.S.15 It is not unusual for long-term legal perma-
nent residents, especially those who entered the United States in
their infancy or childhood and speak only English, to have not yet
naturalized and thus remain at risk of deportation.
To find out what immigration status a client has, the attor
14. See generally I.N.A. §§ 310-44.
15. See INS Releases Estimates of Undocumented Population, Announces New
Removal Tracking System, 74 INTERPRETER RELEASES 298, 299 (1997) (citing
Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, Canada and Haiti as the five countries from
which the largest "illegal" populations in the United States have come). Canadi-
ans may be illegally in the United States after having overstayed the time permit-
ted as a visitor or having entered the United States through the Boundary Waters
National Park. Anyone who enters the United States through the Boundary Wa-
ters must report to one of the United States Customs stations located throughout
northern Minnesota and obtain Form 1-68. See INS Issues Interim Rule on Cana-
dian Border Boat Landing Programn, 74 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1558 (1997).
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ney should ask the client to see her immigration documents and
passport. Common immigration documents that a client may have
include: a green card (1-551 or 1-151) or 1-551 stamp in a foreign
passport, temporary resident card (1-688), 1-94 Arrival/Departure
Record, an employment authorization document or work permit (I-
688B), Mexican border crossing identification card (1-586 or 1-186),
Mexican border visitors permit (1-444), Canadian border crossing
card (1-185) or parole authorization (1-512).
By first asking about citizenship status to every client in the
criminal justice system and then consulting with an immigration
attorney regarding possible immigration consequences for the non-
citizen client as a result of criminal proceedings, Minnesota Rules
of Criminal Procedure Rule 15 motions to withdraw guilty pleas,
motions to reduce sentences and motions for post-conviction relief
may be avoided.
II. Provisions of Immigration Law Involving Criminal
Issues
Immigration law relating to non-citizens with criminal be-
havior has changed dramatically in the last ten years with the
most far-reaching changes in the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),16 and the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRAIRA). 17
Congress changed the definition of a "conviction" for immigration
purposes. Certain felony convictions and certain misdemeanor
convictions can now permanently bar long-term permanent resi-
dents from remaining in the United States, even though the per-
manent residents may have never served any time in prison, are
married to United States citizens and have United States citizen
children. Much of the discretion that immigration judges previ-
ously had to grant relief from deportation for minor offenses has
been stripped by the expansion of the number of crimes now con-
sidered to be "aggravated felonies" for immigration purposes.
A. Definition of Conviction
In the IIRAIRA, Congress amended the definition of convic-
tion for immigration purposes. The amended immigration convic-
tion definition impacts non-citizens in Minnesota criminal pro-
ceedings. Under the immigration definition of conviction, a
Minnesota stay of adjudication will be a "conviction" for immigra-
16. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
17. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
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tion purposes where a non-citizen admits facts on the record and
receives any penalty, punishment or restraint on her liberty, in-
cluding a period of probation or a fine. Care must be taken to
analyze the requirements of pretrial diversion programs as the re-
quirements differ from county to county in Minnesota.
To prove that a non-citizen has a "conviction" for immigration
purposes, the Immigration and Naturalization Service may offer
the following documents or records or a certified copy of: an offi-
cial record of judgment and conviction; an official record of plea,
verdict and sentence; a docket entry from court records that indi-
cates the existence of the conviction; or official minutes of a court
proceeding or a transcript of a court hearing in which the court
takes notice of the existence of the conviction.18 Different strate-
gies and plea bargains may lead to or avoid deportation conse-
quences as discussed below.
1. Statute
I.N.A. § 101(a)(48) [8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)1
(A) The term "conviction" means, with respect to an
alien, a formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a
court or, if adjudication of guilt has been withheld, where-
(i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien
has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted
sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt, and
(ii) the judge has ordered some form of punishment,
penalty, or restraint on the alien's liberty to be imposed.
(3) Any reference to a term of imprisonment of a sen-
tence with respect to an offense is deemed to include the pe-
riod of incarceration or confinement ordered by a court of law
regardless of any suspension of the imposition or execution of
that imprisonment or sentence in whole or in part. [emphasis
added]
18. See I.N.A. § 240(c)(3)(B). Other proof of a criminal conviction that may be
offered by the I.N.S. includes:
[ain abstract of a record of conviction prepared by the court in which the
conviction was entered, or by a State official associated with the State's
repository of criminal justice records, that indicates the charge or section
of law violated, the disposition of the case, the existence and date of con-
viction, and the sentence[;] [a]ny document or record prepared by, or un-
der the direction of, the court in which the conviction was entered that in-
dicates the existence of a conviction[;] [or] [any document or record
attesting to the conviction that is maintained by an official of a State or
Federal penal institution, which is the basis for that institution's author-




In a proceeding where the adjudication of guilt has been
stayed and the defendant successfully completes probation, the
plea will often be vacated or dismissed and there will not be a con-
viction under state law. For a non-citizen defendant, however,
where the adjudication of guilt has been stayed and both prongs (i)
and (ii) of the definition of conviction have been met, a non-citizen
will have a conviction for immigration purposes even though there
is not a conviction under state law. 19 In a recent decision, the
Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) interpreted the statutory
definition of "conviction" to mean that no effect is to be given in
immigration proceedings to a state action which purports to ex-
punge, dismiss, cancel, vacate, discharge, or otherwise remove a
guilty plea or other record of guilt or conviction by operation of a
state rehabilitative statute.20 A couple of dispositions that have
not been deemed "convictions" include: (1) a state conviction re-
versed on direct appeal on the merits and (2) a state conviction re-
versed on direct appeal relating to a violation of a fundamental
statutory or constitutional right in the underlying criminal pro-
ceedings (not as the result of the operation of a state rehabilitative
statute).21
Prong (ii) has been broadly defined. The Board defined the
terms "punishment, penalty, or restraint on liberty" to "include in-
carceration, probation, a fine or restitution, a rehabilitation pro-
gram, a work-release or study-release program, revocation or sus-
pension of a driver's license, deprivation of nonessential activities
or privileges, or community service."22
In In re S-S-,23 the Board interpreted I.N.A. section
101(a)(48)(B), by clarifying that a criminal sentence includes any
part of the sentence suspended by the court. The Board applied
the new definition and held that a suspended sentence for an inde-
terminate term not to exceed five years under an Iowa statute was
19. See In re Roldan, Int. Dec. 3377 (B.I.A. 1999); In re Punu, Int. Dec. 3364
(B.I.A. 1998).
20. In re Roldan, Int. Dec. 3377 (overruling In re Luviano, Int. Dec. 3267
(B.I.A. 1996); In re Ibarra-Obando, 12 I. & N. Dec. 576 (A.G. 1967); In re G-, 9 I. &
N. Dec. 159 (A.G. 1961)).
21. See In re Roldan, Int. Dec. 3377 at 15, 16 n.9 (declining to decide the effect
to be given a federal disposition under 18 U.S.C. § 3607 until that issue is directly
presented to the B.I.A.).
22. In re Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. 546, 551 (B.I.A. 1988); see also Molina v.
I.N.S., 981 F.2d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 1992) (sustaining I.N.S. interpretation of
"conviction" to include probation ordered by a judge in a deferred adjudication).
23. Int. Dec. 3317 (B.I.A. 1997).
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a five year sentence. 24 The sentencing scheme in this case was an
indeterminate sentencing scheme.2
5
The immigration consequences can differ under a determi-
nate sentencing scheme because the sentence is for a specific num-
ber of days. For example, in a determinate sentencing scheme, a
non-citizen sentenced to 364 days for theft will be considered to be
sentenced to 364 days even though the maximum allowed by the
statute may be three years.
26
Minnesota has a determinate sentencing scheme. Under a
determinate sentencing scheme, a stayed sentence may be accom-
plished by either a stay of imposition or a stay of execution. 27 Un-
der Minnesota Statute section 609.135(a)(2), 28 the state district
court may stay the imposition of a sentence and place a defendant
on probation. Under a stay of imposition of sentence in a felony
case, the state district court reserves the right to later impose or
pronounce a prison sentence where a defendant violates the terms
of probation, including a sentence to the statutory maximum.
29 If
the defendant successfully completes probation, then the case is
discharged and the defendant has a record of a misdemeanor
rather than a felony for civil purposes.30 If a stay of execution of a
sentence is granted, the sentence is pronounced but the execution
of the sentence is delayed.31 If the defendant successfully com-
pletes probation, then the case is discharged but the defendant has
24. See id. at 5.
25. See id.
26. In an indeterminate sentencing scheme, the state court imposes a sentence
by ordering that the defendant be committed to the Department of Corrections or a
similar agency for an indeterminate period, i.e. zero to five years. See Sentencing
Reform, in SENTENCING REFORM IN OVERCROWDED TIMES 3, 6 (Michael Tonry &
Kathleen Hatlestad, eds., 1997). The Department of Corrections then determines
the length of the sentence that the defendant will serve. In a determinate sen-
tencing scheme, the state court will follow the sentencing guidelines mandated by
the legislature and established by the sentencing commission. See id. at 7-8. The
sentencing commission predetermines a sentence based on criminal history and
severity level of the offense. The state court has the discretion to depart duration-
ally and/or dispositionally from the guidelines based on aggravating or mitigating
factors but will impose a determinate sentence, i.e. two years. See Debra Dailey,
Minnesota's Sentencing Guidelines-Past and Future in Sentencing Reform, in
SENTENCING REFORM IN OVERCROWDED TIMES 35, 37 (Michael Tonry & Kathleen
Hatlestad, eds., 1997).
27. See Minn. Sentencing Guidelines, Appendix, Definition of Terms (1994)
[hereinafter MN Definitions].
28. MINN. STAT. § 609.135(a)(2) (1997 Supp.).





a record of a felony conviction.3 2 When a defendant violates the
terms of probation, the state district court has three options under
Minnesota statute section 609.14, subdivision 3 (1994). The court
can continue the stay of imposition of sentence, impose the sen-
tence under the sentencing guidelines and stay its execution, or
impose and execute the sentence under the sentencing guide-
lines.
3 3
Prior to the 1996 legislation, the Supreme Court held that a
conviction must be final under state or federal court procedure in
order to be a conviction for immigration purposes. 34 Generally, a
conviction is not final until all direct appeals are exhausted; a con-
viction is final where a discretionary appeal has been taken. In
light of the change in the definition of conviction under IIRAIRA,
the issue of whether a judgment on direct appeal can be considered
to be a final conviction for immigration purposes has not been ad-
dressed by the Board.35
In conclusion, pre-trial diversion programs in Minnesota re-
quiring an admission of facts on the record will no longer prevent a
finding that a non-citizen has a conviction for immigration pur-
poses where the non-citizen has admitted sufficient facts to war-
rant a finding of guilty and a judge has imposed a period of proba-
tion, a fine, or any other form of penalty, punishment or restraint
on the liberty of the non-citizen. 36
3. Application to Cases
Case of Epherein from Sudan:
Epherem became a legal permanent resident on December 3,
1994. On June 1, 1997, he was arrested by the Minneapolis police
department for allegedly shoplifting a $300 ruby ring from a local
department store. Since this was his first arrest, the judge
granted a stay of adjudication after Epherem admitted on the rec-
ord that he had taken the ring. The judge placed him on super-
vised probation for two years.
Analysis: Under the new definition of conviction, Epherem
has a conviction for immigration purposes. He admitted guilt on
the record. Second, he was placed on probation, which has been
found to be a form of restraint on liberty. Since his shoplifting
32. See id.
33. See MINN. STAT. § 609.14, subd. 3 (1994).
34. See Pino v. Landon, 349 U.S. 901 (1955) (per curiam).
35. See In re Roldan, Int. Dec. 3377 at 15 (B.I.A. 1999).
36. See Minnesota Pleas and Sentencing Disposition and the Immigration
Definition of Conviction Chart at Appendix B.
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conviction is a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude
within his first five years after becoming a legal permanent resi-
dent and a sentence of one year or longer could have been imposed,
he is deportable under the Immigration and Nationality Act
(I.N.A.) section 237(a)(2)(A)(i). He is eligible to apply for asylum
and withholding of deportation if he believes that he will be perse-
cuted upon his return to Sudan.
Epherem, however, cannot defend his green card, or legal
permanent resident status, because he has only resided in the
United States as a legal permanent resident for three years. A
person who has resided in the United States for seven years, in-
cluding at least five years as a legal permanent resident and two
years in another legal status, such as refugee status, is eligible to
defend his or her green card by requesting cancellation of removal
from the immigration judge, provided that no convictions are
deemed to be aggravated felonies. 37
4. Defense Practice Tip
Both prongs of I.N.A. section 101(a)(48)(A) must be met in
order to find that a non-citizen has a conviction for immigration
purposes. The first prong addresses admissions of guilt or suffi-
cient facts by the non-citizen to warrant a finding of guilt. Many
counties in Minnesota require an admission of facts by the alleged
violator in order to qualify for pretrial diversion. The courts and
prosecutors must be educated as to why a non-citizen should qual-
ify for pretrial diversion without admitting facts that could lead to
a finding of guilt on the record. Arguments can be made that these
counties should follow their neighboring counties and not require
an admission of facts on the record for pretrial diversion. In addi-
tion, the Alford plea will be treated as a guilty plea or admission of
sufficient facts to fit the immigration definition of conviction be-
cause the Alford plea in essence means that the non-citizen could
be found guilty of the alleged crime.
The second prong addresses deprivation of a non-citizen's lib-
erty. Probation is a deprivation of liberty sufficient to meet the
second prong. The issue then becomes how to avoid any restraint
or deprivation of liberty. Creativity and education of the courts by
defense attorneys is the key. Some strategies to consider: con-
tinuance for dismissal with no admissions and no restraints; de-
fendant is responsible to the court (not a probation officer); and
restitution/community service through alternative sentencing pro-
37. See Aggravated Felony, infra p. 611.
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cedures (outside of court). Finally, some clients are more likely
than others to violate the terms of their probation. In such cases,
the state court should be requested to impose a definite sentence
with a stay of execution designed to avoid an aggravated felony or
another conviction that falls under the grounds of inadmissibility
or deportability.
B. Grounds for Deportation of Non-Citizens
Non-citizens who are physically present in the United States
will become deportable or subject to removal once they act in a
manner that places them within one of the grounds of deportation.
Many of the grounds of deportation apply after a non-citizen has
been "admitted." "Admission" in this context means that a non-
citizen has made a lawful entry into the United States after being
inspected by an immigration officer at an airport or a land border.
Non-citizens are also admitted by the I.N.S. official or immigration
judge who adjudicates and approves the non-citizen's adjustment
application for legal permanent residency. For example, in order
to find a non-citizen deportable for having committed a crime in-
volving moral turpitude with a possible maximum sentence of one
year or longer, the non-citizen must have committed the crime
within five years after being admitted to the United States. Other
grounds of deportation do not require that a non-citizen be
"admitted" before deportation consequences may attach, such as
the ground of deportation involving a conviction for falsification of
documents.
By passing the IIRAIRA in 1996, Congress added new
grounds of deportation. Two grounds that greatly affect families
are the grounds for any conviction for domestic violence or any
violation of a protection order. A fifth degree or misdemeanor do-
mestic assault conviction entered since September 30, 1996 makes
a non-citizen deportable. Non-citizens who are convicted of mis-
demeanor domestic assault and who have less than seven years of
lawful presence in the United States, including five years during
which they have had legal permanent residence, have no relief
from deportation unless they have a strong fear of persecution or
torture in their home country or can readjust their status as an
immediate relative of a United States citizen.38 Another ground
involves false claims to United States citizenship made on or after
September 30, 1996, including the use of false birth certificates in
38. See Asylum infra p. 664; Withholding of Removal infra p. 673, Convention
Against Torture, infra p. 696; Adjustment of Status infra pp. 655, 659.
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order to obtain employment or marking the box labeled "United
States citizen" on the 1-9 employment eligibility form.
1. Statute
Deportable aliens
I.N.-AL § 237 [8 U.S.C. § 1227]
(a) Classes of deportable aliens
Any alien (including an alien crewman) in and admitted
to the United States shall, upon the order of the Attorney
General, be removed if the alien is within one or more of the
following classes of deportable aliens:
(1) Inadmissible at time of entry or of adjustment of
status or violates status
(A) Inadmissible aliens
Any alien who at the time of entry or adjustment
of status was within one or more of the classes of ali-
ens inadmissible by the law existing at such time is
deportable.
(B) Present in violation of law
Any alien who is present in the United States in
violation of this Act or any other law of the United
States is deportable.
(C) Violated nonimmigrant status or condition of
entry
(i) Nonimmigrant status violators
Any alien who was admitted as a nonimmi-
grant and who has failed to maintain the nonim-
migrant status in which the alien was admitted or
to which it was changed under section 248, or to
comply with the conditions of any such status, is
deportable.
(ii) Violators of conditions of entry
Any alien whom the Secretary of Health and
Human Services certifies has failed to comply with
terms, conditions, and controls that were imposed
under section 212(g) is deportable.
(D) Termination of conditional permanent resi-
dence
(i) In general
Any alien with permanent resident status on a
conditional basis under section 216 (relating to
conditional permanent resident status for certain
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alien spouses and sons and daughters) or under
section 216A (relating to conditional permanent
resident status for certain alien entrepreneurs,
spouses, and children) who has had such status
terminated under such respective section is de-
portable.
(ii) Exception
Clause (i) shall not apply in the cases de-




Any alien who (prior to the date of entry, at
the time of any entry, or within five years of the
date of any entry) knowingly has encouraged, in-
duced, assisted, abetted, or aided any other alien
to enter or to try to enter the United States in vio-
lation of law is deportable.
(ii) Special rule in the case of family reunifica-
tion
Clause (i) shall not apply in the case of alien
who is an eligible immigrant (as defined in section
301(b)(1) of the Immigration Act of 1990), was
physically present in the United States on May 5,
1988, and is seeking admission as an immediate
relative or under section 203(a)(2)(including under
section 112 of the Immigration Act of 1990) or
benefits under section 301(a) of the Immigration
Act of 1990 if the alien, before May 5, 1988, has
encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided
only the alien's spouse, parent, son, or daughter
(and no other individual) to enter the United
States in violation of law.
(iii) Waiver authorized
The Attorney General may, in his discretion
for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity,
or when it is otherwise in the public interest,
waive application of clause (i) in the case of any
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if
the alien has encouraged, induced, assisted, abet-
ted, or aided only an individual who at the time of
the offense was the alien's spouse, parent, son, or
daughter (and no other individual) to enter the
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United States in violation of law.
(F) [Stricken]
(G) Marriage fraud
An alien shall be considered to be deportable as
having procured a visa or other documentation by
fraud (within the meaning of section 212(a)(6)(C)(i))
and to be in the United States in violation of this Act
(within the meaning of subparagraph (B)) if-
(i) the alien obtains any admission into the
United States with an immigrant visa or other
documentation procured on the basis of a marriage
entered into less than two years prior to such ad-
mission of the alien and which, within two years
subsequent to any admission of the alien in the
United States, shall be judicially annulled or ter-
minated, unless the alien establishes to the satis-
faction of the Attorney General that such marriage
was not contracted for the purpose of evading any
provisions of the immigration laws, or
(ii) it appears to the satisfaction of the Attor-
ney General that the alien has failed or refused to
fulfill the alien's marital agreement which in the
opinion of the Attorney General was made for the
purpose of procuring the alien's admission as an
immigrant.
(H) Waiver authorized for certain misrepresenta-
tions
The provisions of this paragraph relating to the
removal of aliens within the United States on the
ground that they were inadmissible at the time of
admission as aliens described in section
212(a)(6)(C)(i), whether willful or innocent, may, in
the discretion of the Attorney General, be waived for
any alien (other than an alien described in paragraph
(4)(D)) who-
(i) is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a
citizen of the United States or of an alien lawfully
admitted to the United States for permanent resi-
dence; and
(ii) was in possession of an immigrant visa or
equivalent document and was otherwise admissi-
ble to the United States at the time of such admis-
sion except for those grounds of inadmissibility
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specified under paragraphs (5)(A) and (7)(A) of sec-
tion 212(a) which were a direct result of that fraud
or misrepresentation.
A waiver of deportation for fraud or misrepresentation
granted under this subparagraph shall also operate to
waive deportation based on the grounds of inadmissi-




(i) Crimes of moral turpitude
Any alien who-
(1) is convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude committed within five years (or 10
years in the case of an alien provided lawful
permanent resident status under section
245(j) of this title) after the date of admission,
and
(II) is convicted of a crime for which a sen-
tence of one year or longer may be imposed,
is deportable. [emphasis added] [includes gross
misdemeanors]
(ii) Multiple criminal convictions
Any alien who at any time after admission is
convicted of two or more crimes involving moral
turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of
criminal misconduct, regardless of whether con-
fined therefor and regardless of whether the con-
victions were in a single trial, is deportable.
[emphasis added] [includes misdemeanors/gross
misdemeanors]
(iii) Aggravated felony
Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated
felony at any time after admission is deportable.
[emphasis added]
(iv) High speed flight
Any alien who is convicted of a violation of
section 758 of title 18, United States Code (relating
to high speed flight from an immigration check-
point), is deportable.
(v) Waiver authorized
Clauses (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) shall not apply in
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the case of an alien with respect to a criminal con-
viction if the alien subsequent to the criminal con-
viction has been granted a full and unconditional
pardon by the President of the United States or by
the Governor of any of the several States.
(B) Controlled substances
(i) Conviction
Any alien who at any time after admission has
been convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy or
attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a
State, the United States, or a foreign country re-
lating to a controlled substance (as defined in sec-
tion 102 of the Controlled Substances Act 921
U.S.C. § 802)), other than a single offense involv-
ing possession for one's own use of thirty grams or
less of marijuana, is deportable. [emphasis added]
(ii) Drug abusers and addicts
Any alien who is, or at any time after admis-
sion has been, a drug abuser or addict is deport-
able.
(C) Certain firearm offenses
Any alien who at any time after admission is con-
victed under any law of purchasing, selling, offering
for sale, exchanging, using, owning, possessing, or car-
rying, or of attempting or conspiring to purchase, sell,
offer for sale, exchange, use, own, possess, or carry, any
weapon, part, or accessory which is a firearm or de-
structive device (as defined in section 921(a) of title
18, United States Code) in violation of any law is de-
portable.
(D) Miscellaneous crimes
Any alien who at any time has been convicted (the
judgement on such conviction becoming final) of, or
has been so convicted of a conspiracy or attempt to
violate-
(i) any offense under chapter 37 (relating to
espionage), chapter 105 (relating to sabotage), or
chapter 115 (relating to treason and sedition) of ti-
tle 18, United States Code, for which a term of im-
prisonment of five or more years may be imposed;
(ii) any offense under section 871 or 960 of ti-
tle 18, United States Code;
(iii) a violation of any provision of the Military
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Selective Service Act (50 U.S.C. App.451 et seq.) or
the Trading With the Enemy Act (50 U.S.C. App. 1
et seq.); or
(iv) a violation of section 215 or 278 of this Act,
is deportable.
(E) Crimes of domestic violence, stalking, or viola-
tion of protection order, crimes against children and
[sic]
(i) Domestic violence, stalking, and child abuse
Any alien who at any time after entry is con-
victed of a crime of domestic violence, a crime of
stalking, or a crime of child abuse, child neglect, or
child abandonment is deportable. For purposes of
this clause, the term "crime of domestic violence"
means any crime of violence (as defined in section
16 of title 18, United States Code) against a person
committed by a current or former spouse of the
person, by an individual with whom the person
shares a child in common, by an individual simi-
larly situated to a spouse of the person under the
domestic or family violence laws of the jurisdiction
where the offense occurs, or by any other individ-
ual against a person who is protected from that in-
dividual's acts under the domestic or family vio-
lence laws of the United States or any State,
Indian tribal government, or unit of local govern-
ment. [This subsection is effective for convictions
on or after September 30, 1996.]
(ii) Violators of protection orders
Any alien who at any time after entry is en-
joined under a protection order issued by a court
and whom the court determines has engaged in
conduct that violates the portion of a protection
order that involves protection against credible
threats of violence, repeated harassment, or bodily
injury to the person or persons for whom the pro-
tection order was issued is deportable. For pur-
poses of this clause, the term 'protection order'
means any injunction issued for the purpose of
preventing violent or threatening acts of domestic
violence, including temporary or final orders is-
sued by civil or criminal courts (other than support
or child custody orders or provisions) whether ob-
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tained by filing an independent action or as a pen-
dente lite order in another proceeding. [This sub-
section is effective for violations on or after Sep-
tember 30, 1996.]
(3) Failure to register and falsification of documents
(A) Change of address
An alien who has failed to comply with the provi-
sions of section 265 is deportable, unless the alien es-
tablishes to the satisfaction of the Attorney General
that such failure was reasonably excusable or was not
willful.
(B) Failure to register or falsification of documents
Any alien who at any time has been convicted-
(i) under section 266(c) of this Act or under
section 36(c) of the Alien Registration Act, 1940,
(ii) of a violation of, or an attempt or a con-
spiracy to violate, any provision of the Foreign
Agents Registration Act of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 611 et
seq.), or
(iii) of a violation of, or an attempt or a con-
spiracy to violate, section 1546 of title 18, United
States Code (relating to fraud and misuse of visas,




An alien who is the subject of a final order for
violation of section 274C is deportable.
(ii) Waiver authorized
The Attorney General may waive clause (i) in
the case of an alien lawfully admitted for perma-
nent residence if no previous civil money penalty
was imposed against the alien under section 274C
and the offense was incurred solely to assist, aid,
or support the alien's spouse or child (and no other
individual). No court shall have jurisdiction to re-
view a decision of the Attorney General to grant or
deny a waiver under this clause.
(D) Falsely claiming citizenship
Any alien who falsely represents, or has falsely
represented, himself to be a citizen of the United
States for any purpose or benefit under this Act
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(including section 274A) or any Federal or State law is
deportable. [This subsection is effective for claims
made on or after September 30, 1996.]
(4) Security and related grounds
(A) In general
Any alien who has engaged, is engaged, or at any
time after admission engages in-
(i) any activity to violate any law of the United
States relating to espionage or sabotage or to vio-
late or evade any law prohibiting the export from
the United States of goods, technology, or sensitive
information,
(ii) any other criminal activity which endan-
gers public safety or national security, or
(iii) any activity a purpose of which is the op-
position to, or the control or overthrow of, the Gov-




Any alien who has engaged, is engaged, or at any
time after admission engages in any terrorist activity
(as defined in section 212(a)(3)(B)(iii)) is deportable.
(C) Foreign policy
(i) In general
An alien whose presence or activities in the
United States the Secretary of State has reason-
able ground to believe would have potentially seri-
ous adverse foreign policy consequences for the
United States is deportable.
(ii) Exceptions
The exceptions described in clauses (ii) and
(iii) of section 212(a)(3)(C) shall apply to deport-
ability under clause (i) in the same manner as they
apply to inadmissibility under section
212(a)(3)(C)(i).
(D) Assisted in Nazi persecution or engaged in
genocide
Any alien described in clause (i) or (ii) of section
212(a)(3)(E) is deportable.
(5) Public charge
Any alien who, within five years after the date of en-
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try, has become a public charge from causes not affirma-
tively shown to have arisen since entry is deportable.
(6) Unlawful voters
Any alien who has voted in violation of any Federal,
state, or local constitutional provision, statute, ordinance,
or regulation is deportable.
(b) Deportation of certain nonimmigrants
An alien, admitted as a nonimmigrant under the provi-
sions of either section 101(a)(15)(A)(i) or 101 (a)(15)(G)(i),
and who fails to maintain a status under either of those pro-
visions, shall not be required to depart from the United
States without the approval of the Secretary of State, unless
such alien is subject to deportation under paragraph (4) of
subsection (a).
(c) Waiver of grounds for deportation
Paragraphs I(A), 1(B), 1(C), 1(D), and 3(A) of subsection
(a) (other than so much of paragraph (1) as relates to a
ground of inadmissibility described in paragraph (2) or (3) of
section 212(a) shall not apply to a special immigrant de-
scribed in section 101(a)(27)(J) based upon circumstances




a. Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude
A crime involving moral turpitude has been defined as "[an
act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social du-
ties which a man owes to his fellow men, or to society in general,
contrary to the accepted customary rule of right and duty between
man and man.. . ."39 The Eighth Circuit uses the above definition
for crimes involving moral turpitude. 40 Moral turpitude has also
been defined as involving conduct "which is so far contrary to the
moral law, as interpreted by the general moral sense of the com-
munity, that the offender is brought to public disgrace, is no longer
generally respected, or is deprived of social recognition by good
39. Ng Sui Wing v. United States, 46 F.2d 755 (7th Cir. 1931) (quoting In re
Henry, 99 P. 1054, 1055 (Idaho 1909)).
40. See Marciano v. I.N.S., 450 F.2d 1022, 1025 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 997 (1972).
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living persons."41 The United States Supreme Court held that
crimes in which fraud is an ingredient have always been regarded
as involving moral turpitude. 42 Foreign convictions can also con-
stitute crimes involving moral turpitude for purposes of deport-
ability, exclusion or inadmissibility. 43
When making the determination of whether a particular
crime involves moral turpitude, the Board has found it relevant
that an act is not illegal in all states.44 To determine whether a
crime involves moral turpitude, the court looks at the nature of the
offense and determines whether the violation of that statute, with-
out reference to the alien's particular crime, inherently involves
moral turpitude.45 If the court finds that the law punishes acts
that do not inherently involve moral turpitude, then the court
must rule that no conviction under the statute involves moral tur-
pitude even though the particular conduct of the alien was im-
moral.46 If the statute defines a crime in which turpitude neces-
sarily inheres, then the conviction is for a crime involving moral
turpitude for immigration purposes.47 Where a statute includes
some offenses involving moral turpitude and others that do not,
then the court will look to the record of conviction, including the
indictment, plea, verdict and sentence to determine whether the
offense for which the alien was convicted was a crime involving
moral turpitude.48 In addition, where an underlying or substan-
tive crime involves moral turpitude, then a conviction for aiding in
the commission of the crime or for otherwise acting as an accessory
41. In re D-, 1 I. & N. Dec. 190, 194 (B.I.A. 1942).
42. See Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 227 (1951). The Supreme Court
discussed the history of the term "moral turpitude," stating that it first appeared
in the Immigration Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 1084, which directed the exclu-
sion of "'persons who have been convicted of a felony or other infamous crime or
misdemeanor involving moral turpitude.'" Id. at 229 n. 14 (quoting Act of Mar. 3,
1891, 26 Stat. 1084). The court also cited to crimes involving fraud, including ob-
taining goods under fraudulent pretenses, conspiracy to defraud by deceit and
falsehood, using the mails to defraud, concealing assets in bankruptcy, obtaining
money and property by false and fraudulent pretenses, and willful evasion of fed-
eral income taxes. See id. at 228 & n. 13.
43. See, e.g., In re Bader, 17 I. & N. Dec. 525 (B.I.A. 1980) (holding that a con-
viction to defraud the public of money or valuable security under Canadian Crimi-
nal Code section 338(a), which required proof of intent to defraud as a necessary
element of the offense, is a crime involving moral turpitude).
44. See In re R-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 444, 452-53 (B.I.A. 1954).
45. See id. at 448.
46. See id.
47. See In re Short, 20 I. & N. Dec. 136, 137 (B.I.A. 1989).
48. See id. at 137-38 (citing In re Esfandiary, 16 I. & N. Dec. 659 (B.I.A. 1979));
In re Ghunaim, 15 I. & N. Dec. 269 (B.I.A 1975); In re Lopez, 13 I. & N. Dec. 725
(B.I.A. 1971); In re S-, 2 I. & N. Dec. 353 (A.G. 1945).
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before the fact is also a conviction for a crime involving moral tur-
pitude.49
The Board has held that when criminally reckless conduct
requires a conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable
risk to the life or safety of others, then the crime involves moral
turpitude even though no harm was intended.50 Similarly, a con-
viction for distribution of cocaine under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) is a
conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude where knowledge
or intent is an element of the offense. 5 1
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted that crimes
have been divided according to their nature into crimes mala in se
and mala prohibita.52 The court also noted that "[g]enerally, but
not always, crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while
crimes mala prohibita do not."53 The Board has also recognized
that the classification of a crime as a felony is not determinative of
whether it constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude.54
The Eighth Circuit has specifically ruled that the following
crimes involve moral turpitude:
* First degree sexual assault of a minor. See Mendez-
Morales v. I.N.S., 119 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 1997) (also held
to be an aggravated felony).
*Aiding and abetting simple robbery. See Xiong v.
I.N.S., No. 95-3758, 1996 U.S. App. Lexis 23427 (8th Cir.
Sept. 9, 1996).
* Involuntary manslaughter. See Franklin v. I.N.S., 72
F.3d 571 (8th Cir. 1995).
* Third degree criminal sexual conduct. See Maashio v.
I.N.S., 45 F.3d 1235 (8th Cir. 1995).
* Obtaining a Pell Grant by fraud. See Izedonmwen v.
I.N.S., 37 F.3d 416 (8th Cir. 1994).
* Two counts of sexual assault on two children under
age fourteen. See Hajiani-Niroumand v. I.N.S., 26 F.3d
832 (8th Cir. 1994) (deportable based on marijuana con-
viction but not sexual assault because offenses occurred
later than five years after entry; Note-today the sexual
49. See In re Short, 20 I. & N. Dec. 136 (following In re F-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 783
(B.I.A. 1955)).
50. See In re Wojtkow, 18 I. & N. Dec. 111, 112-13 (B.I.A. 1981) (second degree
manslaughter in New York); In re Medina, 15 I. & N. Dec. 611, 613-14 (B.I.A.
1976), affid sub non.; see also Medina-Luna v. I.N.S., 547 F.2d 1171 (7th Cir. 1977)
(aggravated assault in Illinois).
51. See In re Khourn, Int. Dec. 3330 (B.I.A. 1997).
52. See Kempe v. United States, 151 F.2d 680, 688 (8th Cir. 1945).
53. Id. (citing 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law section 8).
54. See In re Short, 20 I. & N. Dec. 136, 139 (citing Tillinghast v. Edmead, 31
F.2d 81 (1st Cir. 1929)).
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assault convictions would be found to be aggravated
felonies).
* Lascivious acts with a child. See Varela-Blanco v.
I.N.S., 18 F.3d 584 (8th Cir. 1994).
* Falsely and willfully representing oneself as a United
States citizen, conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 911 (1988).
See White v. I.N.S., 6 F.3d 1312 (8th Cir. 1993)(dismissed for lack of jurisdiction due to untimely filing
of petition for certiorari; the Board and immigrationjudge both found that respondent's conviction was a
crime involving moral turpitude).
* Possession of stolen mail. See Okoroha v. I.N.S., 715
F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1983) (also held that a suspended sen-
tence is a sentence of confinement for immigration pur-
poses regarding crimes involving moral turpitude).
* Statutory rape under Minnesota Statute § 609.295(4).
See Marciano v. I.N.S., 450 F.2d 1022 (8th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 997 (1972).
* Willfully and knowingly attempting to evade a large
part of income tax due. See Maroon v. I.N.S., 364 F.2d
982 (8th Cir. 1966).
Where the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has not ruled that
a crime involves moral turpitude, the decisions of the Board con-
trol. The Board has held in two cases specifically dealing with
Minnesota statutes that first degree manslaughter and carrying a
concealed and deadly weapon with the intent to use it against an-
other person are crimes involving moral turpitude.55
Simple assault is not a crime involving moral turpitude. 56
However, the Board held that the willful infliction of corporal in-
jury on a spouse, cohabitant or parent of the offender's child in
violation of California Penal Code section 273.5(a) is a crime in-
volving moral turpitude.57
55. See In re S-, 8 I. & N. Dec. 344 (B.I.A. 1959); In re S-, 1 I. & N. Dec. 689
(B.I.A. 1943); see also Appendix D (charting Minnesota statutes and crimes that
involve moral turpitude).
56. See Ciambelli ex rel. Maranci v. Johnson, 12 F.2d 465 (D. Mass. 1926); In re
Fualaau, Int. Dec. 3385 (B.I.A. 1996); In re Perez-Contreras, 20 I. & N. Dec. 615
(B.I.A. 1992) (withdrawing from In re Baker, 15 I. &. N. Dec. 50 (B.I.A. 1974), to
the extent it holds that third degree assault resulting in great bodily harm is a
crime involving moral turpitude without regard to the existence of intentional or
reckless conduct); In re Short, 20 I. & N. Dec. 136 (citing United States ex rel. Zaf-
farano v. Corsi, 63 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1933)); In re Danesh, 19 I. & N. Dec. 669
(B.I.A. 1988); In re Logan, 17 I. & N. Dec. 367 (B.I.A. 1980).
57. See In re Tran, Int. Dec. 3271 (B.I.A. 1996).
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b. Crimes Involving Firearms
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a convic-
tion for aggravated robbery under Minnesota Statute section
609.245 (1991) constitutes a firearms offense for immigration pur-
poses.58 The court held that a weapon must be an essential ele-
ment within the definition of the offense in question and that the
weapon must be a firearm or destructive device.59 Under Minne-
sota statute, aggravated robbery has as an element that the person
is armed with a dangerous weapon or other article that a victim
believes to be a dangerous weapon. Minnesota Statute section
609.02(6) (1991) defines "dangerous weapon" to include any fire-
arm. The court upheld the Board, which had examined the convic-
tion record, including the charge, indictment, plea, verdict and
sentence, to determine that the respondent had used a dangerous
weapon, a revolver. 60
The same analysis regarding firearms applies to second de-
gree assault under Minnesota Statute section 609.222. Where a
dangerous weapon is involved, the immigration court will look to
the formal record of conviction to see if a firearm was used to
commit the crime. If the record of conviction states that a firearm
was used, then the non-citizen will be found to be deportable for a
firearms offense. 6 1
The Board held that the 1994 amendment to I.N.A. section
241(a)(2)(C), which added attempt and conspiracy to the deporta-
tion grounds relating to firearms offenses, applies retroactively to
convictions entered before, on or after October 25, 1994.62
c. Crimes Involving Controlled Substances
A single conviction for simple possession of a controlled sub-
stance, while a deportable offense, is not an aggravated felony.63
The Board's recent holding that state rehabilitative statutes do not
eliminate convictions for immigration purposes applies to first of-
58. See Vue v. I.N.S., 92 F.3d 696 (8th Cir. 1996).
59. See id. at 698.
60. See id.
61. See id.; I.N.A. § 240(c)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(B) (proof of record of
conviction).
62. See In re St. John, Int. Dec. 3295 (B.I.A. 1996); see also it re P-F-, 20 1. &
N. Dec. 661 (B.I.A. 1993) (holding that convictions for first degree armed burglary
and robbery with a firearm under Florida statute constitute a firearms offense un-
der I.N.A. § 241(a)(2)(c) where the use of a firearm was an essential element of the
crimes).
63. See In re Davis, 20 1. & N. Dec. 536 (B.I.A. 1992).
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fenders in controlled substance cases. 64 This interpretation applies
retroactively regardless of the date of conviction.
Regarding foreign convictions, the Board held that the ex-
pungement of a foreign drug-related conviction pursuant to a for-
eign rehabilitative statute does not eliminate the conviction for
immigration purposes even where the convicted non-citizen would
have been eligible for federal first offender treatment if prosecuted
in the United States. 65 The Board limited the exculpating provi-
sions of the I.N.A. relating to pardons to domestic convictions. 66
3. Application to Cases
a. Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude
Case of Roman froin Ukraine:
Roman entered the United States in April 1992 as a refugee.
In February 1994, he adjusted his status and became a legal per-
manent resident. In June 1995, he pled guilty to shoplifting three
packs of cigarettes and received six months of probation. In De-
cember 1996, he was arrested for shoplifting a camera and several
lenses. He pled guilty to a misdemeanor and was placed on one
year of probation. In January 1998, he was placed in removal pro-
ceedings by the I.N.S. for having been convicted of two crimes in-
volving moral turpitude after admission to the United States. He
is eligible for asylum and withholding of deportation, but not for
cancellation of removal because he had been in the United States
for less than seven years when he stole the camera.
Case of Bin from China:
As the son of a Chinese party official, Bin received permission
from the Chinese government to study in the United States. In
August 1991 at age twenty, he entered the United States as an M-
1 student to complete a master's degree in electrical engineering.
In January 1993, he was hired by a computer corporation which
filed a labor certification application on his behalf. In June 1993,
the application was granted and Bin received his green card. In
July 1997, Bin was arrested for fourth degree criminal sexual con-
duct with his seventeen year old girlfriend whose mother wanted
64. See In re Roldan, Int. Dec. 3377 (BIA 1999) (overruling In re Manrique, Int.
Dec. 3250 (B.I.A. 1995)).
65. See In re Dillingham, Int. Dec. 3325 (B.I.A. 1997).
66. See id.; see also Definition of Aggravated Felony, infra pp. 611-20
(discussing case law regarding controlled substances).
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to end their relationship. He pled guilty and was sentenced to five
years probation.
Analysis: Bin is deportable for having been convicted of a
crime involving moral turpitude within the first five years after
admission where the possible sentence was one year. Criminal
sexual conduct is considered to be a crime involving moral turpi-
tude. In addition, he has been convicted of an aggravated felony,
sexual abuse of a minor. 67 Bin has NO defense to deportation as
he does not have a claim of persecution by the Chinese govern-
ment.68
b. Defense Practice Tip
Where a non-citizen has had a green card for less than five
years and has been in the United States legally for less than seven
years, work with the judge and prosecutor to plead the non-citizen
under a provision that is neither a crime involving moral turpitude
nor an aggravated felony. For example, fifth degree assault is not
a crime involving moral turpitude. If that is not possible, try to
plead the non-citizen to a misdemeanor crime involving moral tur-
pitude, not a gross misdemeanor or felony crime involving moral
turpitude. If the non-citizen is convicted for a single misdemeanor
for which a maximum term of imprisonment is ninety days, then
she will not be deportable because the crime involving moral turpi-
tude must have a maximum term of imprisonment of 365 days and
be committed within five years of admission.
However, if the non-citizen has a prior conviction for a crime
involving moral turpitude (even a misdemeanor) and is convicted
for a second misdemeanor crime involving moral turpitude, then
she will be deportable even though both convictions occurred more
than five years after the non-citizen legally entered the country or
received her green card. Due to the second conviction for a crime
involving moral turpitude, the non-citizen will be subject to man-
datory detention without bond. 69 Again, aggravated felony charges
need to be avoided.
c. Controlled Substance Violations
Case of Joseph from England:
Joseph entered the United States as a legal permanent in
June 1987 at age seventeen with his mother who was married to a
67. See Definition of Aggravated Felony infra p. 612.
68. See Withholding of Removal infra p. 674.
69. See Mandatory Detention infra p. 695.
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United States citizen. In December 1995, he was convicted for
possession of sixteen grams of heroin. After leaving a bar late one
night in January 1999, a local police officer stopped him, gave him
a breathalyzer test, arrested him and took him to the county jail
for seventy-two hours. He was charged with driving while intoxi-
cated. While in the county jail, the jailer asked him if he was a
United States citizen because he had a British accent. He told the
jailer that he had a green card. The jailer called the I.N.S. who
put an administrative hold on Joseph. Joseph was served with a
Notice to Appear in immigration court and was informed that he
could not be released from I.N.S. custody under the mandatory de-
tention rules. He pled guilty to a DWI and was sentenced to thirty
days in the county jail.
Analysis: Joseph is deportable for having been convicted of a
controlled substance violation. He has not been convicted of an
aggravated felony because he only has a fifth degree possession
conviction. He is eligible to apply for cancellation of removal be-
cause he has been a legal permanent resident for more than five
years, has resided in the United States lawfully for seven years
continuously and has not been convicted of an aggravated felony.
Case of Maria from Mexico:
Maria entered the United States without inspection in 1981
to work as an in-home day care provider. She later became a legal
permanent resident in 1990, through the 1986 Amnesty Program.
In January 1995, she was stopped by the local sheriff for allegedly
failing to come to a complete stop at a stop sign. Seeing that she
was having difficulty finding her driver's license, the sheriff asked
to look in her purse. Being afraid, she gave the officer her purse
where he found a small baggie of marijuana. He arrested her and
impounded her car. She was charged with possession of a small
amount of marijuana. The I.N.S. placed a hold on Maria. She pled
guilty to the charge and her public defender asked the judge to
note for the record that the amount of marijuana was only twenty-
two grams. Upon receiving a copy of the conviction record, the
I.N.S. released its hold on Maria.
Analysis: Maria is not deportable for her marijuana convic-
tion because she qualifies for the marijuana exception under I.N.A.
section 237(a)(2)(B)(i). If she is convicted for another controlled
substance violation, then she will be deportable and will be consid-
ered to have been convicted of an aggravated felony.70
70. See infra pp. 612-21(defining aggravated felony and discussing case law of
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d. Defense Practice Tip: Protect the Record
Where your non-citizen client is being charged with posses-
sion of a small amount of marijuana of less than thirty grams un-
der Minnesota Statute section 152.027 subdivision 4 and it is the
client's first controlled substance violation, ask the judge to state
on the record the exact amount of marijuana. Such a statement in
the record will protect your non-citizen client from deportation
consequences, because simple possession of an amount of mari-
juana under thirty grams is an exception to the ground of deport-
ability for controlled substances. 71
e. Domestic Violence and Violations of Protection Orders:
Section 237(a)(2)(E)
Case of Mohamed from Sudan:
Mohamed became a legal permanent resident in January
1990. He married Rebka, a legal permanent resident, in 1994 and
they began having difficulties in May 1997. On June 14, 1997,
they got into a shouting match about money. Mohamed pushed
Rebka and she fell to the floor. He kicked her a couple of times
and left the apartment. The neighbors who lived underneath them
called the police to report domestic violence. As Mohamed was
leaving the apartment, the police arrested him and took him to jail
for domestic assault. In criminal court, a no-contact order was is-
sued to protect Rebka from threats by Mohamed and he pled guilty
to fifth degree domestic assault. The judge stayed a ninety day
term of imprisonment. Three days later, Mohamed saw Rebka in
the grocery store where he walked toward her and insulted her.
Then, he quickly left the store. Based on the incident in the gro-
cery store, however, Rebka filed an application for an Order for
Protection (OFP) with the civil county court. The civil court judge
granted the OFP and also found that Mohamed had violated the
no-contact order issued by the criminal court. The district attor-
ney called the I.N.S. to report Mohamed. The I.N.S. served Mo-
hamed with a Notice to Appear on August 1, 1997.
Analysis: Mohamed is deportable on two grounds. First, he
is deportable because he was convicted for a crime of domestic
violence after September 30, 1996 and the I.N.S. began removal
proceedings against Mohamed after April 1, 1997. Second, he is
deportable because the judge found that Mohamed had violated
the no-contact order September 30, 1996 and was placed in re-
crimes involving controlled substances).
71. See I.N.A. § 237(a)(2)(B).
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moval proceedings. As Mohammed has not been convicted of an
aggravated felony and has been a permanent resident for seven
years, he is eligible to apply for cancellation of removal, a form of
discretionary relief from deportation.
Case of Marcos from Guatemala:
Marcos entered the United States without inspection in 1992,
looking for work to help support his elderly parents in Guatemala.
In October 1994, he married Esmeralda, a United States citizen,
who filed an application for Marcos to obtain legal permanent
resident status under I.N.A. section 245(i). Marcos received his
green card in February 1995. They had two United States citizen
children born in December 1995 and October 1996. On August 28,
1997, he and Esmeralda got into a fight because Marcos had been
selling small amounts of marijuana for extra cash for the family.
Marcos punched Esmeralda in the face, severely bruising her
cheek and eye. She called the police who came to the house and
arrested Marcos for third degree domestic assault. In court, Mar-
cos pled guilty to domestic violence on September 20, 1997 and
was given a 120 day suspended sentence. He served ten days in
the workhouse and went into a drug treatment program, which he
successfully completed.
Analysis: Marcos is deportable based on the conviction for a
crime of domestic violence for which he was convicted after Sep-
tember 30, 1996. He has no relief available from removal under
cancellation of removal because he has only been a permanent
resident for two and a half years. To be eligible for cancellation of
removal, a non-citizen must have been in the United States in a
lawful status for seven years, of which the person was a legal per-
manent resident for at least five of the seven years.72 If he fears
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, political opin-
ion, or membership in a particular social group or torture if he
were to return to Guatemala, then Marcos may be eligible for
asylum, withholding of removal or deferred removal.73 Based on
the facts in this particular case, however, Marcos is deportable
without any remedy or defense to removal (deportation) unless
Esmeralda agrees to file another marriage petition on his behalf
and a criminal waiver is granted to allow him to adjust his
72. See Cancellation of Removal for Legal Permanent Residents with Convic-
tions, infra p. 656.
73. See Asylum infra p. 665; Withholding of Removal infra p. 674; and Conven-




f Defense Practice Tip
To avoid placing a non-citizen at risk of removal proceedings
for domestic issues, negotiate for a lesser charge that does not in-
volve a crime that falls under the categories of aggravated felonies
or crimes involving moral turpitude. Because the deportation
ground for domestic violence is new as of April 1, 1997, it is too
early to tell whether an admission of facts on the record relating to
domestic violence, as defined by the Minnesota statute, will be suf-
ficient for the I.N.S. to charge the non-citizen as being deportable
for a crime of domestic violence where the conviction is for disor-
derly conduct or fifth degree assault, not domestic violence. There-
fore, where possible, the original complaint should be dismissed, a
new complaint alleging facts constituting disorderly conduct or
fifth degree assault without mentioning the relationship should be
issued and the client should plead to the barest facts of the case in
order to avoid admitting facts that could constitute domestic vio-
lence. The relationship between your client and the alleged victim
should not be admitted on the record. For example, a client could
admit that he was speaking loudly with a woman and that they
had a verbal disagreement, but not that he pushed his wife to try
to get her to agree with him.
You may need to educate the prosecutor and the court to
show the ramifications of the changes in the immigration law for
convictions of crimes of domestic violence and the effect on any
United States citizen or legal permanent resident spouse or chil-
dren involved. Domestic violence is a serious issue, but one spouse
may not want to have the other spouse deported over what may be
seen by both parties as a "misunderstanding." In addition, depor-
tation may not be the best solution for the children where the de-
ported parent is the sole wage earner for the family, especially
with the five year limits on welfare receipt. Finally, child support
is not easily collected from a parent in another country, particu-
larly where wages are much lower than in the United States, such
as the case of a Mexican worker who earns forty cents per hour in
a clothing assembly plant.
C. Definition of Aggravated Felony
The term "aggravated felony" is an immigration law term.
When the term "aggravated felony" was statutorily defined by
74. See Adjustment of Status infra p. 656, 660; § 212(h) waivers infra p. 680.
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Congress in 1988 in the Anti-Abuse Drug Act,75 it included only
three crimes: murder, controlled substance or drug trafficking and
weapons trafficking. In 1990, Congress amended the definition to
include crimes of violence for which the term of imprisonment was
at least five years.76 In 1994, Congress again amended the defini-
tion of aggravated felony, adding twenty new offenses to include
money laundering, child pornography, prostitution and theft,
where the term of imprisonment was five years or more.77 In the
AEDPA and IIRAIRA, Congress expanded the definition of aggra-
vated felony to include more than fifty offenses and reduced the
imposed term of imprisonment for many crimes from five years to
one year.
It is critical to note that an immigration judge has no discre-
tion to grant any form of relief from deportation or removal once
she finds that the non-citizen has been convicted of an aggravated
felony. The impact of this provision has been great, particularly in
light of the retroactive application of the definition of aggravated
felony to convictions that are ten, twenty or even thirty or more
years old, for which a non-citizen may have never served any
prison time, successfully completed probation and has been a pro-
ductive and contributing member in her community. In addition,
many of these convictions carried no immigration consequences
when the non-citizens committed the acts or were convicted for the
acts. For example, a non-citizen sentenced to a term of imprison-
ment of 365 days with a stay of execution and placed on probation
for one gross misdemeanor theft offense prior to September 30,
1996 was not previously deportable but is now convicted of an ag-
gravated felony for purposes of immigration law. Similarly, non-
citizens convicted of criminal sexual conduct (including statutory
rape) and placed on probation will be found to have been convicted
of aggravated felonies for immigration purposes.
1. Statute
I.N.-A. § 101(a)(43) [8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)]
The term "aggravated felony" means-
(A) murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor;
(B) illicit trafficking in a controlled substance (as defined
in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act), including a
75. Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7342, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988).
76. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 501(b),
104 Stat. 4978 (1990).
77. See Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub.
L. No. 103-416, § 222(b), 108 Stat. 4305 (1994).
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drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) of title 18,
United States Code);
(C) illicit trafficking in firearms or destructive devices (as
defined in section 921 of title 18, United States Code) or in
explosive materials (as defined in section 841(c) of that title);
(3) an offense described in section 1956 of title 18,
United States Code (relating to laundering of monetary in-
struments) or section 1957 of that title (relating to engaging
in monetary transactions in property derived from specific
unlawful activity) if the amount of the funds exceeded
$10,000;
(E) an offense described in-
(i) section 842(h) or (i) of title 18, United States Code,
or section 844(d), (e), (f), (g), (h), or (i) of that title
(relating to explosive materials offenses);
(ii) sections 922(g)(1), (2), (3), (4) or (5), (j), (n), (o), (p),
or (r) or 924(b) or (h) of title 18, United States code
(relating to firearms offenses); or
(iii) section 5861 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986
(relating to firearms offenses);
(F) a crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of title 18,
United States Code, but not including a purely political of-
fense) for which the term of imprisonment at least one year;78
(G) a theft offense (including receipt of stolen property) or
burglary offense for which the term of imprisonment at least
one year;
(H) an offense described in section 875, 876, 877, or 1202
of title 18, United States Code (relating to the demand for or
receipt of ransom);
(I) an offense described in section 2251, 2251A, or 2252 of
title 18, United States Code (relating to child pornography);
(J) an offense described in section 1962 of title 18, United
States Code (relating to racketeer influenced corrupt organi-
zations), or an offense described in section 1084 (if it is a sec-
ond or subsequent offense) or 1955 of that title (relating to
gambling offenses) for which a sentence of one year impris-
78. A crime of violence is defined as:
(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threat-
ened use of physical force against the person or property of another; or
(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a
substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of an-
other may be used in the course of committing the offense.
18 U.S.C. § 16 (1992).
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onment or more may be imposed;
(K) an offense that-
(i) relates to the owning, controlling, managing, or su-
pervising of a prostitution business;
(ii) is described in section 2421, 2422, or 2433 of title
18, United States Code (relating to transportation for the
purpose of prostitution) if committed for commercial ad-
vantage; or
(iii)is described in section 1581, 1582, 1583, 1584,
1585, or 1588 of title 18, United States Code (relating to
peonage, slavery, and involuntary servitude);
(L) an offense described in-
(i) section 793 (relating to gathering or transmitting
national defense information), 798 (relating to disclosure
of classified information), 2153 (relating to sabotage) or
2381 or 2382 (relating to treason) of title 18, United
States Code;
(ii) section 601 of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. § 421) (relating to protecting the identity of
undercover intelligence agents); or
(iii) section 601 of the National Security Act of 1947
(relating to protecting the identity of undercover agents);
(M) an offense that-
(i) involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the vic-
tim or victims exceeds $10,000; or
(ii) is described in section 7201 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1986 (relating to tax evasion) in which the
revenue loss to the Government exceeds $10,000;
(N) an offense described in paragraph (1)(A) or (2) of sec-
tion 274(a) (relating to alien smuggling), except in the case of
a first offense for which the alien has affirmatively shown
that the alien committed the offense for the purpose of as-
sisting, abetting, or aiding only the alien's spouse, child, or
parent (and no other individual) to violate a provision of this
Act;
(0) an offense described in section 275(a) or 276 commit-
ted by an alien who was previously deported on the basis of a
conviction for an offense described in another subparagraph
of this paragraph;
(P) an offense (i) which either is falsely making, forging,
counterfeiting, mutilating, or altering a passport or instru-
ment in violation of section 1543 of title 18, United States
Code, or is described in section 1546(a) of such title (relating
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to document fraud) and (ii) for which the term of imprison-
ment [is at least] 12 months, except in the case of a first of-
fense for which the alien has affirmatively shown that the
alien committed the offense for the purpose of assisting, abet-
ting, or aiding only the alien's spouse, child, or parent (and no
other individual) to violate a provision of this Act;
(Q) an offense relating to a failure to appear by a defen-
dant for service of sentence if the underlying offense is pun-
ishable by imprisonment for a term of 5 years or more;
(R) an offense relating to commercial bribery, counter-
feiting, forgery, or trafficking in vehicles the identification
numbers of which have been altered for which the term of
imprisonment is at least one year;
(S) an offense relating to obstruction of justice, perjury or
subornation of perjury, or bribery of a witness, for which the
term of imprisonment is at least one year;
(T) an offense relating to a failure to appear before a
court pursuant to a court order to answer to or dispose of a
charge of a felony for which a sentence of 2 years' imprison-
ment or more may be imposed; and
(U) an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense de-
scribed in this paragraph.
The term [aggravated felony] applies to an offense described
in this paragraph whether in violation of Federal or State law
and applies to such an offense in violation of the law of a for-
eign country for which the term of imprisonment was com-
pleted within the previous 15 years. Notwithstanding any
other provision of law (including any effective date), the term
applies regardless of whether the conviction was entered be-
fore, on, or after the date of enactment of this paragraph.
2. Case Law
Analyzing the length of sentences is critical to avoid convic-
tions for aggravated felonies and to determine the consequences
for convictions defined as aggravated felonies. 79 Concurrent sen-
79. Non-citizens deported on grounds other than having been convicted of an
aggravated felony who later illegally reenter the United States face a maximum
penalty of two years of incarceration. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). In contrast, non-
citizens who illegally reenter the United States after being deported for an aggra-
vated felony face an enhanced term of imprisonment of up to twenty years in
prison. See Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 130001(b)(2), 108 Stat. 1796, 2023 (1994). In
determining sentencing enhancement for illegal reentry into the United States
after deportation for an aggravated felony in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a), (b)(2),
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld sentencing enhancements. See
[Vol. 17:567
DEFENDING NON-CITIZENS
tences are evaluated as the length of the longest sentence whereas
consecutive sentences are added together.8 0 Where the sentences
for aggravated felony convictions are five years (sixty months) or
more, the non-citizen will be statutorily ineligible for withholding
of deportation or removal.81
a. Retroactivity of I.N.A. Section 101(a)(43)
A non-citizen who has been convicted of an aggravated felony
is subject to deportation or removal, without regard to the date of
conviction, if she is placed in proceedings on or after March 1, 1991
and the crime qualifies as an aggravated felony.8 2 In In re
Lettinan, the Board held that a non-citizen convicted in 1987 for
third degree murder in Florida and placed in proceedings in 1996
was deportable because she was convicted of an aggravated fel-
ony.8 3
Similarly, a panel of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in-
dicated that the amended definition of aggravated felony applies
retroactively. In a footnote, the court stated that Congress clearly
intended to apply the amended definition of aggravated felony ret-
roactively by using the words "convictions entered before, on, or
United States v. Cazares-Gonzalez, 152 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 1998) (federal conviction
for aggravated rape); United States v. Diaz-Diaz, 135 F.3d 572 (8th Cir. 1998)
(Minnesota conviction for fifth degree sale of a controlled substance); United States
v. Garcia-Chavez, 1997 WL 468268 (8th Cir. Aug. 18, 1997) (Nebraska conviction
for possession of more than one pound of marijuana); United States v. Baca-
Valenzuela, 118 F.3d 1223 (8th Cir. 1997) (conviction in United States district
court in Arizona for aiding and abetting the possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute); United States v. Briones-Mata, 116 F.3d 308 (8th Cir. 1997) (Florida
conviction for purchasing marijuana); United States v. Haggerty, 85 F.3d 403 (8th
Cir. 1996) (second California conviction for methamphetamine); United States v.
Martinez-Amaya, 67 F.3d 678 (8th Cir. 1995) (conviction for delivery of cocaine);
United States v. Torres-Sanchez, 68 F.3d 227 (8th Cir. 1995) (convictions for at-
tempted possession of cocaine and distribution of a controlled substance);
Camacho-Bordes v. I.N.S., 33 F.3d 26 (8th Cir. 1994) (conviction for distribution of
cocaine); United States v. Gomez, 38 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 1994) (conviction for de-
livering a controlled substance); United States v. Bauer, 990 F.2d 373 (8th Cir.
1993) (convictions for distribution of LSD and statutory rape); United States v.
Maul-Valverde, 10 F.3d 544 (8th Cir. 1993) (conviction for burglary); United States
v. Rodriguez, 979 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1992) (conviction for lascivious acts with a
child as a crime of violence); see also Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S.
224 (1998) (holding that a provision of the I.N.A. pertaining to reentry of deported
aliens after conviction of an aggravated felony is a sentencing enhancement, not a
separate criminal offense).
80. See In re Fernandez, 14 I. & N. Dec. 24 (B.I.A. 1972).
81. See In re S-S-, Int. Dec. 3374 (B.I.A. 1999) (removal proceedings); In re Q-T-
M-T-, Int. Dec. 3300 (B.I.A. 1996) (deportation proceedings); see also Withholding
of Removal infra p. 674.




after" the enactment of IIRAIRA on September 30, 1996.84 In
Mendez-Morales v. I.N.S., the court determined that a 1992 convic-
tion for first degree sexual assault of a thirteen year old consti-
tuted an aggravated felony and that the non-citizen was, therefore,
deportable.8 5 The court also held that it did not have jurisdiction
to review the denial of his section 212(h) waiver application and
adjustment of status application by the Board.86
The Eighth Circuit in Mendez-Morales did not directly decide
the issue of retroactivity, but indicated how the issue may be ulti-
mately decided. Negotiating with the prosecutor and the judge in
current cases is critical. The Minnesota Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure have been amended, effective January 1, 1999, to require an
advisal in the plea agreement that if the defendant is not a citizen
of the United States, a plea of guilty to the crime charged may re-
sult in deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States
or denial of naturalization as a United States citizen.87 For convic-
tions entered prior to the passage of IIRAIRA (September 30,
1996), limited possibilities for post-conviction relief may be the
only means by which to avoid an aggravated felony conviction.8 8
b. Crimes Involving Controlled Substances
In In re L-G-, the Board held that a first conviction for simple
possession of any drug in state court is not an aggravated felony,
even if the law of the state categorizes the offense as a felony, be-
cause whether an offense is a felony or not for purposes of the ag-
gravated felony drug provision depends on the federal classifica-
tion.89  The Board stated that a first conviction for simple
possession is only a misdemeanor under federal law and, therefore,
does not meet the definition of an aggravated felony drug offense,
even if the offense is classified as a felony under state law.9 0 In re
L-G-, is binding on the immigration court for cases involving a first
conviction for simple possession of a controlled substance because
84. See Mendez-Morales v. I.N.S., 119 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 1997) (dismissing for
lack of jurisdiction on account of other provisions of IIRAIRA eliminating judicial
review for § 212(h) waivers).
85. See id. at 738.
86. See id.
87. See MINN. R. CRIM. PROC. 15.01, 15.02.
88. See Post-Conviction Relief infra p. 700.
89. In re L-G-, Int. Dec. 3254 (B.I.A. 1995).
90. See id. A second conviction of simple possession of a controlled substance




the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has not overruled the Board.91
The Board held that a conviction for accessory after the fact is
not sufficiently related to a controlled substance violation to sup-
port a finding of deportability under I.N.A. section 241(a)(2)(B)(i). 92
The Board also held that a conviction for accessory after the fact is
an aggravated felony under I.N.A. section 101(a)(43)(S),
"obstruction of justice," where the term of imprisonment is at least
one year.93
c. Crimes of Violence
In United States v. Rodriguez,94 the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that a court must look at the nature of the crime to
determine whether it is a crime of violence. 95 The court stated,
91. Cf. United States v. Briones-Mata, 116 F.3d 308, 309 (8th Cir. 1997)
(defining felony possession offenses for purposes of enhanced sentencing for an il-
legal reentry after deportation for an aggravated felony). For purposes of sen-
tencing enhancement under the sentencing guidelines for an illegal reentry after
deportation for an aggravated felony, the Eighth Circuit held that a state drug of-
fense can be an aggravated felony "if the offense is classified as a felony under the
law of the relevant state, even if the same offense would be punishable only as a
misdemeanor under federal law." Id. (citing United States v. Restrepo-Aguilar, 74
F.3d 361, 365 (lst Cir. 1996)); see also United States v. Haggerty, 85 F.3d 403 (8th
Cir. 1996) (enhanced sentencing for an illegal reentry after deportation for an ag-
gravated felony). The court specifically dismissed the defendant's contention that
the term "aggravated felony" includes only drug crimes with a distribution ele-
ment. See Briones-Mata, 116 F.3d 308.
The reasoning of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals draws on the interplay
between the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the federal Controlled Substances Act
and the federal criminal code. Ruling in the context of the federal sentencing
guidelines' definition of aggravated felony, the court found that the definition of
'aggravated felony" applies to offenses described in either 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) or 21
U.S.C. § 802. A drug trafficking crime is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) as in-
cluding "any felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. §
801 et seq.)." Under federal law, an offense is a felony if the maximum terms of
imprisonment authorized for the offense is more than one year. See 18 U.S.C. §
3559(a). Possession of a controlled substance is punishable as a felony under the
Controlled Substances Act if the defendant has a prior federal or state drug convic-
tion because the defendant may be sentenced up to two years. See 21 U.S.C. §
844(a). Under the Controlled Substances Act, "any Federal or State offense classi-
fied by applicable Federal or State Law as a felony" is a felony. 21 U.S.C. §
802(a)(13).
92. See In re Batista-Hernandez, Int. Dec. 3321 (B.I.A. 1997).
93. See id.
94. 979 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1992).
95. A crime of violence is defined as:
(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threat-
ened use of physical force against the person or property of another; or
(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a
substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of an-
other may be used in the course of committing the offense.
18 U.S.C. § 16 (1992).
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"All crimes which by their nature involve a substantial risk of
physical force share the risk of harm. It matters not one whit
whether the risk ultimately causes actual harm. Our scrutiny
ends upon a finding that the risk of violence is present."96
In In re L-S-J-, the Board held that a non-citizen convicted of
robbery with a deadly weapon for which he was sentenced to two
and a half years had been convicted of a crime of violence and an
aggravated felony.97 Looking at the issue of crimes of violence in
In re B-, the Board held that statutory rape by its nature involves
a substantial risk of the use of physical force against a child and,
therefore, constitutes a crime of violence and an aggravated fel-
ony. 98
d. DWI As a Crime of Violence and Aggravated Felony
The Board upheld an immigration judge's decision finding
that a non-citizen had been convicted of an aggravated felony on
account of his conviction for "aggravated driving while under the
influence" under Arizona Revised Statute sections 28-192(A)(1)
and 28-697(A)(1), (D), (E), (G)(1), (H) and (I).99 In this case, the
non-citizen was found guilty of a felony, driving while under the
influence while his driver's license was suspended, revoked or in
violation of a restriction under Arizona Revised Statutes sections
28-192(A)(1) and 28-697(A)(1), (D), (E), (G)(1), (H) and (I).100 The
Board held that the nature of the crime committed under the Ari-
zona statute involves a type of crime that involves a substantial
risk of harm to persons and property and, therefore, falls within
the second part of the definition of a crime of violence, "a felony...
by its nature . . . involves a substantial risk that physical force
against the person or property of another may be used in the
course of committing the offense."'101 In deciding that the non-
citizen had been convicted of a crime of violence and therefore an
aggravated felony on account of the two and a half year sentence
imposed, the Board stated,
[Wie point to the incontrovertible evidence that drunk driving
is an inherently reckless act, which exacts a high societal toll
in the forms of death, injury, and property damage ...
[A]pplying the 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) test to the conduct required
96. United States v. Bauer, 990 F.2d 373 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing United States
v. Rodriguez, 979 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1992)).
97. Int. Dec. 3322 (B.I.A. 1997).
98. Int. Dec. 3270 (B.I.A. 1996).
99. See In re Magallanes, Int. Dec. 3341 (B.I.A. 1998).
100. See id. at 2.
101. Id. at 4 (citing 18 U.S.C. §16(b)).
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for a conviction under section 28-692(a)(1) or section 28-
697(a)(1) of the Arizona Revised Statutes, we find that the re-
spondent was convicted of a "crime of violence" within the
meaning of the [Immigration and Nationality] Act. 102
Based on In re Magallanes,10 3 a defense attorney should work
with the prosecutor and the judge to sentence a non-citizen to 364
days or less to avoid a finding by the immigration judge that her
client has been convicted of a crime of violence and an aggravated
felony, which will bar all immigration relief except withholding of
removal. 0 4 In Operation Last Call in Texas, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service arrested more than 500 long-term perma-
nent residents who had been convicted of felony level DWI offenses
and placed them in removal proceedings.105
e. An Offense Involving Fraud Where the Loss Exceeds
$10,000
The Board recently held that a conviction for submitting a
false claim with the intent to defraud arising from an unsuccessful
scheme to obtain $15,000 from an insurance company is a convic-
tion for an "attempt" to commit a fraud in which the loss to the vic-
tim exceeded $10,000 and, therefore, an aggravated felony.106
3. Application to Cases
Case of Francisco from Mexico:
Francisco came to the United States in 1971 from Mexico as a
legal permanent resident because his mother had married a
United States citizen. In 1974, Francisco was nineteen years old
when he was charged with and pled guilty to having sex with his
fifteen year old girlfriend, a minor crime for which he could not be
deported in 1974. The judge imposed on him a suspended sen-
tence of sixty days. Francisco successfully completed one year of
102. Id. at 6.
103. Id.
104. The Minnesota Supreme Court declared the enhanced gross misdemeanor
statutes, Minnesota Statute sections 169.121 subdivision 3(d) and 169.129 subdivi-
sion 2(b), as well as the related amendment in 1997 of the felony definition in
Minnesota Statutes section 609.02, subd. 2, unconstitutional. See Baker v. State,
590 N.W.2d 636 (Minn. 1999) (holding that the authorization of local imprison-
ment for a period exceeding one year without a 12 person jury violates article I,
section 6 of the Minnesota Constitution).
105. See William Branigin, INS Reviews DWI Deportations; Texas Offices' Pro-
gram Angers Immigrants' Rights Groups, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 1998, at A21;
Texas Drunken Drivers Arrested for Deportation; 537 Legal Immigrants with 3
Convictions Are Rounded Up by INS, BALT. SUN, Sept. 4, 1998, at A4.
106. See In re Oynido, Int. Dec. 3379 (B.I.A. 1999).
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probation. Since 1974, Francisco has not been arrested for any
other violations of the law.
In 1989, Francisco married a United States citizen, Martha,
and together they opened a small grocery store in their neighbor-
hood. They now have three young United States citizen children,
ages two, three and six. Life was going well for Francisco, Martha
and their family. On July 2, 1997, Francisco was stopped by the
local police for failing to signal a left-hand turn at an intersection
while driving a friend's car to the gas station. The police officer
gave Francisco a ticket and told him to go to traffic court on July 7,
1997.
Francisco went to traffic court and pled guilty to failing to
signal for a turn, a misdemeanor. At court, the city attorney dis-
covered that Francisco was convicted in 1974 and called the I.N.S.
The I.N.S. placed a hold on Francisco who was very surprised to be
taken to jail because he was not arrested by the police officer who
gave him the traffic ticket. The I.N.S. served Francisco with a No-
tice to Appear before the immigration court for a hearing on
whether Francisco should be removed (deported) from the United
States for his 1974 conviction.
Analysis: Francisco's conviction is now an aggravated felony
because it is a crime involving sexual abuse of a minor and Con-
gress, through IIRAIRA, stated that the new definition of aggra-
vated felony should be applied retroactively. Unless the retroac-
tivity provision of IIRAIRA is overturned by the federal courts,
Francisco will be considered to have been convicted of an aggra-
vated felony and will be barred from any form of relief, including
cancellation of removal. Thus, a twenty-five year old minor convic-
tion for which he was not deportable in 1974 now has the effect of
a bar to any immigration relief for at least twenty years after
Francisco is removed from the United States. Post-conviction re-
lief or a pardon may provide some form of relief from deportation
or removal for Francisco.
4. Defense Practice Tip
Many non-citizen youth face criminal sexual conduct charges
for their sexual relations with girlfriends or boyfriends. Two pos-
sible plea bargains under the Minnesota statute may prevent re-
moval or deportation. In both instances, the original complaint
should be dismissed and a new complaint issued with facts not
constituting sexual relations. The first possible plea bargain is to
negotiate a plea agreement for disorderly conduct, keeping admis-
sions regarding the relationship of the non-citizen and the boy-
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friend or girlfriend out of the court record.
The second is to negotiate a plea agreement under Minnesota
Statute section 609.26, subdivision 6, Depriving Another of Custo-
dial or Parental Rights. A conviction under this provision may still
lead to immigration consequences because it will be a conviction
for a crime involving moral turpitude. If the non-citizen is con-
victed of a crime involving moral turpitude within her first five
years after admission, then she is deportable and may only be eli-
gible for asylum and withholding of removal. If it is the non-
citizen's second conviction involving moral turpitude at any time
after admission, then the non-citizen will be deportable. In either
case, the sentence must be 364 days or less to avoid an aggravated
felony conviction.
If the prosecutor is not willing to allow the non-citizen to
plead to a different statutory provision, then the case should be
taken to trial because even a fifth degree conviction for criminal
sexual conduct may be deemed to be an aggravated felony.
Case of Ezekiel from Jordan:
Ezekiel entered the United States as legal permanent resi-
dent in 1985 based on his marriage to a United States citizen. In
1986, he pled guilty to driving under the influence and his license
was suspended for three months. In January 1995, he pled guilty
to a second charge of driving under the influence and received
thirty days in the workhouse. In July 1995, he pled guilty to a
third charge of driving under the influence. He received forty-five
days in the workhouse and his license was suspended for one year.
On January 1, 1998, he was stopped by the police on his way to
work at 8:00 a.m. A breathalyzer test showed that his blood alco-
hol was 0.21. He was charged with a felony for driving while in-
toxicated. He pled guilty and was sentenced to thirteen months in
prison.
Analysis: Although traffic violations generally will not have
the effect of making a legal permanent resident deportable,
Ezekiel may be deportable for having been convicted of an aggra-
vated felony under IIRAIRA. An immigration judge will probably
find that he has been convicted of a crime of violence and an ag-
gravated felony.10 7 A successful motion to reduce the sentence to
364 days will have the effect of making him not deportable.




5. Defense Practice Tip
To avoid a conviction for an aggravated felony, first analyze
whether a charged crime falls within the definition of aggravated
felony as a sentence or a category crime. Category crimes are ag-
gravated felonies regardless of the length of the term of imprison-
ment imposed. Category crimes include murder, rape, sexual
abuse of a minor, drug trafficking, weapons trafficking and an of-
fense involving fraud or deceit where the loss to the victim or vic-
tims exceeds $10,000. If the non-citizen has been charged with a
category aggravated felony crime, work with the prosecution to re-
charge the non-citizen under another provision of Minnesota stat-
utes.
Sentence crimes are aggravated felonies that require an im-
posed sentence of at least one year. Sentence crimes include theft,
burglary, crimes of violence, forgery, an offense relating to the ob-
struction of justice and perjury. Work with the prosecution and
judge to arrange a sentence for a term of imprisonment of 364 days
or less to avoid a conviction for an aggravated felony. In addition,
where a long-term legal permanent resident is charged with third
degree assault with an offer from the prosecution for a two year
sentence, a plea to two counts of third degree assault with each
having a 364 day sentence will avoid convictions for aggravated
felonies; such a plea will make a non-citizen deportable for two
crimes involving moral turpitude but she may be eligible for can-
cellation of removal. 0 8
In addition, many aggravated felonies are also crimes in-
volving moral turpitude, including murder, rape, theft and bur-
glary. Non-citizens are deportable and/or inadmissible for convic-
tions of crimes involving moral turpitude unless such conviction
meets the petty offense definition under I.N.A. section
212(a)(2)(A)(ii).10 9 Depending on the non-citizen's immigration
status and length of time in the United States, immigration relief
may be available. Work with the prosecution to have the crime
charged under a provision of law that does not involve moral turpi-
tude.
108. See Cancellation of Removal for Certain Permanent Residents infra p. 656.
109. See Grounds of Inadmissibility infra p. 627.
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Sentencing Factors and Immigrants
The following factors are areas for arguments for a more leni-
ent sentence for non-citizens:
Factors
1. Nature of Conviction
2. Degree of Aggravation of
Offense
3. Mitigating Factors regard-
ing Defendant's Behavior
4. Prior Conviction Record of
Defendant







Similar to act of self-defense?
Post-traumatic stress disorder?
Post-traumatic stress disorder?
Other mental or emotional is-
sues?
Post-traumatic stress disorder?
Lack of understanding of U.S.
laws? Lived in situation of an-
archy? Lived in country with-
out functioning judicial system?
Lack of understanding regard-




prior to coming to U.S.? Tor-
tured by governmental or other
agent? Imprisoned in another
country? Length of time and
conditions? Possibility or prob-
ability of political persecution,
other problems or torture in
home country if deported?
Recently cut-off of welfare
and/or food stamps? Possible ef-
fect on current employment?
Sole provider for family?
Married to U.S. citizen or immi-
grant? Ages of children, if any?
Extended family in U.S.? Psy-




6. Treatment Needs and De-
sires of Defendant
7. Economic Situation of De-
fendant
8. Defendant's Attitude To-
ward Criminal Behavior
9. Victim's Attitude toward
Defendant
10. Type of Judge with Sen-
tencing Authority
11. Dividing Lines regarding
Immigration Consequences
zen/LPR spouse, children, or
parents if defendant is de-
ported?
Position within local ethnic
community? (i.e. clan leader)
Length of time in community?






Number of persons supported
by defendant? Current em-
ployment or possibility? Eco-
nomic impact on U.S. citi-
zen/LPR spouse, children, or
parents if defendant is de-
ported?
Acceptance of guilt? Reason for
criminal act?
Victim wants prosecution of de-
fendant? Victim wants charges
dropped? Victim was the pri-
mary aggressor?
Aggravated Felony: Category v.
Sentence Crimes 365 v. 364
days term of imprisonment.
Crimes Involving Moral Turpi-




D. Grounds of Inadmissibility
Any non-citizen who applies to become a legal permanent
resident must overcome the grounds of inadmissibility in order to
be granted permanent residency. Such non-citizens include im-
mediate family members who are beneficiaries of relative visa pe-
titions, such as the daughter of a United States citizen or legal
permanent resident. Other such non-citizens are refugees and
asylees who may apply to adjust their status to become permanent
residents after being in the United States as refugees or asylees
for one year.
In a significant departure from past law, all legal permanent
residents who have committed certain crimes and have not been
granted a waiver under section 212(h) or Cancellation of Removal
are now subject to the grounds of inadmissibility upon their return
to the United States.110 This includes permanent residents who fly
to another country for business or a vacation as well as those who
cross the Canadian or Mexican border to shop or visit family mem-
bers for only a few hours and then return to the United States.
When a legal permanent resident presents herself at the border,
she will have to answer questions from a federal officer, including
whether she has ever been convicted of any crimes. If a legal per-
manent resident has been convicted of a crime that is a ground of
inadmissibility but has not previously been granted a waiver, that
non-citizen will be detained by the I.N.S. and placed in removal
proceedings.
The number of different grounds of inadmissibility increased
with the passage of IIRAIRA. New grounds include proof of vacci-
nations and a permanent bar for false claims of United States citi-
zenship. Additional permanent bars include any conviction for
violation of a controlled substance law (other than where a non-
citizen qualifies for a waiver for a single simple possession offense
for thirty grams or less of marijuana) and any conviction or admis-
110. In In re Collado, the Board of Immigration Appeals held that the language
of I.N.A. section 101(a)(13)(C)(v) compelled the finding that
[A] lawful permanent resident who has committed an offense identified in
section 212(a)(2), who has not since such time been granted relief under
sections 212(h) or 240A(a) (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1250a(a)), who de-
parts the United States and returns, shall be regarded as seeking an ad-
mission into the United States despite his lawful permanent resident
status.
Int. Dec. 3333 at 5 (B.I.A. 1997) (en banc).
The Board stated that the permanent resident is seeking an admission and that
the Fleuti doctrine regarding entry and a "brief, casual, and innocent departure"
does not apply under the clear change in the law. Id. at 7.
1999]
Law and Inequality
sion of facts related to murder or torture. Limited waivers for cer-
tain grounds are available for non-citizens with United States citi-
zen or legal permanent resident spouses, children or parents, but
permanent bars cannot be waived.
1. Statute
I.N.A. § 212 [8 U.S.C. § 11821
Excludable aliens
(a) Classes of aliens ineligible for visas or admission
Except as otherwise provided in this Act, aliens who are
inadmissible under the following paragraphs are ineligible to
receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to the United
States:
[(1) Health-related grounds-omitted here]
(2) Criminal and related grounds
(A) Conviction of certain crimes
(i) In general
Except as provided in clause (ii), any alien
convicted of, or who admits having committed, or
who admits committing acts which constitute the
essential elements of-
(I) a crime involving moral turpitude (other
than a purely political offense or an attempt or
conspiracy to commit such a crime), or
(II) a violation of (or a conspiracy or at-
tempt to violate) any law or regulation of a
State, the United States, or a foreign county
relating to a controlled substance (as defined
in section 102 of the Controlled Substance Act
(21 U.S.C. § 802), is inadmissible.
(ii) Exception
Clause (i)(I) shall not apply to an alien who
committed only one crime if-
(1) the crime was committed when the alien
was under 18 years of age, and the crime was
committed (and the alien released from any
confinement to a prison or correctional institu-
tion imposed for the crime) more than 5 years
before the date of application for visa or other
documentation and the date of application for
admission to the United States, or
(II) the maximum penalty possible for the
[Vol. 17:567628
DEFENDING NON-CITIZENS
crime of which the alien was convicted (or
which the alien admits having committed or of
which the acts that the alien admits having
committed constituted the essential elements)
did not exceed imprisonment for one year and,
if the alien was convicted of such crime, the
alien was not sentenced to a term of impris-
onment in excess of 6 months (regardless of
the extent to which the sentence was ulti-
mately executed). [petty offense exception]
(B) Multiple criminal convictions
Any alien convicted of 2 or more offenses (other
than purely political offenses), regardless of whether
the conviction was in a single trial or whether the of-
fenses arose from a single scheme of misconduct and
regardless of whether the offenses involved moral
turpitude, for which the aggregate sentences to con-
finement actually imposed were 5 years or more is in-
admissible.
(C) Controlled substance traffickers
Any alien who the consular or immigration officer
knows or has reason to believe is or has been an illicit
trafficker in any such controlled substance or is or has
been a knowing assister, abettor, conspirator, or col-
luder with others in the illicit trafficking in any such
controlled substance, is inadmissible.
(D) Prostitution and commercialized vice
Any alien who-
(i) is coming to the United States solely, princi-
pally, or incidentally to engage in prostitution, or
has engaged in prostitution within 10 years of the
date of application for a visa, admission, or ad-
justment of status,
(ii) directly or indirectly procures or attempts to
procure, or (within 10 years of the date of applica-
tion for a visa, admission, or adjustment of status)
procured or attempted to procure or to import,
prostitutes or persons for the purpose of prostitu-
tion, or receives or (within such 10 year period) re-
ceived, in whole or in part, the proceeds of prosti-
tution, or
(iii) is coming to the United States to engage in
any other unlawful commercialized vice, whether
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or not related to prostitution, is inadmissible.
(E) Certain aliens involved in serious criminal ac-
tivity who have asserted immunity from prosecution
Any alien-
(i) who has committed in the United States at
any time a serious criminal offense (as defined in
section 101(h)),
(ii) for whom immunity from criminal jurisdic-
tion was exercised with respect to that offense,
(iii) who as a consequence of the offense and
exercise of immunity has departed from the United
States, and
(iv) who has not subsequently submitted fully
to the jurisdiction of the court in the United States
having jurisdiction with respect to that offense, is
inadmissible.
(F) Waiver authorized
For provision authorizing waiver of certain sub-
paragraphs of this paragraph, see subsection (h).
(G) Foreign government officials who engaged in
particularly severe violations of religious freedom
Any alien who, while serving as a foreign official,
was responsible for or directly carried out, at any time
during the preceding 24-month period, particularly
severe violations of religious freedom, as defined in
section 3 of the International Religious Freedom Act
of 1998, and the spouse and children, if any, are in-
admissible.
(3) Security and related grounds
(A) In general
Any alien who a consular officer or the Attorney
General knows, or has reasonable ground to believe,
seeks to enter the United States to engage solely,
principally, or incidentally in-
(i) any activity (I) to violate any law of the
United States relating to espionage or sabotage or
(II) to violate or evade any law prohibiting the ex-
port from the United States of goods, technology,
or sensitive information,
(ii) any other unlawful activity, or
(iii) any activity a purpose of which is the oppo-
sition to, or the control or overthrow of, the Gov-
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ernment of the United States by force, violence, or




(I) has engaged in a terrorist activity,
(II) a consular officer or the Attorney Gen-
eral knows, or has reasonable ground to be-
lieve, is engaged in or is likely to engage after
entry in any terrorist activity (as defined in
clause (iii)),
(III) has, under circumstances indicating
an intention to cause death or serious bodily
harm, incited terrorist activity,
(IV) is a representative (as defined in
clause (iv)) of a foreign terrorist organization,
as designated by the Secretary under section
219, which the alien knows or should have
known is a terrorist organization, or
(V) is a member of a foreign terrorist or-
ganization, as designated by the Secretary un-
der section 219, is inadmissible. An alien who
is an officer, official, representative, or spokes-
man of the Palestine Liberation Organization is
considered, for purpose of this Act, to be en-
gaged in a terrorist activity.
(ii) Terrorist activity defined
As used in this Act, the term "terrorist activity"
means any activity which is unlawful under the
laws of the place where it is committed (or which,
if committed in the United States, would be unlaw-
ful under the laws of the United States or any
State) and which involves any of the following:
(I) The highjacking or sabotage of any con-
veyance (including an aircraft, vessel, or vehi-
cle).
(II) The seizing or detaining, and threat-
ening to kill, injure, or continue to detain, an-
other individual in order to compel a third per-
son (including a governmental organization) to
do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit
or implicit condition for the release of the indi-
vidual seized or detained.
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(III) A violent attack upon an internation-
ally protected person (as defined in section
1116(b)(4) of title 18, United States Code) or
upon the liberty of such a person.
(IV) An assassination.
(V) The use of any- (a) biological agent,
chemical agent, or nuclear weapon or device, or
(b) explosive or firearm (other than for mere
personal monetary gain), with intent to endan-
ger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or
more individuals or to cause substantial dam-
age to property.
(VI) A threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do
any of the foregoing.
(ii) Engage in terrorist activity defined
As used in this Act, the term "engage in terror-
ist activity" means to commit, in an individual ca-
pacity or as a member of an organization, an act of
terrorist activity or an act which the actor knows,
or reasonably should know, affords material sup-
port to any individual, organization, or govern-
ment in conducting a terrorist activity at any time,
including any of the following acts:
(I) The preparation or planning of a ter-
rorist activity.
(II) The gathering of information on poten-
tial targets for terrorist activity.
(III) The providing of any type of material
support, including a safe house, transportation,
communications, funds, false documentation or
identification, weapons, explosives, or training,
to any individual the actor knows or has reason
to believe has committed or plans to commit a
terrorist activity.
(IV) The soliciting of funds or other things
of value for terrorist activity or for any terrorist
organization.
(V) The solicitation of any individual for
membership in a terrorist organization, terror-
ist government, or to engage in a terrorist ac-
tivity.
(iv) Representative defined
As used in this paragraph, the term
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"representative" includes an officer, official, or
spokesman of an organization, and any person who
directs, counsels, commands, or induces an organi-




An alien whose entry or proposed activities in
the United States the Secretary of State has rea-
sonable ground to believe would have potentially
serious adverse foreign policy consequences for the
United States is excludable.
(ii) Exception for officials
An alien who is an official of a foreign govern-
ment or a purported government, or who is a can-
didate for election to a foreign government office
during the period immediately preceding the elec-
tion for that office, shall not be excludable or sub-
ject to restrictions or conditions on entry into the
United States under clause (i) solely because of the
alien's past, current, or expected beliefs, state-
ments, or associations, if such beliefs, statements,
or associations would be lawful within the United
States.
(iii) Exception for other aliens
An alien, not described in clause (ii), shall not
be excludable or subject to restrictions or condi-
tions on entry into the United States under clause
(i) because of the alien's past, current, or expected
beliefs, statements, or associations, if such beliefs,
statements, or associations, if such beliefs, state-
ments, or associations would be lawful within the
United States, unless the Secretary of State per-
sonally determines that the alien's admission
would compromise a compelling United States for-
eign policy interest.
(iv) Notification of determinations
If a determination is made under clause (iii)
with respect to an alien, the Secretary of State
must notify on a timely basis the chairmen of the
Committees on the Judiciary and Foreign Affairs
of the House of Representatives and of the Com-
mittees on the Judiciary and Foreign Relations of
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the Senate of the identity of the alien and the rea-
sons for the determination.
(D) Immigrant membership in totalitarian party
(i) In general
Any immigrant who is or has been a member of
or affiliated with the Communist or any other to-
talitarian party (or subdivision or affiliate thereof),
domestic or foreign, is inadmissible.
(ii) Exception for involuntary membership
Clause (i) shall not apply to an alien because of
membership or affiliation if the alien establishes to
the satisfaction of the consular officer when ap-
plying for a visa (or to the satisfaction of the At-
torney General when applying for admission) that
the membership or affiliation is or was involun-
tary, or is or was solely when under 16 years of
age, by operation of law, or for purposes of obtain-
ing employment, food rations, or other essentials of
living and whether necessary for such purposes.
(iii) Exception for past membership
Clause (i) shall not apply to an alien because of
membership or affiliation if the alien establishes to
the satisfaction of the consular officer when ap-
plying for a visa (or to the satisfaction of the At-
torney General when applying for admission)
that-
(1) the membership or affiliation termi-
nated at least-
(a) 2 years before the date of such appli-
cation, or
(b) 5 years before the date of such appli-
cation, in the case of an alien whose mem-
bership or affiliation was with the party
controlling the government of a foreign
state that is a totalitarian dictatorship as
of such date, and
(II) the alien is not a threat to the security
of the United States.
(iv) Exception for close family members
The Attorney General may, in the Attorney
General's discretion, waive the application of
clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is the
parent, spouse, son, daughter, brother, or sister of
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a citizen of the United States or a spouse, son, or
daughter of an alien lawfully admitted for perma-
nent residence for humanitarian purposes, to as-
sure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the
public interest if the immigrant is not a threat to
the security of the United States.
(E) Participants in Nazi persecutions or genocide
[(i) Participation in Nazi persecutions (1933-
1945--omitted here]
(ii) Participation in genocide
Any alien who has engaged in conduct that is
defined as genocide for purposes of the Interna-
tional Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of Genocide is inadmissible.
[(4) Public charge-omitted here]
[(5) Labor certification and qualifications for certain
immigrants--omitted here]
(6) Illegal entrants and immigration violators
(A) Aliens present without permission or parole
(i) In general
An alien present in the United States without
being admitted or paroled, or who arrives in the
United States at any time or place other than as
designed by the Attorney General, is inadmissible.
(ii) Exception for certain battered women and
children
Clause (i) shall not apply to an alien who dem-
onstrates that-
(I) the alien qualifies for immigrant status
under subparagraph (A)(iii), (A)(iv), (B)(ii), or
(B)(iii) of section 204(a)(1),
(II) (a) the alien has been battered or sub-
jected to extreme cruelty by a spouse or parent,
or by a member of the spouse's or parent's fam-
ily residing in the same household as the alien
and the spouse or parent consented or acqui-
esced to such battery or cruelty, or (b) the
alien's child has been battered or subjected to
extreme cruelty by a spouse or parent of the
alien (without the active participation of the
alien in the battery or cruelty) or by a member
of the spouse's or parent's family residing in the
same household as the alien when the spouse
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or parent consented to or acquiesced in such
battery or cruelty and the alien did not actively
participate in such battery or cruelty, and
(III) there was a substantial connection be-
tween the battery or cruelty described in sub-
clause (I) or (II) and the alien's unlawful entry
into the United States.
(B) Failure to attend removal proceeding
Any alien who without reasonable cause fails or re-
fuses to attend or remain in attendance at a proceed-
ing to determine the alien's inadmissibility or deport-
ability and who seeks admission to the United States




Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepre-
senting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has
sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other
documentation, or admission into the United
States or other benefit provided under this Act is
inadmissible.
(ii) Falsely claiming citizenship
Any alien who falsely represents, or has falsely
represented, himself or herself to be a citizen of
the United States for any purpose or benefit under
this Act (including section 274A) or any other Fed-
eral or State law is excludable. [This subsection is
effective for claims made on or after September 30,
1996.]
(iii) Waiver authorized
For provision authorizing waiver of clause (i),
see subsection (i).
(D) Stowaways
Any alien who is a stowaway is inadmissible.
(E) Smugglers
(i) In general
Any alien who at any time knowingly has en-.
couraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided any
other alien to enter or to try to enter the United
States in violation of law is inadmissible.




Clause (i) shall not apply in the case of alien
who is an eligible immigrant (as defined in section
301 (b)(1) of the Immigration Act of 1990), was
physically present in the United States on May 5,
1988, and is seeking admission as an immediate
relative or under section 203(a)(2) (including under
section 112 of the Immigration Act of 1990) or
benefits under section 301(a) of the Immigration
Act of 1990 if the alien, before May 5, 1988, has
encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided
only the alien's spouse, parent, son, or daughter
(and no other individual) to enter the United
States in violation of law.
(iii) Waiver authorized
For provision authorizing waiver of clause (i),
see subsection (d)(11).
(F) Subject of civil penalty
(i) In general
An alien who is the subject of a final order for
violation of section 274C [document fraud] is in-
admissible.
(ii) Waiver authorized
For provision authorizing waiver of clause (i),
see subsection (d)(12).
(G) Student visa abusers
An alien who obtains the status of a nonimmigrant
under section 101(a)(15)(F)(i) and who violates a term
or condition of such status under section 214(1) is ex-
cludable until the alien has been outside the United





Except as otherwise specifically provided in this
Act, any immigrant at the time of application for
admission-
(I) who is not in possession of a valid unex-
pired immigrant visa, reentry permit, border
crossing identification card, or other valid entry
document required by this Act, and a valid un-
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expired passport, or other suitable travel docu-
ment, or document of identity and nationality if
such document is required under the regula-
tions issued by the Attorney General under sec-
tion 211(a), or
(II) whose visa has been issued without
compliance with the provisions of section 203,
is excludable.
(ii) Waiver authorized





(I) is not in possession of a passport valid
for minimum of six months from the date of the
expiration of the initial period of the alien's
admission or contemplated initial period of stay
authorizing the alien to return to the country
from which the alien came or to proceed to and
enter some other country during such period, or
(II) is not in possession of a valid nonimmi-
grant visa or border crossing identification card
at the time of application for admission, is in-
admissible.
(ii) General waiver authorized
For provision authorizing waiver of clause (i),
see subsection (d)(4).
(iii) Guam visa waiver
For provision authorizing waiver of clause (i) in
the case of visitors to Guam, see subsection (1).
(iv) Visa waiver pilot program
For authority to waive the requirement of
clause (i) under a pilot program, see section 217.
(8) Ineligible for citizenship
(A) In general
Any immigrant who is permanently ineligible to
citizenship is inadmissible.
(B) Draft evaders
Any person who has departed from or who has re-
mained outside the United States to avoid or evade
training or service in the armed forces in time of war
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or a period declared by the President to be a national
emergency is inadmissible, except that this subpara-
graph shall not apply to an alien who at the time of
such departure was nonimmigrant and who is seeking
to reenter the United States as a nonimmigrant.
(9) Aliens previously removed
(A) Certain aliens previously removed
(i) Arriving aliens
Any alien who has been ordered removed under
section 235(b)(1) [summary removal at port of en-
try] or at the end of proceedings under section 240
[removal proceedings] initiated upon the alien's
arrival in the United States and who again seeks
admission within 5 years of the date of such re-
moval (or within 20 years in the case of a second or
subsequent removal or at any time in the case of
an alien convicted of an aggravated felony) is in-
admissible.
(ii) Other aliens
Any alien not described in clause (i) who-
(I) has been ordered removed under section
240 or any other provision of law, or
(II) departed the United States while an
order of removal was outstanding, and who
seeks admission within 10 years of the date of
such alien's departure or removal (or within 20
years of such date in the case of a second or
subsequent removal or at any time in the case
of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony) is
inadmissible.
(iii) Exception
Clauses (i) and (ii) shall not apply to an alien
seeking admission within a period if, prior to the
date of the alien's reembarkation at a place outside
the United States or attempt to be admitted from
foreign contiguous territory, the Attorney General
has consented to the alien's reapplying for admis-
sion.
(B) Aliens unlawfully present
(i) In general
Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admit-
ted for permanent residence) who-
(I) was unlawfully present in the United
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States for a period of more than 180 days but
less than 1 year, voluntarily departed the
United States (whether or not pursuant to sec-
tion 244(e)) prior to the commencement of pro-
ceedings under section 235(b)(1) or section 240,
and again seeks admission within 3 years of the
date of such alien's departure or removal, or
(II) has been unlawfully present in the
United States for one year or more, and who
again seeks admission within 10 years of the
date of such alien' departure or removal from
the United States, is inadmissible.
(ii) Construction of unlawful presence
For purposes of this paragraph, an alien is
deemed to be unlawfully present in the United
States if the alien is present in the United States
after the expiration of the period of stay authorized
by the Attorney General or is present in the
United States without being admitted or paroled.
(iii) Exceptions
(I) Minors
No period of time in which an alien is un-
der 18 years of age shall be taken into account
in determining the period of unlawful presence
in the United States under clause (i).
(II) Asylees
No period of time in which an alien has a
bone fide application for asylum pending under
section 208 shall be taken into account in de-
termining the period of unlawful presence in
the United States under clause (i) unless the
alien during such period was employed without
authorization in the United States.
(III) Family unity
No period of time in which the alien is a
beneficiary of family unity protection pursuant
to section 301 of the Immigration Act of 1990
shall be taken into account in determining the
period of unlawful presence in the United
States under clause (i).
(IV) Battered women and children
Clause (i) shall not apply to an alien who
would be described in paragraph (6)(A)(ii) if
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'violation of the terms of the alien's nonimmi-
grant visa' were substituted for 'unlawful entry
into the United States' in subclause (III) of that
paragraph.
(iv) Tolling for good cause
In the case of an alien who-
(I) has been lawfully admitted or paroled
into the United States,
(II) has filed a nonfrivolous application for
a change or extension of status before the date
of expiration of the period of stay authorized by
the Attorney General, and
(III) has not been employed without
authorization in the United States before or
during the pendency of such application, the
calculation of the period of time specified in
clause (i)(I) shall be tolled during the pendency
of such application, but not to exceed 120 days.
(v) Waiver
The Attorney General has sole discretion to
waive clause (i) in the case of an immigrant who is
the spouse or son or daughter of a United States
citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for perma-
nent residence, if it is established to the satisfac-
tion of the Attorney General that the refusal of
admission to such immigrant alien would result in
extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resi-
dent spouse or parent of such alien. No court shall
have jurisdiction to review a decision or action by
the Attorney General regarding a waiver under
this clause.




(I) has been unlawfully present in the
United States for an aggregate period of more
than 1 year, or
(II) has been ordered removed under sec-
tion 235(b)(1), section 240, or any other provi-
sion of law, and who enters or attempts to reen-





Clause (i) shall not apply to an alien seeking
admission more than 10 years after the date of the
alien's last departure from the United States if,
prior to the alien's reembarkation at a place out-
side the United States or attempt to be readmitted
from a foreign contiguous territory, the Attorney




Any immigrant who is coming to the United States
to practice polygamy is inadmissible.
(B) Guardian required to accompany helpless alien
Any alien-
(i) who is accompanying another alien who is
inadmissible and who is certified to be helpless
from sickness, mental or physical disability, or in-
fancy pursuant to section 232(c), and
(ii) whose protection or guardianship is deter-
mined to be required by the alien described in
clause (i), is inadmissible.
(C) International child abduction
(i) In general
Except as provided in clause (ii), any alien who,
after entry of an order by a court in the United
States granting custody to a person of a United
States citizen child who detains or retains the
child, or withholds custody of the child, outside the
United States from the person granted custody by
the order, is inadmissible until the child is surren-
dered to the person granted custody by that order.
(ii) Aliens supporting abductors and relatives of
abductors
Any alien who-
(I) is known by the Secretary of State to
have intentionally assisted an alien in the con-
duct described in clause (i),
(II) is known by the Secretary of State to be
intentionally providing material support or safe
haven to an alien described in clause (i), or
(III) is a spouse (other than the spouse who
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is the parent of the abducted child), child (other
than the abducted child), parent, sibling, or
agent of an alien described in clause (i), if such
person has been designated by the Secretary of
State at the Secretary's sole and unreviewable
discretion, is inadmissible until the child de-
scribed in clause (i) is surrendered to the per-
son granted custody by the order described in
that clause, and such person and child are per-
mitted to return to the United States or such
person's place of residence.
(iii) Exceptions
Clauses (i) and (ii) shall not apply-
(I) to a government official of the United
States who is acting within the scope of his or
her official duties;
(II) to a government official of any foreign
government if the official has been designated
by the Secretary of State at the Secretary's sole
and unreviewable discretion; or
(III) so long as the child is located in a for-
eign state that is a party to the Convention on
the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduc-
tion, done at The Hague on October 25, 1980.
(D) Unlawful voters
Any alien who has voted in violation of any Fed-
eral, State, or local constitutional provision, statute,
ordinance, or regulation is excludable.
(E) Former citizens who renounced citizenship to
avoid taxation
Any alien who is a former citizen of the United
States who officially renounces United States citizen-
ship and who is determined by the Attorney General
to have renounced United States citizenship for the
purpose of avoiding taxation by the United States is
excludable.
2. Case Law
For case law regarding possible waivers for certain grounds of
inadmissibility, see section 212(h) at page 679, section 212(i) at
page 683, and section 212(c) at page 685.
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3. Application to Cases
Case of Herbert from France:
Herbert came to the United States as an F-1 student in
August 1993. In March 1996, he pled guilty to fifth degree posses-
sion of cocaine. In July 1997, he married a United States citizen,
Harriet. They went to file an application for permanent residency
for him at I.N.S. At the window, the clerk reviewed his application
and noted that he had checked the box for having been arrested
and explained on a separate page that he had been convicted for
possession of cocaine. She called a deportation officer who came to
the counter and arrested him.
Analysis: Herbert is permanently inadmissible (as well as
deportable) for having violated a controlled substance law. No
waivers are available for controlled substance violations unless it
is for one simple possession of thirty grams or less of marijuana
and the non-citizen qualifies for a section 212(h) waiver."'
Case of Pamela from Guinea:
Pamela came to the United States as a legal permanent resi-
dent in 1989 based on the family visa petition filed in 1983 by her
legal permanent resident father. In October 1991, she pled guilty
to charges for gross misdemeanor theft and was given a stay of
execution for a nine month sentence and five years of probation.
In December 1997, she went to Toronto, Canada to visit her sister
who was studying at a university in'Toronto. When she presented
herself to I.N.S. officers in Detroit in January 1998, she was ques-
tioned by the officers. They asked her how long she had been out
of the country, why she had gone to Canada and if she had com-
mitted any crimes in the United States before she went to visit her
sister in Toronto. She told them that she had been convicted for
theft but did not serve any jail time. The officers arrested her and
detained her at the local I.N.S. detention facility.
Analysis: Pamela is inadmissible. As a permanent resident,
she is subject to the grounds of inadmissibility upon her return to
the United States. Pamela has been convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude, which does not meet the petty offense exception
under I.N.A. section 212(a)(2)(A)(ii) because she has been sen-
tenced to nine months, regardless of the stay of execution. In ad-
dition, she did not apply for or receive a grant under section 212(h)
or cancellation of removal prior to going to Canada. She will have
a hearing with an immigration judge under summary removal pro-
111. See section 212(h) Waivers infra p. 680.
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ceedings to determine whether she will be removed from the
United States and whether she is eligible for a section 212(h)
waiver.
E. "S"or "Snitch" Visa
For non-citizens who are arrested and charged with crimes,
including drug crimes, snitching on their cohorts in crime may be
an opportunity to avoid the consequences of deportation through
the "S" visa or "snitch" visa. Congress created the S visa as part of
the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 to
allow the lawful admission and adjustment of status to become le-
gal permanent residents of non-citizens who provide testimony or
information to law enforcement agencies. 112 The S visa allows the
spouse, married and unmarried sons and daughters, and parents
of the non-citizen to enter the United States with an immigrant
visa or to adjust their status to become legal permanent residents
if they are already in the United States upon the "snitching" non-
citizen's adjustment of status to legal permanent resident.
Under I.N.A. section 101(a)(15)(S), two types of S visas are
available. First, for non-citizens whose presence is required for
the investigation or prosecution of criminal organizations, up to
200 visas may be issued each fiscal year (throughout the United
States). Second, for non-citizens who have reliable information
about terrorist groups or organizations, up to fifty visas may be is-
sued each year. The S visa is a nonimmigrant visa valid for three
years. At the end of the three year period, if the non-citizen is
deemed to have contributed enough information that has substan-
tially contributed to the success of an investigation or prosecution,
the non-citizen may apply for adjustment of status under I.N.A.
section 245(j). In the case of a non-citizen who has supplied infor-
mation regarding terrorist organizations, the non-citizen must
have substantially contributed to the prevention or frustration of
an act of terrorism against a United States person or property or
have contributed to the success of an investigation or prosecution
of a person involved in an act of terrorism.
Individuals and their attorneys cannot apply for the S visas.
Only law enforcement agencies can file applications with the As-
sistant Attorney General for Criminal Division in the Department
of Justice to obtain the S visas. The law enforcement agency must
agree to conditions relating to the non-citizen and certify the need
for an S visa for the particular non-citizen. The Assistant Attorney
112. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
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General then has seven days to respond to the request. The I.N.S.
District Director can still arrest a non-citizen to initiate removal
(formerly deportation) proceedings against her if the request to the
Assistant Attorney General is denied or the non-citizen commits
another crime at any time.
If your non-citizen client is interested in working with a law
enforcement agency, contact an immigration attorney who can
work with you to assist the local law enforcement agency to pre-
pare the application.
III. Juveniles and Inmmigration Consequences
Non-citizen juveniles may face immigration consequences for
certain criminal acts. The consequences depend on the nature of
the acts and whether they are in juvenile delinquency proceedings,
in extended juvenile jurisdiction proceedings or certified to stand
trial as an adult in Minnesota.
The Juvenile Justice Project at the Pacer Center, Inc. has
been created to work with youth, including non-citizen youth, in
the Minnesota juvenile justice system. The staff can provide assis-
tance to public defenders and coordinate with other agencies. 113
The Minnesota Disability Law Center works with youth with
disabilities in educational settings, their families and attorneys
representing disabled youth in juvenile court proceedings. 114 Un-
der the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act" 5 and Minne-
sota Statute section 120.17, it may be possible for defense counsel
to move for dismissal of a juvenile court petition where the non-
citizen youth's behavior on school premises or a school bus is based
on a disability and his special education needs have not been suffi-
ciently addressed by the school.
A. Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings
Non-citizens placed in juvenile delinquency proceedings who
have been found to have committed an act of juvenile delinquency
have Ynt been subject to deportation or exclusion proceedings un-
der deportation or exclusion law. A juvenile who is adjudicated
113. To contact the Juvenile Justice Project, call 612/827-2966. For more infor-
mation on youth with disabilities, the Juvenile Justice Project has published a
manual, Unique Challenges, Hopeful Responses. A Handbook for Professionals
Working with Youth with Disabilities in the Juvenile Justice System (1997).
114. The Minnesota Disability Law Center is located at 430 First Avenue North,
Suite 300 in Minneapolis. To contact the Special Education Unit, call 612/332-
1441.
115. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (1997).
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delinquent by the juvenile court is not considered to have commit-
ted a crime unless the juvenile court certifies the matter in accor-
dance with Minnesota Statute section 260.125, transfers the mat-
ter to a court in accordance with section 260.193, or convicts the
child as an extended jurisdiction juvenile and subsequently exe-
cutes the adult sentence under section 260.126, subdivision 5.
Under Minnesota Statute section 260.211, subdivision 1(a), an
adjudication of a child in the jurisdiction of the juvenile court shall
not operate to impose any of the civil disabilities imposed by con-
viction, nor deem the child to be a criminal, nor constitute a crimi-
nal conviction. In addition, the disposition of the child and any
evidence given by the child cannot be admitted as evidence against
the child in any case or proceedings in any other court except it
may be later used to determine a proper sentence. 116
An act of juvenile delinquency is not considered a crime un-
der deportation or exclusion law. 117 Since an act of juvenile delin-
quency is not considered to be a crime for deportation purposes,
non-citizens placed in juvenile delinquency proceedings will not be
deportable for their acts of delinquency. They may, however, be
found to be inadmissible based on their conduct and consequently
deportable. A non-citizen juvenile is inadmissible: for an adjudi-
cation or admissions involving controlled substances other than
minor drug offenses relating to simple possession or use of con-
trolled substances that occurred under age eighteen;" 8 if the I.N.S.
has "reason to believe" that the juvenile is or has been a drug traf-
ficker, drug abuser or drug addict; 119 or if she was involved in pros-
titution within ten years of the date of her application for adjust-
ment of status to become a legal permanent resident.120 A non-
citizen juvenile may also be inadmissible and deportable for hav-
ing knowingly encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted or aided an-
other non-citizen to enter the United States under I.N.A. sections
237(a)(1)(E) and 212(a)(6)(E).
In addition, certain dispositions for juvenile delinquency bar
applicants from adjusting to become legal permanent residents
through Family Unity under the 1986 Amnesty and 1988 Special
Agricultural Worker (SAW) Programs. If an act of juvenile delin-
quency, which if committed by an adult would be a felony involv-
116. See MINN. STAT. § 260.211, subd. 1(a).
117. See In re Ramirez-Rivero, 18 1. & N. Dec. 135 (B.I.A. 1981); 22 C.F.R. §
40.21(a)(2) (1998).
118. See 9 FOREIGN AFF. MAN. 40.21(b) N2.1 (1996).
119. Id.; see I.N.A. § 212(a)(2)(C).
120. See I.N.A. § 212(a)(2)(D).
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ing violence or the threat of physical force against another person,
then the juvenile disposition is a bar to Family Unity benefits
granted or extended after September 30, 1996 under the Immigra-
tion Act of 1990 section 301(e) as amended by the IIRAIRA section
383.
1. Defense Practice Tip
In cases involving the trafficking or manufacturing of con-
trolled substances, smuggling of non-citizens or prostitution, the
juvenile court records should be sealed to avoid immigration con-
sequences. Even though the juvenile disposition is not a
"conviction" for immigration purposes, a juvenile non-citizen may
still be found to be inadmissible in these cases, which may result
in the juvenile being found deportable and subsequently removed
from the United States.
B. Extended Juvenile Jurisdiction (EJJ) Proceedings
In 1994, the Minnesota legislature passed the extended juve-
nile jurisdiction (EJJ) statute, which enables a juvenile court judge
to place a juvenile on probation until he or she turns twenty-one
years old. 121 Since the statute was recently enacted, parts of the
statute remain unclear regarding long-term civil and immigration
consequences. The Immigrant Law Center of Minnesota (a.k.a.
Oficina Legal) sent a letter to the local I.N.S. office in 1998 re-
questing a formal I.N.S. policy and is still waiting for a response.
A formal policy will enable defense attorneys to adequately advise
their juvenile non-citizens about the immigration consequences for
juvenile delinquency adjudications and possible revocations of EJJ
jurisdiction under the EJJ statute. As of May 31, 1999, the Board
had not decided any cases involving hybrid statutes, such as Min-
nesota's statute for EJJ proceedings, and the issue of deportability
for delinquency adjudications or executed sentences under such
statutes.
1. Minnesota Statute
Defense attorneys representing juveniles in extended juvenile
jurisdiction (EJJ) proceedings should treat the juvenile's case as
though the juvenile were an adult for purposes of evaluating
whether the juvenile may face subsequent immigration conse-
quences. Under Minnesota law, a juvenile alleged to have commit-
ted a felony offense may be placed in EJJ proceedings by the court
121. See MINN. STAT. § 260.126.
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after a request by the prosecutor and hearing by the court.122 If
the EJJ prosecution results in a guilty plea or finding of guilt, the
court imposes a juvenile disposition and an adult criminal sen-
tence with a stay of execution. 123 If the juvenile then violates pro-
bation or other terms of the disposition or commits a new offense,
then the court may revoke the stay of execution of the adult sen-
tence and probation. 124 Once the stay of execution is revoked, then
the juvenile's extended jurisdiction status and juvenile court juris-
diction are terminated.125 Ongoing jurisdiction for adult sanctions
is with the adult court. 126
Thus, a juvenile placed in extended juvenile jurisdiction
(EJJ) proceedings has an adjudication of delinquency and an adult
sentence, which turns into an adult conviction and sentence if she
violates probation and the adult sentence is executed. In essence,
revocation of EJJ status imposes an adult conviction and an adult
sentence.127
Since immigration consequences do attach where the EJJ ju-
venile violates probation, the attorney should assume that the EJJ
juvenile may violate probation. Therefore, the felony charges must
be evaluated for possible grounds of deportation and inadmissibil-
ity, including whether the conviction will be considered to be a
crime involving moral turpitude and/or an aggravated felony. The
analysis regarding immigration consequences will be the same as
for adult non-citizens.
2. Application to Cases
Case of Marlo from Italy:
In 1995, Marlo entered the United States at age sixteen as a
legal permanent resident with his parents who invested a large
amount of money to open a chain of bakeries and obtained their
green cards. He got into a fight on the soccer field eight months
later and punched another player in the face, breaking the player's
122. See MINN. STAT. § 260.126, subd. 1 and 2.
123. See MNN. STAT. § 260.126, subd. 4(a).
124. See MNN. STAT. § 260.125, subd. 5.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. This appears to be the policy of the St. Paul District I.N.S. office. In addi-
tion, a letter dated February 10, 1997, addressed to an Anoka county attorney, dis-
trict counsel for the Immigration and Naturalization Service Office in Blooming-
ton, Minnesota, stated that no adverse immigration consequences attach for a
juvenile non-citizen in EJJ proceedings as long as the stay of the adult sentence is
not revoked. Letter from Richard Soli, District Counsel of the I.N.S., to Barbara
Jondahl, Assistant County Attorney for Anoka County (Feb. 10, 1997) (on file with
the Journal of Law and Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice).
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nose. The prosecutor filed a petition to place him in EJJ proceed-
ings which was granted by the court. Marlo was adjudicated guilty
of third degree assault. The court stayed the execution of a year
and a day sentence. Two months later, Marlo was arrested for al-
legedly stealing a can of freon from the local gas station. His pro-
bation was revoked and his sentence was executed.
Marlo is now deportable for having been convicted of an ag-
gravated felony. He has been convicted of a crime of violence for
which a year term of imprisonment has been imposed. Unless he
has a claim of persecution for withholding of removal, which is un-
likely in his case, he will be found to be deportable for having been
convicted of an aggravated felony and will be removed from the
United States. No waivers are available to Marlo.
3. Defense Practice Tip
In EJJ proceedings, a juvenile is technically supposed to ad-
mit to a felony and receive a felony sentence of a year and a day.
To avoid an aggravated felony conviction for immigration pur-
poses, negotiate a sentence for 364 days or less with the prosecu-
tion.128
C. Certification As an Adult
Where the possibility exists that a juvenile non-citizen may
be certified to stand trial as an adult under Minnesota Statute sec-
tion 260.125, then the case must be analyzed as if the juvenile
were an adult non-citizen. A juvenile non-citizen with an adult
conviction and sentence will be treated as an adult for immigration
purposes.
IV. Immigration Remedies or Defenses Under the
Immigration and Nationality Act for Non-Citizens
A. Overview
Through the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Re-
sponsibility Act of 1996 (IIRAIRA),129 which became effective April
1, 1997, Congress created a new system of removal proceedings to
deport or remove non-citizens from the United States. Removal
proceedings have combined deportation and exclusion proceedings
into a single proceeding. A removal order has the same result as a
128. For a list of aggravated felonies, see Definition of Aggravated Felony, page
612.
129. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
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deportation or exclusion order: the non-citizen is ordered to be
physically removed from the United States.
The charging documents issued by the I.N.S. control whether
a non-citizen is in deportation, exclusion or removal proceedings.
Persons who were issued the charging document, Order to Show
Cause, by the I.N.S. prior to April 1, 1997, remain in deportation
proceedings, and those issued a different charging document for
exclusion proceedings prior to April 1, 1997, remain in exclusion
proceedings. Persons in deportation proceedings have made an
"entry" for immigration purposes and, as a result, have more
rights and constitutional protections than those in exclusion pro-
ceedings who have not made an "entry" for immigration purposes.
Since April 1, 1997, the I.N.S. has issued the new charging docu-
ment called a Notice to Appear to place non-citizens into removal
proceedings. The distinction is critical because different forms of
relief are available to non-citizens depending on whether they
have been placed in deportation, exclusion or removal proceed-
ings.130
B. Good Moral Character
Good Moral Character (GMC) is a statutory requirement for
certain immigration benefits under the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act in both removal and deportation/exclusion proceedings.
Such immigration benefits include registry, voluntary departure,
suspension of deportation, naturalization and cancellation of re-
moval for certain nonpermanent residents. The finding of good
moral character may also affect the determination of applications
for discretionary relief, including asylum and adjustment of status
to a legal permanent resident.
130. General Chart of Forms of Immigration Relief
Proceedings Begun: AFTER 4/1/97 Proceedings Begun: BEFORE 4/1/97
Removal Proceedings Deportation/Exclusion Proceedings
Cancellation of Removal for Certain § 212(c) Waiver
Permanent Residents
Cancellation of Removal for Nonper- Suspension of Deportation
manent Residents
§ 212(h) Waiver § 212(h) Waiver
Asylum Asylum
Withholding of Removal Withholding of Deportation
Adjustment of Status Based on a Fam- Adjustment of Status Based on a Fam-
ily Relationship ily Relationship
1999]
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Certain statutory bars to demonstrating good moral character
have been enumerated in the immigration statute. 131 The statu-
tory list, however, is not exhaustive. Courts have created two tests
to determine whether an applicant has shown good moral charac-
ter in the exercise of discretion. In Postusta v. United States,
Judge Learned Hand stated that good moral character should be
defined based on the ethical standards current at the time.
132
Other courts have defined good moral character as "conduct which
measures up as good among the average citizens of the community
in which the applicant lives, or that it is conduct which conforms to
the 'generally accepted moral conventions current at the time."
' 133
1. Statute
I.N.A. § 101(f) [8 U.S.C. § 1101(0]
For the purposes of this Act-
No person shall be regarded as, or found to be a person of
good moral character who, during the period for which good
moral character is required to be established, is, or was
(1) a habitual drunkard;
(2) [Removed]
(3) a member of one or more of the classes of persons,
whether inadmissible or not, described in paragraphs (2)(D)
[prostitution and commercialized vice], (6)(E) [smuggling
aliens], and (9)(A) [certain aliens previously removed] of sec-
tion 212(a) of this Act; or subparagraphs (A) [crimes involv-
ing moral turpitude or controlled substances] and (B)
[multiple criminal convictions] of section 212(a)(2) and sub-
paragraph (C) [controlled substance traffickers] thereof such
section (except as such paragraph relates to a single offense
of simple possession of thirty grams or less of marihuana), if
the offense described therein, for which such person was
convicted or of which he admits the commission, was com-
mitted during such period;
(4) one whose income is derived principally from illegal
gambling activities;
(5) one who has been convicted of two or more gambling
offenses committed during such period;
131. See I.N.A. § 101(f).
132. 285 F.2d 533, 535 (2d Cir. 1961).
133. In re Denssy, 200 F. Supp. 354, 358 (D. Del. 1961) (quoting Annotation:
Naturalization - 'Good Moral Character,' 22 A.L.R.2D 244, 250 (1952)); see also, In
re Paoli, 49 F. Supp. 128, 130 (N.D. Cal. 1943).
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(6) one who has given false testimony for the purpose of
obtaining any benefits under this Act;
(7) one who during such period has been confined, as a
result of conviction, to a penal institution for an aggregate
period of one hundred and eighty days or more, regardless of
whether the offense, or offenses, for which he has been con-
fined were committed within or without such period;
[emphasis added]
(8) one who at any time has been convicted of an aggra-
vated felony (as defined in subsection (a)(43)).
The fact that any person is not within any of the forego-
ing classes shall not preclude a finding that for other rea-
sons such person is or was not of good moral character.
2. Exceptions to Statutory Bars
Two exceptions exist to the statutory bars above for crimes
involving moral turpitude. 34 First, a crime classifiable as a petty
offense under I.N.A. section 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) is not subject to the
mandatory bar. Second, a pardon for a conviction for a crime in-
volving moral turpitude will not trigger the mandatory bar. 135
3. Application to Cases
a. GMC and Naturalization
Case of Xia from Laos:
Xia came to the United States as a refugee in 1988 and ad-
justed his status to a legal permanent resident in 1989. He was
convicted for fifth degree possession of opium in 1995. An appli-
cant for citizenship must demonstrate his good moral character for
five years as a legal permanent resident prior to applying. Xia's
opium conviction statutorily precludes him from ever establishing
good moral character. In addition, he can be deported based on
the drug conviction if he were to apply for naturalization or if he
were to come to the attention of the I.N.S. Xia should not apply for
134. Expungements of convictions for crimes involving moral turpitude under
state rehabilitative statutes are no longer given effect in immigration proceedings.
See In re Roldan, Int. Dec. 3377 (B.I.A. 1999); see also supra p. 587 (discussing the
definition of "conviction").
135. Pardons forgive convictions under moral turpitude deportation grounds
only. See 8 U.S.C. § 1251(A)(2)(a)(iv), I.N.A. § 241(a)(2)(A)(iv); see also In re Lind-
ner, 15 I. & N. Dec. 170 (B.I.A. 1975). In an application for naturalization, a par-
don for murder will not erase the basis for a finding of a lack of good moral charac-
ter since the fact of murder still exists. See, e.g., In re Salani, 196 F. Supp. 513





John entered the United States as a university student in
1970. In 1975, he married a United States citizen and became a
permanent resident. In 1992, he was convicted for credit card
fraud and served 150 days in jail. In 1993, he was convicted for
welfare fraud in the amount of $2000 and served 100 days in jail.
John is statutorily ineligible for citizenship because he has served
an aggregate of 250 days in jail within the five year period re-
quired for good moral character. In addition, he is deportable for
having been convicted for a second crime involving moral turpi-
tude since he became a legal permanent resident. John should int
apply for naturalization.
b. GMC and Non-Immigrant Visas
Case of Marla from Argentina:
Marla entered the United States in 1994 on a student visa.
In 1996, she stopped attending the technical college and began
working as a waitress. In December 1996, she was driving home
from work when the police pulled her over for failing to come to a
complete stop at a red light. As Marla got out of the car to follow
the officer to his squad car, a baggie containing sixty grams of
marijuana fell out of her coat pocket. She was convicted of fifth
degree possession of marijuana for sixty grams of marijuana and
the county attorney called I.N.S. In removal proceedings in May
1997, the immigration judge found that Marla had violated her F-1
visa on account of her separation from the college and her fifth de-
gree controlled substance violation. Marla requested the immigra-
tion relief of voluntary departure. An applicant for voluntary de-
parture must show good moral character for at least five years
immediately preceding the application. The immigration judge
found Marla statutorily ineligible for voluntary departure based on
her marijuana conviction and ordered her removed from the
United States. Under the judge's final removal order, Marla is
barred from returning to the United States for at least ten years
whereas a grant of voluntary departure would not have barred her
from returning to the United States. Based on her controlled sub-
stance conviction, however, she is permanently inadmissible.
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c. GMC and Suspension of Deportation/Cancellation of
Removal
Case of Jose from Guatemala:
Jose entered the United States illegally in 1989, fleeing
forced recruitment by the Guatemalan Army. In 1991, he filed for
immigration status as part of the American Baptist Churches set-
tlement in which Salvadorans and Guatemalans were permitted to
have their claims for asylum adjudicated under fair terms. In
January 1997, he was convicted for fifth degree assault for a bar
fight in which Jose defended himself against racially biased com-
ments by another patron. Based on arguments by his public de-
fender, the judge ordered Jose to serve 100 days in jail and agreed
to a stay of imposition for the remainder of the eleven month sen-
tence. Jose has not been convicted of an aggravated felony and
remains prima facie eligible for suspension of deportation. Fifth
degree assault is not a crime involving moral turpitude. The im-
migration judge may, however, find that the underlying facts of
Jose's conviction preclude Jose from establishing good moral char-
acter.
Case of Sylvia from Sierra Leone:
Sylvia entered the United States illegally in 1982. In 1985,
she gave birth to a United States citizen son. In 1988, she pled
guilty to driving under the influence and was placed on probation.
In June 1998, the I.N.S. arrested her during a workplace raid and
began removal proceedings against her. Sylvia is statutorily eligi-
ble for cancellation of removal; her conviction for driving under the
influence is not a statutory bar to good moral character. To be eli-
gible for cancellation of removal, Sylvia must show that she has
been physically present in the United States for at least ten years,
has had good moral character for the past ten years and there
would be exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a United
States citizen child if she were removed from the United States.
4. Defense Practice Tip
Where a non-citizen would otherwise be eligible for relief
from deportation or removal and has been charged with a crime
triggering one of the mandatory bars to good moral character, an
attempt should be made to have the non-citizen charged under an-
other provision of law that will not trigger such bars. In addition,
the immigration definition of "conviction" must be considered
where the non-citizen is required to admit facts on the record in




Legal permanent residents with criminal convictions may be
eligible for limited forms of relief, including cancellation of re-
moval for certain legal permanent residents, section 212(h) waiver
for an adjustment of status, asylum and withholding of removal.
Undocumented persons may be eligible for a different category of
cancellation of removal, adjustment of status, voluntary departure,
asylum and withholding of removal.
1. Cancellation of Removal: Non-Citizens with Criminal
Convictions
Cancellation of Removal for Certain Permanent Residents is
a discretionary waiver available to long-term legal permanent
residents who have been convicted of certain crimes, not including
aggravated felonies. An immigration judge will weigh positive and
negative equities in determining whether the ground for deport-
ability that has arisen since the non-citizen became a permanent
resident will be waived. Non-citizens who have previously been
granted section 212(c) waivers, suspension of deportation or can-
cellation of removal for certain permanent residents are ineligible
for this relief.
a. Statute
I.N.A. § 240A [8 U.S.C. § 1229b]
Cancellation of removal; adjustment of status
(a) Cancellation of removal for certain permanent resi-
dents
The Attorney General may cancel removal in the case of
an alien who is inadmissible or deportable from the United
States if the alien-
(1) has been an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence for not less than 5 years,
(2) has resided in the United States continuously for 7
years after having been admitted in any status, and
(3) has not been convicted of any aggravated felony.
(c) Aliens ineligible for relief
The provisions of subsections (a) and (b)(1) shall not ap-
ply to any of the following aliens:
(1) An alien who entered the United States as a
crewman subsequent to June 30, 1964.
(2) An alien who was admitted to the United States as
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a nonimmigrant exchange alien as defined in section
101(a)(15)(J), or has acquired the status of such nonim-
migrant exchange alien after admission, in order to re-
ceive graduate medical education or training, regardless
of whether or not the alien is subject to or has fulfilled
the two-year foreign residence requirement of section
212(e).
(3) An alien who-
(A) was admitted to the United States as a
nonimmigrant exchange alien as defined in section
101(a)(15)(J) or has acquired the status of such
nonimmigrant exchange alien after admission other
than to receive graduate medical education or train-
ing,
(B) is subject to the two-year foreign residence re-
quirement of section 212(e), and
(C) has not fulfilled that requirement or received a
waiver thereof.
(4) An alien who is inadmissible under section
212(a)(3) [security and related grounds] or deportable
under section 237(a)(4) [security and related grounds].
(5) An alien who is described in section 241(b)(3)(B)(i)
[statutorily barred from withholding of removal due to
persecution of another on account of one of five protected
grounds].
(6) An alien whose removal has been previously can-
celled under this section or whose deportation was sus-
pended under section 244(a) or who has been granted re-
lief under section 212(c), as such sections were in effect
before the date of the enactment of the Illegal Immigra-
tion Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.
(d) Special rules relating to continuous residence or
physical presence
(1) Termination of continuous period
For purposes of this section, any period of continuous
residence or continuous physical presence in the United
States shall be deemed to end when the alien is served a
notice to appear under section 239(a) or when the alien
has committed an offense referred to in section 212(a)
that renders the alien inadmissible to the United States
under section 212(a)(2) [convictions of certain crimes] or
removable from the United States under section 237(a)(2)
[criminal offenses] or 237(a)(4) [security and related
1999]
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grounds], whichever is earliest.
(2) Treatment of certain breaks in presence
An alien shall be considered to have failed to main-
tain continuous physical presence in the United States
under subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) if the alien has de-
parted from the United States for any period in excess of
90 days or for any periods in the aggregate exceeding 180
days.
(3) Continuity not required because of honorable
service in armed forces and presence upon entry into
service
The requirements of continuous residence or continu-
ous physical presence in the United States under subsec-
tions (a) and (b) shall not apply to an alien who-
(A) has served a minimum period of 24 months in
an active-duty status in the Armed Forces of the
United States and, if separated from such service, was
separated under honorable conditions, and
(B) at the time of the alien's enlistment or induc-
tion was in the United States.
b. Statutory Changes from I.N.A. Section 212(c) Relief
In IIRAIRA,136 Congress created a new form of relief for long-
term permanent residents who have been convicted of crimes not
constituting aggravated felonies and are placed in removal pro-
ceedings. Cancellation of Removal for Certain Permanent Resi-
dents, I.N.A. section 240A, replaces section 212(c) relief which had
been available to non-citizens convicted of crimes for which they
could be deported. In very limited cases, section 212(c) relief re-
mains available to eligible non-citizens against whom deportation
or exclusion proceedings were begun prior to April 1, 1997.137
Cancellation for legal permanent residents is available to non-
citizens placed in Removal Proceedings on or after April 1, 1997.138
c. Case Law
The Board held that once a non-citizen meets the statutory
requirements for cancellation, the non-citizen must also establish
136. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
137. See IIRAIRA § 347 (noting that replacement of § 212(c) applies prospec-




that she warrants such relief as a matter of discretion.139 The gen-
eral standards set forth in In re Marin'40 for the exercise of discre-
tion for section 212(c) relief apply to the exercise of discretion for
cancellation. 141
d. Application to Cases
Case of Joshua from England:
Joshua entered the United States in January 1989 with a B-2
visitor's visa. He became a legal permanent resident in May 1989
as the step-son of a United States citizen. On October 15, 1996, he
pled to one count of misdemeanor domestic assault. His previous
convictions included two other domestic assault misdemeanor con-
victions entered prior to September 30, 1996, possession of drug
paraphernalia and fifth degree possession of marijuana. He has
four United States citizen children under the age of eight from a
relationship with a United States citizen. In June 1997, the I.N.S.
served him with a Notice to Appear.
Analysis: Joshua is deportable due to his misdemeanor do-
mestic assault conviction in October 1996 but not for the prior do-
mestic assault convictions since they were entered prior to the
passage of IIRAIRA on September 30, 1996. He is statutorily eli-
gible for cancellation of removal because he has not been convicted
of an aggravated felony and has been lawfully in the United States
for eight years as a permanent resident.
Case of Paul from Liberia:
Paul came to the United States as a legal permanent resident
in 1973 when he was eleven years old as the son of a legal perma-
nent resident. In 1979, he pled guilty to petty theft for stealing $5
worth of batteries from a gas station and was placed on probation
for five months. In 1992, he was convicted for fifth degree posses-
sion of cocaine. He successfully completed one year of probation.
In May 1997, he was arrested on suspicion of possession of crack
which turned out to be drywall plaster. Charges were never filed
by the county attorney. Upon his arrest, however, the jailer called
the I.N.S. to report him. Although he was to be released from the
county jail, I.N.S. had placed an immigration hold on him and he
was transferred to I.N.S. custody where he received a Notice to
Appear charging him with being deportable for his 1992 controlled
139. See In re C-V-T-, Int. Dec. 581 (B.I.A. 1998).
140. 16 I. & N. Dec. 581 (B.I.A. 1978).




Analysis: Paul is deportable for having been convicted of a
controlled substance since he was admitted to the United States as
a legal permanent resident. His petty theft does not make him de-
portable because the maximum possible sentence was less than
one year. Paul has been a permanent resident for more than
twenty-five years and has not been convicted of an aggravated fel-
ony. Therefore, he is eligible for cancellation of removal.
2. Cancellation of Removal: Non-Citizens Without Criminal
Convictions
Cancellation of Removal for Nonpermanent Residents is a
discretionary waiver of the ground of deportability for non-citizens
who have been physically present in the United States without
being detected or arrested by the I.N.S. for at least ten years be-
fore applying for cancellation and who can show exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship to a qualifying relative. Cancellation
of removal is available as a defense to removal (deportation) in
removal proceedings before the immigration judge. Special rules
apply to non-citizen spouses and children who have been battered
or subjected to extreme cruelty by a United States citizen or legal
permanent resident spouse or parent. A non-citizen who is
granted the waiver will be a legal permanent resident as of the
date that a visa number becomes available. Immigration judges
may only grant 4000 waivers per year, although certain nationali-
ties are exempt from the yearly cap and the new standard of hard-
ship under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Re-
lief Act of 1997 (NACARA).142
a. Statute
I.N. § 240A [8 U.S.C. § 1229b]
Cancellation of removal; adjustment of status
(b) Cancellation of removal and adjustment of status for
certain nonpermanent residents
(1) In general
The Attorney General may cancel removal in the case
of an alien who is inadmissible or deportable from the
142. For statutory eligibility specifically affecting Nicaraguans and Cubans who
entered the United States on or before December 1, 1995 as well as Salvadorans,
Guatemalans and persons from the former Soviet Union and eastern block coun-
tries who entered the United States prior to the end of 1990 seeking refuge, see




United States if the alien-
(A) has been physically in the United States for a
continuous period of not less than 10 years immedi-
ately preceding the date of such application;
(B) has been a person of good moral character
during such period;
(C) has not been convicted of an offense under sec-
tion 212(a)(2) [conviction of certain crimes], 237(a)(2)
[criminal offenses], or 237(a)(3) [security and related
grounds]; and
(D) establishes that removal would result in excep-
tional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien's
spouse, parent, or child who is a citizen of the United
States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence.
(2) Special rule for battered spouse or child
The Attorney General may cancel removal in the case
of an alien who is inadmissible or deportable from the
United States if the alien demonstrates that-
(A) the alien has been battered or subjected to ex-
treme cruelty in the United States by a spouse or par-
ent who is a United States citizen or lawful perma-
nent resident (or is the parent of a child of a United
States citizen or lawful permanent resident and the
child has been battered or subjected to extreme cru-
elty in the United States by such citizen or permanent
resident parent);
(B) the alien has been physically present in the
United States for a continuous period of not less than
3 years immediately preceding the date of such appli-
cation;
(C) the alien has been a person of good moral char-
acter during such period;
(D) the alien is not inadmissible under paragraph
(2) or (3) of section 212(a), is not deportable under
paragraph (1)(G) or (2) through (4) of section 237(a),
and has not been convicted of an aggravated felony;
and
(E) the removal would result in extreme hardship
to the alien, the alien's child, or (in the case of an
alien who is a child) to the alien's parent.
In acting on applications under this paragraph, the At-
torney General shall consider any credible evidence rele-
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vant to the application. The determination of what evi-
dence is credible and the weight to be given that evidence
shall be within the sole discretion of the Attorney Gen-
eral.
(3) Recordation of date
With respect to aliens who the Attorney General
adjusts to the status of an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence under paragraph (1) or (2), the At-
torney General shall record the alien's lawful admission
for permanent residence as of the date the Attorney Gen-
eral's cancellation of removal under paragraph (1) or (2).
(c) Aliens ineligible for relief
The provisions of subsections (a) and (b)(1) shall not ap-
ply to any of the following aliens:
(1) An alien who entered the United States as a
crewman subsequent to June 30, 1964.
(2) An alien who was admitted to the United States as
a nonimmigrant exchange alien as defined in section
101(a)(15)(J), or has acquired the status of such a
nonimmigrant exchange alien after admission, in order to
receive graduate medical education or training, regard-
less of whether or not the alien is subject to or has ful-
filled the two-year foreign residence requirement of sec-
tion 212(e).
(3) An alien who-
(A) was admitted to the United States as a
nonimmigrant exchange alien as defined in section
101(a)(15)(J) or has acquired the status of such
nonimmigrant exchange alien after admission other
than to receive graduate medical education or train-
ing,
(B) is subject to the two-year foreign residence re-
quirement of section 212(e), and
(C) has not fulfilled that requirement or received a
waiver thereof.
(4) An alien who is inadmissible under section
212(a)(3) or deportable under section 237(a)(4).
(5) An alien who is described in section 241(b)(3)(B)(i).
(6) An alien whose removal has previously been can-
celled under this section or whose deportation was sus-
pended under section 244(a) or who has been granted re-
hef under section 212(c), as such sections were in effect
before the date of the enactment of the Illegal Immigra-
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tion Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.
(d) Special rules relating to continuous residence or
physical presence
(1) Termination of continuous period
For purposes of this section, any period of continuous
residence or continuous physical presence in the United
States shall be deemed to end when the alien is served a
notice to appear under section 239(a) or when the alien
has committed an offense referred to in section 212(a)
that renders the alien inadmissible to the United States
under section 212(a)(2) or removable from the United
States under section 237(a)(2) or 237(a)(4), whichever is
earliest.
(2) Treatment of certain breaks in presence
An alien shall be considered to have failed to main-
tain continuous physical presence in the United States
under subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) if the alien has de-
parted from the United States for any period in excess of
90 days or for any periods in the aggregate exceeding 180
days.
(3) Continuity not required because of honorable
service in armed forces and presence upon entry into
service
The requirements of continuous residence or continu-
ous physical presence in the United States under subsec-
tions (a) and (b) shall not apply to an alien who-
(A) has served a minimum period of 24 months in
an active-duty status in the Armed Forces of the
United States and, if separated from such service, was
separated under honorable conditions, and
(B) at the time of the alien's enlistment or induc-
tion was in the United States.
(e) Annual Limitation
(1) Aggregate limitation
Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), the Attorney Gen-
eral may not cancel the removal and adjust the status
under this section, nor suspend the deportation and ad-
just the status under section 244(a) (as in effect before
the enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996), of a total of more
than 4,000 aliens in any fiscal year. The previous sen-
tence shall apply regardless of when an alien applied for
such cancellation and adjustment, or such suspension
1999]
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and adjustment, and whether such an alien had previ-
ously applied for suspension of deportation under such
section 244(a).
b. Case Law
The standard of hardship changed for cases brought since
April 1, 1997. The Board has not yet defined the new standard of
"exceptional and extremely unusual hardship." This new standard
covers all cases initiated by the filing of a Notice to Appear in Re-
moval Proceedings on or after April 1, 1997, except for the cases
that fall under the NACARA for which the extreme hardship stan-
dard will be applied. The standard for extreme hardship was de-
fined by the Board in In re Anderson,143 to include the age of the
non-citizen, family ties in the United States and abroad, the length
of residence in the United States, the non-citizen's health, condi-
tions in the country to which the non-citizen is deportable
(including economic and political conditions), the non-citizen's fi-
nancial status (including employment and occupation), the possi-
bility of other means of adjustment of status, whether the non-
citizen is of special assistance to the United States or community,
her immigration history in the United States (including immigra-
tion violations) and ties to the United States community.
c. Application to Cases
Margarita from Panama:
Margarita entered the United States as an F-1 student in
January 1987 to study English for one year. In November 1997,
she married a legal permanent resident, Pablo, from Panama. Pa-
blo was the only child of his parents who are deceased. They have
a United States citizen son who was born with cerebral palsy and
requires constant care. Pablo did not file a marriage visa petition
for Margarita because he said that she did not need a green card
because she was going to remain at home to care for their son. In
May 1997, Pablo fell from a scaffold at a construction site and died
from internal hemorrhaging. After his funeral, Margarita asked a
neighbor to watch her son. She went to apply for a job at the mall
where a store owner called the I.N.S. after discovering that she did
not have a green card. Margarita was arrested and then released
to continue caring for her son.
Analysis: Margarita is eligible for cancellation of removal.
She has been physically present in the United States for more
143. 16 1. & N. Dec. 596 (B.I.A. 1978).
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than ten years and has good moral character. She must show that
her United States citizen son would suffer exceptional and ex-
tremely unusual hardship if she were removed or deported to Pan-
ama. Such hardship can be shown through evidence of lack of
medical facilities and support for her son in Panama as well as the
fact that if she is deported, her son does not have any other family
in the United States who can care for him.
Enrique from Spain:
Enrique entered the United States as a B-2 tourist in 1991.
He overstayed his sixty-day visa and started working for his uncle.
In 1995, he married Sonia from Spain who was undocumented.
Their United States citizen daughter was born in January 1997.
In November 1997, Enrique was stopped by the police for running
a red light. The police officer asked him for his license and his
green card. Enrique told the officer that he did not have a green
card. The officer called the I.N.S. who arrested Enrique and is-
sued him a Notice to Appear before an immigration judge. Enri-
que does not have any family member in the United States who
could file a family visa petition for him which would give him an
immediate relative visa.
Analysis: Enrique is not eligible for cancellation of removal.
He has not been in the United States for the statutory minimum of
ten years. In addition, he cannot show any exceptional and ex-
tremely unusual hardship to his United States citizen daughter
other than the normal consequences of deportation. Enrique has
no defense to removal except voluntary departure.
3. Asylum and Refugees
Non-citizens may arrive in the United States after being
forced to flee their home countries due to political threats on their
lives. In certain countries, membership in a union, student group
or political party which peacefully and politically opposes an
elected or military government can put a person's life at risk.
Many non-citizens have been arrested, imprisoned and tortured or
have suffered other forms of persecution before arriving in the
United States. They may have family members and friends who
have been disappeared by governmental or non-governmental
forces. They fear for their safety and their family's safety if they
are forced to return to their home country.
Such persons are eligible to apply for asylum unless they are
statutorily barred for certain criminal convictions, including ag-
gravated felonies and particularly serious crimes. Applicants must
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meet the definition of "refugee," which is an international stan-
dard,144 adopted by the United States in the enactment of the
Refugee Act of 1980.145 A refugee is a non-citizen outside of her
country of nationality or country of last habitual residence where a
she has no nationality
who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or un-
willing to avail himself or herself of the protection of that
country because of [past] persecution or a well-founded fear of
[future] persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion..
146
An asylum applicant must prove that a possibility of persecution
exists (10% chance),147 which differs from the probability of perse-
cution standard required for withholding of deportation/removal
(51% or more likely than not).148
An immigration judge exercises her discretion in deciding
whether to grant an applicant asylum. While most misdemeanor
convictions and traffic violations will not statutorily bar a non-
citizen from applying for asylum, such convictions and violations
may be used to deny asylum in the exercise of discretion. A non-
citizen who is granted asylum within the territory of the United
States has the immigration status of an asylee indefinitely.
A non-citizen convicted of an aggravated felony is statutorily
barred from applying for asylum. Nonetheless, she may be eligible
to apply for withholding of removal/deportation where the imposed
term of imprisonment is less than five years. If she demonstrates
that it is more likely than not that she will suffer persecution if re-
turned to her country of nationality (or of country last habitual
residence where an applicant has no nationality), the applicant
must be granted withholding of removal/deportation unless she is
statutorily ineligible on account of having been convicted of a
"particularly serious crime" or other statutory bar. 149
Refugees are non-citizens who are determined by representa-
tives of the United States government to meet the definition of
refugee while overseas. Often they are recognized as refugees
144. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, T.I.A.S.
No. 6577 (1951); Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 606 U.N.T.S. 267,
T.I.A.S. No. 6577 (1967).
145. Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201(a), 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
146. I.N.A. § 101(a)(42)(A).
147. See Cardoza-Fonseca v. I.N.S., 480 U.S. 421, 469 (1987).
148. See Stevic v. I.N.S., 467 U.S. 407, 430 (1984).
149. For the statutory bars to withholding of removal and a discussion on par-
ticularly serious crimes, see Withholding of Removal, page 673.
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while in a refugee camp run by the United Nations High Commis-
sioner on Refugees. Non-citizens may also apply for refugee status
at a United States Consulate or Embassy. Refugees are admitted
to the United States under I.N.A. section 207. A non-citizen who is
a refugee has the immigration status of a refugee indefinitely.
The issue of convictions again becomes an issue when asylees
and refugees apply for lawful permanent resident status. Asylees
and refugees apply for adjustment of status immediately prior to
the end of their first year as asylees or refugees. At the time of
their applications for adjustment, they are subject to all of the
grounds of inadmissibility for which a waiver may be possible for
certain convictions and at the same time may also be subject to the
grounds of deportation for convictions. 150 If a refugee or an asylee
is found to have been convicted of an aggravated felony and sen-
tenced to less than five years, then she may be eligible for removal
or deportation. A refugee or asylee who is found to have been con-
victed of a particularly serious crime for a crime which is not an
aggravated felony will also be statutorily ineligible for withholding
of removalldeportation. 151 Where an asylee, refugee or other non-
citizen is ineligible for asylum, cancellation or withholding, the
non-citizen may be eligible for deferred removal if she can prove by
substantial evidence that she will probably be tortured upon re-
turn to her country.152 In the case where a refugee or asylee is
statutorily barred even from withholding of removal/deportation,
analyzing the possibility of a Rule 15 Motion to Withdraw a Guilty
Plea and post-conviction relief is critical.
a. Statute
Below are the definition of "refugee"'153 and relevant sections
of asylum law. 154
I.NA. § 101(a)(42) [8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)]
The term "refugee" means-
(A) any person who is outside any country of such per-
son's nationality or, in the case of a person having no na-
tionality, is outside any country in which such person last
habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return
150. See Grounds of Inadmissibility supra p. 627, Grounds of Deportation supra
p. 593.
151. See Withholding of Removal infra p. 674.
152. See Convention Against Torture, infra p. 697.
153. I.N.A. § 101(a)(42).
154. I.N.A. § 208.
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to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of
the protection of, that country because of persecution or a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or po-
litical opinion, or
(B) in such special circumstances as the President after
appropriate consultation (as defined in section 207(e) of this
Act) may specify, any person who is within the country of
such persons' nationality or, in the case of a person having
no nationality, within the country in which such person is
habitually residing, and who is persecuted or who has a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or po-
litical opinion. The term "refugee" does not include any per-
son who ordered, incited, assisted or otherwise participated
in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or po-
litical opinion.
For purposes of determinations under this Act, a person
who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo in-
voluntary sterilization, or who has been persecuted for fail-
ure or refusal to undergo such a procedure or for other resis-
tance to a coercive population control program, shall be
deemed to have been persecuted on account of political
opinion, and a person who has a well-founded fear that he or
she will be forced to undergo such a procedure or subject to
persecution for such failure, refusal, or resistance shall be
deemed to have a well-founded fear of persecution on ac-
count of political opinion.
INA. § 208 [8 U.S.C. § 1158]
Asylum procedure
(a) Authority to apply for asylum
(1) In general
Any alien who is physically present in the United
States or who arrives in the United States (whether or
not at a designated port of arrival and including an alien
who is brought to the United States after having been in-
terdicted in international or United States waters), irre-
spective of such alien's status, may apply for asylum in





(A) Safe third country
Paragraph (1) shall not apply to an alien if the At-
torney General determines that the alien may be re-
moved, pursuant to a bilateral or multilateral agree-
ment, to a country (other than the country of the
alien's nationality or, in the case of an alien having no
nationality, the country of the alien's last habitual
residence) in which the alien's life or freedom would
not be threatened on account of race, religion, nation-
ality, membership in a particular social group, or po-
litical opinion, and where the alien would have access
to a full and fair procedure for determining a claim to
asylum or equivalent temporary protection, unless the
Attorney General finds that it is in the public interest
for the alien to receive asylum in the United States.
(B) Time limit
Subject to subparagraph (D), paragraph (1) shall
not apply to an alien unless the alien demonstrates by
clear and convincing evidence that the application has
been filed within 1 year after the date of the alien's
arrival in the United States.
(C) Previous asylum applications
Subject to subparagraph (D), paragraph (1) shall
not apply to an alien if the alien has previously ap-
plied for asylum and had such application denied.
(D) Changed circumstances
An application for asylum of an alien may be con-
sidered, notwithstanding subparagraphs (B) and (C),
if the alien demonstrates to the satisfaction of the At-
torney General either the existence of changed cir-
cumstances which materially affect the applicant's
eligibility for asylum or extraordinary circumstances
relating to the delay in filing an application within
the period specified in subparagraph (B).
(3) Limitation on judicial review
No court shall have jurisdiction to review any deter-
mination of the Attorney General under paragraph (2).
(b) Conditions for Granting Asylum
(1) In general
The Attorney General may grant asylum to an alien
who has applied for asylum in accordance with the re-
quirements and procedures established by the Attorney
General under this section if the Attorney General de-
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Paragraph (1) shall not apply to an alien if the At-
torney General determines that-
(i) the alien ordered, incited, assisted, or other-
wise participated in the persecution of any person
on account of race, religion, nationality, member-
ship in a particular social group, or political opin-
ion;
(ii) the alien, having been convicted by a final
judgment of a particularly serious crime, consti-
tutes a danger to the community of the United
States;
(iii) there are serious reasons for believing that
the alien has committed a serious nonpolitical
crime outside the United States prior to the arrival
of the alien in the United States;
(iv) there are reasonable grounds for regarding
the alien as a danger to the security of the United
States;
(v) the alien is inadmissible under subclause
(I), (II), (III), or (IV) of section 212(a)(3)(B)(i) or
removable under section 237(a)(4)(B) (relating to
terrorist activities), unless, in the case only of an
alien inadmissible under subclause (IV) of section
212(a)(3)(B)(i), the Attorney General determines,
in the Attorney General's discretion, that there are
reasonable grounds for regarding the alien as a
danger to the security of the United States; or
(vi) the alien was firmly resettled in another
country prior to arriving in the United States.
(B) Special rules
(i) Conviction of aggravated felony
For purposes of clause (ii) of subparagraph (A),
an alien who has been convicted of an aggravated
felony shall be considered to have been convicted of
a particularly serious crime.
(ii) Offenses
The Attorney General may designate by regula-
tion offenses that will be considered to be a crime




The Attorney General may by regulations estab-
lish additional limitations and conditions, consistent
with this section, under which an alien shall be ineli-
gible for asylum under paragraph (1).
(D) No judicial review
There shall be no judicial review of a determina-
tion of the Attorney General under subparagraph
(A)(v).
(3) Treatment of spouse and children
A spouse or child (as defined in section 101(b)(1)(A),
(B), (C), (D), or (E) of an alien who is granted asylum
under this subsection may, if not otherwise eligible for
asylum under this section, be granted the same status as
the alien if accompanying, or following to join, such alien.
(c) Asylum Status
(1) In general
In the case of an alien granted asylum under subsec-
tion (b), the Attorney General-
(A) shall not remove or return the alien to the
alien's country of nationality or, in the case of a per-
son having no nationality, the country of the alien's
last habitual residence;
(B) shall authorize the alien to engage in employ-
ment in the United States and provide the alien with
appropriate endorsement of that authorization; and
(C) may allow the alien to travel abroad with the
prior consent of the Attorney General.
(2) Termination of asylum
Asylum granted under subsection (b) does not convey
a right to remain permanently in the United States, and
may be terminated if the Attorney General determines
that-
(A) the alien no longer meets the conditions de-
scribed in subsection (b)(1) owing the a fundamental
change in circumstances [in the country of nationality
or last habitual residence from which the alien fled
persecution];
(B) the alien meets a condition described in sub-
section (b)(2);
(C) the alien may be removed, pursuant to a bilat-
eral or multilateral agreement to a country (other
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than the country of the alien's nationality or, in the
case of an alien having no nationality, the country of
the alien's last habitual residence in which the alien's
life or freedom would not be threatened on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion, and where the alien
is eligible to receive asylum or equivalent temporary
protection;
(D) the alien has voluntarily availed himself or
herself of the protection of the alien's country of na-
tionality or, in the case of an alien having no nation-
ality, the alien's country of last habitual residence, by
returning to such country with permanent resident
status or the reasonable possibility of obtaining such
status with the same rights and obligations pertain-
ing to other permanent residents of that country; or
(E) the alien has acquired a new nationality and
enjoys the protection of the country of his or her new
nationality.
(3) Removal when asylum is terminated
An alien described in paragraph (2) is subject to any
applicable grounds of inadmissibility or deportability un-
der section 212(a) and 237(a), and the alien's removal or
return shall be directed by the Attorney General in ac-
cordance with sections 240 and 241.
b. Case Law
An applicant for asylum has established a well-founded fear
of persecution if she shows that a reasonable person in her circum-
stances would fear persecution based on one of the five grounds
specified in the Act. 155 Unlike withholding of deportation or re-
moval, asylum may be denied in the exercise of discretion to an
alien who establishes statutory eligibility for the relief.156 Case
law regarding the five grounds of asylum is extensive.
Criminal convictions are considered by the I.N.S. asylum offi-
cer or the immigration judge who grants asylum in the exercise of
discretion. Under In re Pula,157 an asylum officer or immigration
judge will consider the totality of the circumstances in the exercise
of discretion. Factors to be considered include: whether the appli-
155. See In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
156. See id.; Cardoza-Fonseca v. I.N.S., 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
157. 19 I. & N. Dec. 467 (B.I.A. 1987).
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cant passed through any other countries or arrived in the United
States directly from the country of persecution; whether orderly
refugee procedures were in fact available to help him in any coun-
try he passed through and whether he made any attempts to seek
asylum before coming to the United States; the length of time the
applicant remained in a third country and living conditions, safety,
and potential for long-term residency; personal ties to the United
States; whether the applicant engaged in fraud to circumvent or-
derly refugee procedures and the seriousness of any fraud; age or
health; immigration violations in the United States; and criminal
history in the United States. l 58 The danger of persecution should
generally outweigh all but the most egregious of adverse factors in
the applicant's case. 159
c. Application to Cases
Case of Ivan from Bulgaria:
Ivan was expelled from Bulgaria by Communist government
officials for his political organizing activities in March 1988. He
lived in Austria for three years where he applied for asylum but
his asylum claim was never adjudicated by the government. He
came to the United States as a tourist in July 1991 and immedi-
ately applied for asylum with the I.N.S. In December 1995, he was
arrested for driving under the influence. He pled guilty and re-
ceived fifteen days in the county jail.
Analysis: Ivan is eligible for asylum. He has not been con-
victed of an aggravated felony. His conviction will be considered in
the totality of the circumstances and should not bar a favorable
exercise of discretion if the immigration judge finds him credible
and to have a well-founded fear of future persecution. In light of
the changed country conditions and democracy now in Bulgaria, he
may be denied for failure to show a well-founded fear of future
persecution in Bulgaria. As a former citizen of an eastern block
country, he may be eligible for cancellation of removal under the
NACARA.1 60
Michael from Sudan:
Michael was forcibly recruited into a guerrilla force at age
twelve to fight against the Muslim government in southern Sudan.
Three years later he defected and fled to a refugee camp in Kenya.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See Cancellation of Removal for Nonpermanent Residents supra p. 660.
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In 1994, he was recognized by the United States government as a
refugee and brought to the United States where he resettled in
Minnesota. In July 1995, he adjusted his status to become a legal
permanent resident. In December 1995, he went with a friend to
North Dakota to visit other friends. Outside of a grocery store, he
was assaulted by some local teenagers looking for money. His
friends called the police who arrived at the store. One of the offi-
cers grabbed Michael from behind and Michael kicked him, be-
lieving that the officer was one of the teens. He was arrested and
later pled guilty to fourth degree assault. He received a suspended
sentence of nine months and was placed on unsupervised proba-
tion. In May 1997, his probation officer told him to come to his of-
fice. Michael was surprised to see two immigration officers at the
probation office. They arrested him for having committed a crime
involving moral turpitude within five years of admission and
placed him in removal proceedings.
Analysis: Michael is eligible to apply for asylum because he
has not been convicted of an aggravated felony. The immigration
judge will consider the seriousness of his conviction against the
persecution that Michael would face if returned to Sudan. The
judge will also consider whether he has violated his probation and
has any support from the community where he now lives.
4. Withholding of Removal (Formerly Known As
Withholding of Deportation)
The expansion and retroactivity of the definition of aggra-
vated felony has greatly impacted non-citizens in Minnesota and
across the country. Minnesota is the home to refugees and asylees
from many countries, including Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, El
Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Laos, Liberia, Nicaragua, Somalia,
the former Soviet Union, Sudan and Vietnam. Many refugees and
asylees have become permanent residents but not United States
citizens for various reasons, including difficulty learning English
and not having been a legal permanent resident for five years.
Withholding of removal/deportation is a critical form of relief
for asylees, refugees and legal permanent residents who face a
probability of persecution, including torture and death, if they are
forced to return to their home countries. However, even those who
can prove that they will be harmed or killed upon their return are
statutorily barred from withholding if an immigration judge de-
termines that they have been convicted of a "particularly serious
crime" or have been sentenced to an aggregate term of imprison-
ment of five years or more for an aggravated felony or aggravated
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felonies have been imposed. Non-citizens will be deported once the
order of removal or deportation is final, which occurs once the non-
citizen has exhausted all possible appeals and the government of
the country to which they will be deported agrees to accept them.
If an immigration judge finds that the non-citizen has not
been convicted of an aggravated felony but denies asylum in the
exercise of discretion, then the immigration judge must grant
withholding of removal/deportation where the non-citizen has
proven that she would probably be persecuted if deported to her
country of nationality or last habitual residence. A grant of with-
holding of removal/deportation will never lead to a non-citizen
adjusting her status to become a legal permanent resident. A
grant of withholding does, however, withhold the removal or de-
portation of the non-citizen to a country where he or she will
probably be persecuted. The Attorney General can revoke the
grant of withholding upon a finding that the non-citizen no longer
faces a probability of persecution due to a change in country condi-
tions.
a. Statute
I.N.A. § 241(b)(3) [8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)]
Restriction on removal to a country where alien's life
or freedom would be threatened
(A) In general
Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), the Attorney
General may not remove an alien to a country if the Attor-
ney General decides that the alien's life or freedom would be
threatened in that country because of the alien's race, relig-
ion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion.
(B) Exception
Subparagraph (A) does not apply to an alien deportable
under section 237(a)(4)(D) or if the Attorney General decides
that-
(i) the alien ordered, incited, assisted or otherwise
participated in the persecution of an individual because
of the individual's race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion;
(ii) the alien, having been convicted by a final judg-
ment of a particularly serious crime, is a danger to the
community of the United States;
(iii) there are serious reasons to believe that the alien
committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside the
Law and bequality
United States before the alien arrived in the United
States; or
(iv) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the
alien is a danger to the security of the United States.
For purposes of clause (ii), an alien who has been convicted
of an aggravated felony (or felonies) for which the alien has
been sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of at
least 5 years shall be considered to have committed a par-
ticularly serious crime. The previous sentence shall not pre-
clude the Attorney General from determining that, notwith-
standing the length of sentence imposed, an alien has been
convicted of a particularly serious crime. [emphasis added]
For purposes of clause (iv), an alien who is described in sec-
tion 237(a)(4)(B) [terrorist activity] shall be considered to be
an alien with respect to whom there are reasonable grounds
for regarding as a danger to the security of the United
States.
b. Definition of a Particularly Serious Crime
A non-citizen convicted of one or more aggravated felonies for
which the aggregate sentence is at least five years is considered to
have committed a particularly serious crime which bars him from
eligibility for withholding of deportation.16 1 For non-citizens con-
victed of an aggravated felony and sentenced to less than five
years imprisonment, the burden of proof and standard to deter-
mine whether she has been convicted of a particularly serious
crime depends on whether the non-citizen is in deportation or re-
moval proceedings. In a recent decision, the Board held that
where a non-citizen has been convicted of an aggravated felony or
felonies, sentenced to less than five years imprisonment, and
placed in removal proceedings, the immigration court must con-
duct an individual examination of the nature of the conviction, the
sentence imposed, and the circumstances and underlying facts of
the conviction to determine whether he or she has been convicted
of a particularly serious crime.'6 2
For non-citizens in deportation proceedings, however, a dif-
161. See In re S-S-, Int. Dec. 3374 (B.I.A. 1999); In re Q-T-M-T-, Int. Dec. 3300
(B.I.A. 1996).
162. See In re S-S-, Int. Dec. 3374 (following In re Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec.
244, 247 (B.I.A. 1982), which held that whether a crime is a "particularly serious
crime" depends on the nature of the conviction, the circumstances and underlying
facts of the conviction, the type of sentence imposed, and most importantly,
whether the type and circumstances of the crime indicate that the alien will be a
danger to the community).
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ferent standard is applied. In deportation proceedings, a non-
citizen convicted of an aggravated felony or felonies and sentenced
to less than five years must rebut the presumption that he or she
has been convicted of a particularly serious crime. 163 If an evalua-
tion of the nature and circumstances of the offense indicates that
the particular aggravated felony cannot be rationally deemed
"particularly serious" in light of United States treaty obligations
under the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees, 64 the presumption can be overcome. 65
Prior to the 1996 statutory changes, certain crimes had been
held to be inherently particularly serious crimes.1 66 These catego-
ries or types of inherently particularly serious crimes no longer
exist. 167 Other crimes analyzed under the Frentescu test may be
found to be "particularly serious crimes."168
Drug trafficking is an aggravated felony169 and, therefore, a
163. See In re Q-T-M-T-, Int. Dec. 3300.
164. 606 U.N.T.S. 268, T.I.A.S. No. 6577 (1967).
165. See In re Q-T-M-T-, Int. Dec. 3300 (holding that robbery with a deadly
weapon was a particularly serious crime where lives were threatened and endan-
gered); see also In re L-S-J-, Int. Dec. 3322 (B.I.A. 1997) (holding that robbery with
a deadly weapon was a particularly serious crime).
166. See Ahmetovic v. I.N.S., 62 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 1995) (first degree manslaugh-
ter); Bogle-Martinez v. I.N.S., 1995 WL 163618 (9th Cir. Apr. 7, 1995) (two counts
of unlawful sexual intercourse with a person under age 18 and one count of lewd or
lascivious act with a child of 14-15 years of age); Dor v. I.N.S., 891 F.2d 997 (2d
Cir. 1989) (first degree manslaughter); Abascal-Montalvo, 901 F. Supp. 309 (D.
Kan. 1995) (armed criminal assault); Cepero v. I.N.S., 882 F. Supp. 1575 (D. Kan.
1995) (aiding and abetting armed bank robbery); In re C-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 529
(B.I.A. 1992) (murder); In re B-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 427 (B.I.A. 1991) (aggravated bat-
tery); In re Carballe, 19 I. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1986) (armed robbery with a
deadly weapon); In re Garcia-Garrocho, 19 I. & N. Dec. 423 (B.I.A. 1986) (first de-
gree residential burglary).
167. See In re S-S-, Int. Dec. 3374 (explaining and distinguishing In re Gonzalez,
19 I. & N. Dec. 692 (B.I.A. 1988)).
168. See, e.g., Hamma v. I.N.S., 78 F.3d 233 (6th Cir. 1996) (an alien convicted
of felonious assault, possession of firearm in commission of a felony, and carrying a
pistol in a vehicle was found to pose a substantial risk of violence toward another
person and thus was found to have been convicted of a particularly serious crime);
Maashio v. I.N.S., 45 F.3d 1235 (8th Cir. 1995) (two misdemeanor convictions for
third degree sexual misconduct and repeated misdemeanor convictions for driving
under the influence evidenced serious criminal misconduct and a danger to the
community).
169. A drug trafficking crime as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) is an aggravated
felony. See I.N.A § 101(a)(43)(B). For a drug offense to be an aggravated felony, it
must fall under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) as a felony punishable under the Controlled
Substances Act (21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.), the Controlled Substance Import and Ex-
port Act (21 U.S.C. § 951 et seq.) or the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (46
U.S.C. § App. 1901, et seq.). See I.N.A. § 101(a)(43). A drug offense falls within 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) where the offense is punishable under the Controlled Substance
Act, the Controlled Substance Import and Export Act or the Maritime Drug Law
Enforcement Act and the offense is a felony. See 21 U.S.C. § 802(13). An offense
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"particularly serious crime." 170 Simple possession of a controlled
substance, however, is not an aggravated felony. 171 Consequently,
a conviction for simple possession of a controlled substance is not a
particularly serious crime. 172
c. Application to Cases
Case of Cheng from Laos:
Cheng is Hmong. He fought with the United States Central
Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.) in Laos from 1960 to 1975 under the
direction of General Pao. In 1975, he fled to Thailand where he
lived with his family in a refugee camp. In September 1980, he
came to the United States as a refugee. Cheng was arrested in St.
Paul on August 31, 1990 and charged with possession of 800 grams
of opium with intent to distribute and with fourth degree assault.
In jury trials, he was convicted and sentenced to forty-seven
months for the opium and twelve months for the assault.
Analysis: Cheng is deportable under I.N.A. section
237(a)(2)(B)(i) for his controlled substance conviction and for his
assault conviction. Both convictions are aggravated felonies under
I.N.A. section 101(a)(43)(B), illicit trafficking in a controlled sub-
stance, and I.N.A. section 101(a)(43)(F), a crime of violence for
which the term of imprisonment is at least one year. An assault
falls under the federal definition of a crime of violence. Cheng has
been sentenced to fifty-nine months, which will allow him the op-
portunity in removal proceedings to rebut the presumption that he
has been convicted of a particularly serious crime. If the immigra-
tion judge finds that he has not been convicted of a particularly se-
rious crime, he will then be allowed to apply for withholding of
removal based on his fear that he will probably be killed by the
Communist Laotian government on account of his participation
with the C.I.A. and political opposition to the Communist govern-
is a felony if the maximum term of imprisonment authorized for the offense is
more than one year. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(1)-(5). An offense is a misdemeanor if
the maximum term of imprisonment is five days to one year. See 18 U.S.C. §
3559(a)(6)-(8).
170. See AI-Salehi v. I.N.S., 47 F.3d 390 (10th Cir. 1995) (guilty plea and convic-
tion for possession with intent to distribute at least 500 grams of cocaine);
Mosquera-Perez v. I.N.S., 3 F.3d 553 (1st Cir. 1993) (conviction for possession of
cocaine with intent to distribute); In re K-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 418 (B.I.A. 1991)
(conviction for distribution and possession with intent to distribute); In re U-M-, 20
I. & N. Dec. 327 (B.I.A. 1991) (conviction for sale of marijuana and LSD); In re
Gonzalez, 19 I. & N. Dec. 682 (guilty plea and conviction for two counts of traf-
ficking in heroin).
171. See In re Davis, 20 1. & N. Dec. 536 (B.I.A. 1992).
172. See In re Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819 (B.I.A. 1990) (designated by




Cheng cannot defend his legal permanent residence even
though he has been a legal permanent resident for years. His con-
victions for aggravated felonies preclude eligibility for any other
form of immigration relief. Post-conviction relief, however, may
provide relief for Cheng if he is able to obtain both a reduction in
his sentence for the assault and a vacation of the controlled sub-
stance conviction. If he is successful in state court on both convic-
tions, he will be able to move to terminate the deportation or re-
moval proceedings because he will no longer be deportable. A
judgment that is vacated eliminates the conviction ab initio, as
having been illegal from the time it was imposed. 173
d. Defense Practice Tip
To avoid the effect of the retroactive expanded definition of
aggravated felony, seek to have a client who was originally con-
victed of a single crime (which is now defined as an aggravated fel-
ony) and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of more than five
years to be resentenced to a term of imprisonment of less than five
years (i.e. fifty-nine months) in order to preserve eligibility for
withholding of removal/deportation. Defense counsel may be
asked to try to have a client convicted of a single crime (now con-
sidered to be an aggravated felony) originally sentenced to a term
of imprisonment of more than one year to be re-sentenced to a
term of imprisonment of less than one year (i.e. eleven months or
364 days) in order to take the crime out of the category of aggra-
vated felony, and thus, preserving eligibility for other forms of re-
lief, including section 212(c), cancellation of removal for certain
permanent residents and asylum. Reducing a sentence by one day
(from 365 to 364 days) will still result in a "serious" conviction for
the prosecution but will allow an otherwise eligible non-citizen the
opportunity to apply for relief from immigration consequences.
In addition, "good" facts should be entered into the record
when a non-citizen client pleads guilty to a crime, such as the fact
that an unloaded gun or toy gun was used in the case of a burglary
or that a victim consented when the non-citizen is charged with
criminal sexual conduct involving a young non-citizen's boyfriend
or girlfriend.
173. See In re Kaneda, 16 I. & N. Dec. 677 (B.I.A. 1979); In re Sirhan, 13 I. & N.
Dec. 592 (B.I.A. 1970).
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5. Section 212(h) Waivers
A section 212(h) waiver allows the I.N.S. or an immigration
judge to waive grounds of inadmissibility (exclusion) for non-
citizens who have committed certain criminal convictions: one
crime involving moral turpitude, prostitution, commercialized vice,
multiple criminal convictions or a single offense of possession of
thirty grams or less of marijuana. A non-citizen must show ex-
treme hardship to a qualifying relative. If the non-citizen does not
have a qualifying relative, then the non-citizen must show that he
or she committed the act of inadmissibility more than fifteen years
before applying for the waiver, has been rehabilitated and is not a
danger to the United States. Non-citizens who previously adjusted
their status to become legal permanent residents or who are first
applying to adjust their status to become legal permanent resi-
dents can apply. If the I.N.S. or an immigration judge grants the
waiver, then the non-citizen will become a legal permanent resi-
dent. Waivers are not available to non-citizens who have commit-
ted murder or criminal acts involving torture. In addition, legal
permanent residents who have been convicted of an aggravated
felony since becoming a legal permanent resident or who have not
resided lawfully in the United States for seven years before initia-
tion of removal proceedings are ineligible for the section 212(h)
waiver.
a. Statute
I.N.A. § 212(h) [8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)]
Waiver of Subsection (a)(2)(A)(i)(I), (II), (B), (D), and (E)
The Attorney General may, in his discretion, waive the
application of subparagraphs (A)(i)(I) [crime involving moral
turpitude], (B) [multiple criminal convictions with aggregate
sentences to confinement imposed for 5 years or more], (D)
[prostitution and commercialized vice], and (E) [certain ali-
ens involved in serious criminal activity who have asserted
immunity from prosecution] of subsection (a)(2) and sub-
paragraph (A)(i)(II) [violation of controlled substance laws]
of such subsection insofar as it relates to a single offense of
simple possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana if-
(1)(A) in the case of any immigrant it is established
to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that-
(i) the alien is inadmissible only under sub-
paragraph (D)(i) or (D)(ii) of such subsection or the
activities for which the alien is inadmissible oc-
curred more than 15 years before the date of the
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alien's application for a visa, admission, or ad-
justment of status,
(ii) the admission to the United States of such
alien would not be contrary to the national wel-
fare, safety, or security of the United States, and
(iii) the alien has been rehabilitated; or
(B) in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse,
parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the United
States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence if it is established to the satisfaction of the
Attorney General that the alien's denial of admission
would result in extreme hardship to the United States
citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son, or
daughter of such alien; and
(2) the Attorney General, in his discretion, and pur-
suant to such terms, conditions and procedures as he
may by regulations prescribe, has consented to the
alien's applying or reapplying for a visa, for admission
to the United States, or adjustment of status.
[emphasis added]
No waiver shall be provided under this subsection in the
case of an alien who has been convicted of (or who has ad-
mitted committing acts that constitute) murder or criminal
acts involving torture, or an attempt or conspiracy to commit
murder or a criminal act involving torture. No waiver shall
be granted under this subsection in the case of an alien who
has previously been admitted to the United States as an
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if either
since the date of such admission the alien has been con-
victed of an aggravated felony or the alien has not lawfully
resided continuously in the United States for a period of not
less than 7 years immediately preceding the date of initia-
tion of proceedings to remove the alien from the United
States. No court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision




Eligibility for a section 212(h) waiver is currently available to
non-citizens who are not permanent residents and who have been
convicted of an aggravated felony but not to legal permanent resi-
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dents convicted of an aggravated felony. In In re Michel,' 74 the
Board held that a non-citizen who has not been previously admit-
ted as a lawful permanent resident is statutorily eligible for a sec-
tion 212(h) waiver, despite a conviction for an aggravated felony.
In contrast, in In re Yeultg,175 the Board held that the IIRAIRA
amended definition of aggravated felony applied retroactively to a
legal permanent resident in deportation proceedings who filed a
section 212(h) waiver prior to the enactment of IIRAIRA. The
Board held that the legal permanent resident had been convicted
of an aggravated felony and, therefore, was ineligible for a section
212(h) waiver. 176
In In re Pineda,177 the Board denied a motion to reopen de-
portation proceedings for a non-citizen to apply for a section 212(h)
waiver in conjunction with an application for adjustment of status.
The Board held that the non-citizen would be ineligible for relief
because he would be considered to be convicted of an aggravated
felony under the IIRAIRA amended definition of aggravated felony
if deportation proceedings were reopened. 178
2. Extreme Hardship Standard
The Board has stated that "extreme hardship" encompasses
both present and future hardship and necessarily depends on all of
the facts and circumstances of each case. 179 Extreme hardship
means more than common results of exclusion, such as separation
and financial difficulties. 8 0 The applicant for the waiver must
demonstrate some greater additional injury that the denial of the
waiver would cause to the relevant citizen or legal permanent
resident family member. For example, in In re Pao, the Adminis-
trative Appeals Unit held that where an applicant's wife suffered
from clinical depression due to the applicant's exclusion from the
United States, a finding of hardship was warranted.' 8 ' Once ex-
treme hardship is shown, the I.N.S. or immigration judge will look
at the following factors to determine whether an applicant de-
serves a favorable exercise of discretion to grant the waiver: the
nature of the offense, the circumstances leading to the offense,
174. Int. Dec. 3335 (B.I.A. 1998).
175. Int. Dec. 3297 (B.I.A. 1997).
176. See id.
177. 1nt. Dec. 3326 (B.I.A. 1997).
178. See id.
179. See In re Shaughnessy, 12 I. & N. Dec. 810 (B.I.A. 1968).
180. See id.
181. A70 270 864 (Comm'r [AAU] Apr. 23, 1992).
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whether the offense is isolated or is part of a pattern of criminal
behavior, evidence of rehabilitation, the extent of hardship to the
applicant's United States citizen or legal permanent resident fam-
ily members and the stability of the applicant's marriage, if mar-
ried to a United States citizen or legal permanent resident.182
c. Application to Cases
Case of Kim from Korea:
Kim entered the United States in January 1990 on an F-1
student visa and attended college. In November 1995, he married
a United States citizen. Their daughter was born in Minneapolis
on August 20, 1996. In September 1996, he adjusted his immigra-
tion status to become a legal permanent resident based on mar-
riage to his United States citizen wife. In January 1997, he was
arrested for paying for a $300 lawnmower with a forged check at a
hardware store. He pled guilty to the charges and was placed on
one year probation with a stay of imposition of sentence. In
August 1997, the I.N.S. arrested him and placed him in removal
proceedings.
Analysis: Kim is deportable for having committed a crime in-
volving moral turpitude within five years of becoming a legal per-
manent resident. He is eligible, however, for a section 212(h)
waiver. His wife will be able to file another marriage petition for
him with the I.N.S. He will file an adjustment of status applica-
tion along with Form 1-601 for the section 212(h) waiver with the
immigration judge. If the I.N.S. approves the marriage, Kim will
need to show the immigration judge that his United States citizen
wife and daughter will suffer extreme hardship if he is deported.
If the immigration judge grants Kim's section 212(h) waiver appli-
cation, then the immigration judge will adjudicate his adjustment
of status application for legal permanent residency.
Case of Michael from Nigeria:
Michael entered the United States in July 1996 as a B-2
tourist to visit his grandmother. His grandmother asked him to
pick up her mail at her box at the post office. Her younger neigh-
bor, Tom, asked him for a ride to the post office and he agreed to
take Tom with him. At the post office, they both retrieved mail
from the boxes and walked out. They had driven about a block
when the police pulled them over. The police arrested Tom for re-
ceiving stolen property (stolen checks) and Michael for aiding and
182. See id.; see also It re Mendez-Moralez, Int. Dec. 3272 (B.I.A. 1996).
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abetting the receipt of stolen property because he was driving the
get-away car. Michael pled guilty to driving the car and was
placed on probation for five years. After the sentencing hearing,
Michael was transferred to the I.N.S. and held without bond.
Analysis: Michael is deportable for having violated the terms
of his visitor's visa by committing a crime involving moral turpi-
tude. He is ntot eligible for a section 212(h) waiver because he does
not have any means by which he can adjust his status to become a
legal permanent resident.
6. Section 212(i) Waivers
The I.N.S. and the immigration judge have the power to
waive the ground of inadmissibility relating to fraud or willful
misrepresentations made by non-citizens where the non-citizen
has a qualifying relative and can prove extreme hardship to the
relative if the non-citizen were to be refused admission for perma-
nent residence. The qualifying relatives include a United States
citizen or legal permanent resident spouse, son or daughter.
Fraud or willful misrepresentations that can be waived include use
of a false green card in order to obtain employment or to cross the
United States border from Canada or Mexico. Falsely represent-
ing oneself to be a United States citizen cannot be waived for such
misrepresentations made on or after September 30, 1996 and con-
stitute grounds for deportation.18 3
a. Statute
I.N.A. § 212(i) [8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)]
Admission of immigrant excludable for fraud or will-
ful misrepresentation of material fact
(1) The Attorney General may, in the discretion of the At-
torney General, waive the application of clause (i) of subsec-
tion (a)(6)(C) [misrepresentation] in the case of an immi-
grant who is the spouse, son, or daughter of a United States
citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent resi-
dence if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney
General that the refusal of admission to the United States of
such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to
the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an
alien. [emphasis added]
(2) No court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision or




action of the Attorney General regarding a waiver under
paragraph (1).
b. Case Law
In 1996, Congress amended the standard to require extreme
hardship for section 212(i) waivers. The factors to be used in de-
termining whether a non-citizen has established extreme hardship
to a qualifying relative include, but are not limited to: the pres-
ence of lawful permanent resident or United States citizen family
ties to the United States; the qualifying relative's family ties out-
side the United States; the conditions in the country or countries
to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of
the qualifying relative's ties to those countries; the financial im-
pact of the departure from the United States; and significant con-
ditions of health and lack of availability of suitable medical care in
the country where the qualifying relative would relocate. 8 4 Fur-
ther, the underlying fraud or misrepresentation for which the non-
citizen seeks a waiver of inadmissibility may be considered as an
adverse factor in adjudicating the waiver application in the exer-
cise of discretion. 8 5
c. Application to Cases
Case of Dominique from Haiti:
Dominique fled political turmoil in Haiti in December 1990
and entered the United States using her twin sister's green card
which she presented to a United States immigration officer at the
Miami Airport. In February 1991, she used her sister's green card
again to obtain employment as a nursery school janitor. In March
1997, she married a United States citizen. In July 1997, she gave
birth to twin daughters who are United States citizens. They filed
a marriage petition and a section 212(i) waiver application with
the I.N.S. on January 13, 1998.
Analysis: Dominique is eligible for the section 212(i) waiver.
She misrepresented herself as being a permanent resident to an
immigration officer and her employer. She must demonstrate ex-
treme hardship to her United States citizen husband and daugh-
ters.
184. See In re Cervantes, Int. Dec. 3380 (B.I.A. 1999).
185. See id. (following In re Tijam, Int. Dec. 3372 (B.I.A. 1998)).
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D. Deportation and Exclusion Proceedings
Even though cancellation proceedings began on April 1, 1997,
hundreds of cases in Minnesota still remain undecided in deporta-
tion and exclusion proceedings. It will take several years for the
cases to be initially decided by an immigration judge and finalized
through the appellate process. Where post-conviction relief is ob-
tained while a case is pending on appeal before the Board or the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, a motion to reopen the deporta-
tion and exclusion proceedings may be made to review the case in
light of changed circumstances relating to the conviction or convic-
tions on which the prior deportation or exclusion order was en-
tered. For this reason, the following section on forms of relief in
deportation and exclusion proceedings is included.
1. Section 212(c) Relief
Section 212(c) relief is a discretionary waiver of the grounds
of exclusion (inadmissibility) that an immigration judge can grant
to a legal permanent resident convicted of certain crimes. Origi-
nally only available to returning residents in exclusion proceed-
ings, it was made available to legal permanent residents who had
not departed the United States but were in deportation proceed-
ings.18 6 In essence, it allows a legal permanent resident a second
chance to keep his or her legal residency in the United States. Be-
fore changes made by the AEDPA and IIRAIRA, cases were often
granted to non-citizens with convictions such as fifth degree pos-
session of a controlled substance, theft and assault. Because the
judge exercises discretion in granting section 212(c) relief, a non-
citizen must show that her positive equities, including rehabilita-
tion, outweigh the criminal behavior and any other adverse fac-
tors.
a. Statute
I.N.A. § 212(c) [8 U.S.C. § 1182(c)]
Nonapplicability of Subsection (a)
Aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who
temporarily proceeded abroad voluntarily and not under an
order of deportation, and who are returning to a lawful un-
relinquished domicile of seven consecutive years, may be
admitted in the discretion of the Attorney General without
186. See Francis v. I.N.S., 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976).
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regard to the provisions of subsection (a) (other than para-
graphs (3) and (9)(C)). Nothing contained in this subsection
shall limit the authority of the Attorney General to exercise
the discretion vested in him under section 211(b). This sub-
section shall not apply to an alien who is deportable by rea-
son of having committed any criminal offense covered in sec-
tion 241(a)(2)(A)(iii) [aggravated felony], (B) [controlled
substances], (C ) [firearm offenses], (D) [miscellaneous
crimes, i.e. espionage, treason], or any offense covered by
section 241(a)(2)(A)(ii) [two or more convictions for crimes
involving moral turpitude] for which both predicate offenses
are without regard to the date of their commission, other-
wise covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(i) [crime involving
moral turpitude]. 8 7 [emphasis added]
187. In cases initiated prior to the AEDPA amendments on April 24, 1996, the
AEDPA amendments do not apply to I.N.A. section 241(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. §
1251(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), according to AEDPA section 435(a) and the following statutory
language applies:
(i)Crimes of moral turpitude.
Any alien who-
(I) is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within
5 years after the date of entry, and
(I) either is sentenced to confinement or is confined therefor in a
prison or correctional institution for one year or longer,
is deportable. [emphasis added]
I.N.A. § 241(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (1995).
In cases initiated on or after April 24, 1996 and prior to April 1, 1997, the
AEDPA amendments do apply to I.N.A. section 241(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. §
1251(a)(2)(A)(i), and the following statutory language is in effect:
(i)Crimes of moral turpitude.
Any alien who-
() is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within
5 years (or 10 years in the case of an alien provided lawful permanent
resident status under section 12556) [snitch visa adjustment] of this
title) after the date of entry, and
(II) is convicted of a crime for which a sentence of one year or longer
may be imposed,
is deportable. [emphasis added]
I.N.A. § 241(a)(2)(A)(i) (as amended by AEDPA).
I.N.A. section 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) prior to AEDPA and IIRAIRA
amendments:
Aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who temporarily proceeded
abroad voluntarily and not under an order of deportation, and who are returning
to a lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years, may be admitted in
the discretion of the Attorney General without regard to the provisions of subsec-
tion (a) (other than paragraphs (3) and (9)(C)). Nothing contained in this subsec-
tion shall limit the authority of the Attorney General to exercise the discretion
vested in him under section 211(b). 77e first sentence of this subsection shall not
apply to an alien who has been convicted of one or more aggravated felonies and




b. Statutory Changes with AEDPA and IIRAIRA
Section 440(d) of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) eliminated the availability of section
212(c) for persons convicted of any controlled substance offense
(including fifth degree possession offenses), any firearms offense
and more than one felony offense for a crime involving moral tur-
pitude. On February 21, 1997, the Attorney General issued a deci-
sion on certification in In re Soriaiw,18 8 following her previous va-
cation of the Board's published opinion on September 12, 1996.
Attorney General Janet Reno determined that the application of
AEDPA section 440(d) to section 212(c) does not impair a right, in-
crease a liability or impose new duties on criminal aliens and con-
cluded that AEDPA section 440(d) can be applied retroactively to
section 212(c) applications involving controlled substance or fire-
arms offenses pending before the immigration court on April 24,
1996. Legal challenges in the federal courts continue over the ef-
fective date of section 440(d) and its application to section 212(c)
cases pending with the immigration court and the Board on April
24, 1996, the date of enactment. 8 9 Cancellation of removal re-
stored this relief for legal permanent residents in removal pro-
ceedings who have been convicted for controlled substance of-
fenses, firearms offenses or multiple convictions for crimes
I.N.A. § 212(c) (1995).
188. Int. Dec. 3289 (A.G. 1997).
189. Constitutional challenges are pending in federal courts on whether AEDPA
section 440(d) applies retroactively to 212(c) cases filed with the immigration court
on or before April 24, 1996 in light of the United States Supreme Court decision in
Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 265-66 (1994) (holding that a pre-
sumption against retroactivity applies when deciding whether changes in law
should be applied to pending controversies in the absence of express congressional
directive because "settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted"). The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has not yet ruled on the constitutionality of this
provision of the AEDPA. The federal courts that have decided the issue on statu-
tory interpretation grounds have held that AEDPA section 440(d) does not apply
retroactively. See Henderson v. Reno, 157 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1998); Pak v. Reno, 8
F. Supp.2d 1001 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (same); Goncalves v. Reno, 144 F.3d 110, (1st
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 98-835, Reno v. Goncalves, 119 S. Ct. 1140 (1999); Ma-
gana-Pizano v. I.N.S., 152 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 1998) vacated and remanded 98-836;
I.N.S. v. Magana-Pizano with 98-1011 Magana-Pizano v. I.N.S., - S. Ct. (Mar. 8,
1999). Other federal courts have overruled the Board of Immigration Appeals' de-
cision in In re Fuentes-Campos, Int. Dec. 3318 (B.I.A. 1997) that AEDPA section
440(d) does not apply to non-citizens in exclusion proceedings and that section
212(c) is, therefore, available to non-citizens in exclusion proceedings but not
available to legal permanent residents in deportation proceedings. See Jorge de
Sousa v. Reno, 30 F. Supp. 844 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (holding that AEDPA § 440(d) ap-
plies retroactively and that allowing adjudication of § 212(c) applications in exclu-
sion but not deportation proceedings violates equal protection); Almon v. Reno, 13
F. Supp.2d 143 (D. Mass. 1998); Cruz v. Reno, 6 F. Supp.2d 744 (N.D. Ill. 1998);
Jurado-Gutierrez v. I.N.S., 977 F. Supp. 1089 (D. Colo. 1997).
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involving moral turpitude that are not aggravated felonies.
For example, Mario has been a permanent resident for eight
years and has only one conviction. He was convicted for a fifth de-
gree possession of a controlled substance in 1992 (prior to passage
of AEDPA on April 24, 1996) and placed in deportation proceed-
ings in December 1995. The final deportation hearing on his
212(c) application was set for September 1996. Mario's case is
what immigration practitioners call a "gap case:" he is a long-term
permanent resident who would be eligible for 212(c) relief but for
AEDPA section 440(d), which the I.N.S. argues retroactively
eliminated such relief for any non-citizen convicted of any con-
trolled substance crime, including fifth degree simple possession,
regardless of whether the non-citizen pled guilty with the knowl-
edge that he or she would be eligible for 212(c) relief from deporta-
tion. He would be eligible for cancellation of removal if the Attor-
ney General, through the local I.N.S. office, would move to
terminate deportation proceedings and initiate removal proceed-
ings.
Under IIRAIRA section 309(c), the Attorney General has the
discretion to terminate deportation or exclusion proceedings and
initiate removal proceedings where an evidentiary hearing has not
yet taken place. 190 Only recently did the Department of Justice
decide that legal permanent residents with cases pending before
the immigration court or the Board who would be eligible for Can-
cellation of Removal for Permanent Residents could be "repapered"
at the discretion of the I.N.S. to have their cases in deportation
proceedings terminated and to be placed in removal proceedings in
order to apply for Cancellation of Removal upon request by the
non-citizen.19'
For those non-citizens who exhausted their appeal rights to
the Board, the process of "repapering" is not available. 92 Post-
conviction relief is an important option for non-citizens with gap
cases who would not be eligible for Cancellation of Removal.
190. IIRAIRA section 304(b) repealed section 212(c) effective on the Title III-A
effective date, April 1, 1997. However, section 306(d) of IIRAIRA amends AEDPA
section 440(d), which in turn amends former I.N.A. section 212(c), which is in ef-
fect during the transition period and for cases that fall within IIRAIRA section
309(c)'s sweep, that is cases where the I.N.S. issues an Order to Show Cause on or
before March 31, 1997 for deportation or exclusion proceedings and an evidentiary
hearing has not yet taken place.
191. See Memorandum from Michael J. Creppy, chief immigration judge, Dec. 9,
1998, reprinted in 75 INTERPRETER RELEASES app. 11 (1998); Memorandum from
Paul W. Virtue, general counsel for the Immigration and Naturalization Service,





Although section 212(c) appears to apply only to legal perma-
nent residents who departed from the United States and subse-
quently attempt to return to the United States, the federal courts
have extended section 212(c) relief to legal permanent residents
who have not left the United States but are in deportation pro-
ceedings for certain criminal convictions. In Francis v. I.N.S., the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that section 212(c) relief is
available to legal permanent residents in deportation proceedings
under the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's
due process clause which requires extension of the exclusion
waiver to similarly situated legal permanent residents in deporta-
tion hearings. 193
An applicant for section 212(c) relief must establish that she
warrants the favorable exercise of discretion. The court balances
favorable and unfavorable factors. Relevant favorable factors for
the exercise of discretion include family ties in the United States,
length of residence in the United States, United States military
service, employment history, property ownership, business ties,
community service, rehabilitation after criminal convictions and
good moral character references. 194 Unfavorable factors include
adverse immigration history, reports of general bad moral charac-
ter and the nature, seriousness and recency of criminal convic-
tions.195 Where a criminal conviction is involved, the court will
look to the nature and seriousness of the offense, the length of sen-
tence, frequency or recency of convictions and the presence or ab-
sence of rehabilitation. 9 6 In cases involving a serious drug crime,
a grave crime or a pattern of serious criminal misconduct, the ap-
plicant must show outstanding and unusual countervailing equi-
ties to obtain relief.197
Section 212(c) relief is not available in three circumstances.
First, section 212(c) relief is not available where deportability is
based on a firearms conviction under section 241(a)(2)(C) of the
I.N.A. (1990), regardless of whether the firearms offense involved
moral turpitude. Second, recently in In re Fuentes-Campos, the
Board held that non-citizens cannot seek section 212(c) waiver to
193. 532 F.2d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 1976).
194. See it re Matin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581 (B.I.A. 1978).
195. See id.
196. See In re Edwards, 20 . & N. Dec. 191 (B.I.A. 1990).
197. See Maashio v. I.N.S., 45 F.3d 1235, 1239-40 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that
misdemeanor convictions may be sufficient to trigger the outstanding equities re-
quirement); In re Buscemi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 628 (B.I.A. 1988).
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establish adjustment of status in deportation proceedings even
though such relief is available to non-citizens in exclusion pro-
ceedings. 198 In In re Gonzalez-Camnarillo, the Board reaffirmed its
decision in In re Fuentes-Campos stating the AEDPA amendment
for section 212(c) applies retroactively and that there is no uncon-
stitutional disparate treatment because Congress clearly pre-
cluded aliens who are "deportable" on the basis of specified crimi-
nal offenses from establishing eligibility for a waiver. 199 Third, a
non-citizen who is deportable for having been convicted of two or
more crimes involving moral turpitude and whose deportation pro-
ceedings were initiated prior to the enactment of AEDPA on April
24, 1996 is ineligible for a section 212(c) waiver if more than one
conviction resulted in a sentence or confinement of one year or
longer.200
d. Application to Cases
George from South Africa:
In 1983, George was twelve when he entered the United
States as a legal permanent resident based on the visa petition
filed for him by his mother. In 1990, George pled guilty to third
degree assault from a fight in a bar. He received a stay of imposi-
tion of sentence and was placed on three years of probation. In
1993, he pled guilty to misdemeanor theft of a motorcycle; he was
sentenced to thirty days in prison with a stay of execution and
placed on probation for one year. In November 1996, George pled
guilty to gross misdemeanor theft of a computer harddrive. He
was sentenced to ninety days in prison. As he was finishing his
prison term in January 1997, the I.N.S. placed an administrative
hold on him. He was transferred to I.N.S. custody and served with
an Order to Show Cause which initiated deportation proceedings
against him.
Analysis: George is deportable for having committed two
crimes involving moral turpitude since he entered the United
States, third degree assault and gross misdemeanor theft. He is
ineligible for section 212(c) relief because I.N.S. began deportation
proceedings against him after the AEDPA amendments took effect
and he has been convicted of third degree assault, a felony with a
possible sentence of more than one year. Even though he is a legal
permanent resident who had resided in the United States for four-
198. Int. Dec. 3318 (B.I.A. 1997).
199. In re Gonzalez-Camarillo, Int. Dec. 3320 (B.I.A. 1997).
200. See In re Fortiz, Int. Dec. 3340 (BI.MA 1998).
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teen years at the time I.N.S. began deportation proceedings
against him, he is statutorily ineligible for section 212(c) relief.20 1
Katarina from Switzerland:
Katarina entered the United States in January 1986 on a fi-
anc~e visa. She married a United States citizen, Barry, who then
filed a marriage petition for her. She became a legal permanent
resident in May 1986. After they were married, Barry began
growing marijuana plants in the basement of their home and
smoking marijuana frequently. He became abusive toward
Katarina when he was under the influence of the marijuana. One
day while he was beating her in July 1993, she grabbed a fireplace
poker and struck him repeatedly on the head and chest. He began
bleeding and she called for an ambulance. The police arrived,
found the marijuana plants, and arrested her. She was charged
with second degree assault as well as possession of marijuana with
intent to distribute. Barry was charged with possession of mari-
juana with intent to distribute. In a plea bargain, she agreed to
testify against him and pled guilty to third degree assault in ex-
change for an eleven month sentence in December 1993. While in
prison, her husband filed for divorce, which she did not oppose,
and the state district court granted. After her release from prison
in July 1994, she obtained employment. In November 1995, the
I.N.S. mailed her an Order to Show Cause to appear for her first
immigration court hearing which was held in February 1996.
Analysis: Katarina is deportable for having committed a
crime involving moral turpitude within her first five years after
entry. She is eligible for section 212(c) because her case was initi-
ated by the I.N.S. prior to the AEDPA amendments on April 24,
1996; if it were initiated after April 24, 1996, she would be ineligi-
ble for section 212(c) relief because third degree assault is a felony
punishable by a term of imprisonment of more than one year. She
is a legal permanent resident and has legally resided in the United
States for seven years.20 2
2. Suspension of Deportation
Suspension of deportation is a discretionary remedy for non-
citizens in deportation proceedings who have lived in the United
States for at least seven years, can demonstrate that their depor-
tation will result in extreme hardship to themselves or a qualifying
relative and can demonstrate good moral character. Recent
201. See discussion supra p. 686.,
202. See discussion supra p. 686.
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amendments by the NACARA apply retroactively to terminate the
amount of time that a non-citizen has accumulated for purposes of
the seven year physical presence requirement. The seven year pe-
riod stops accumulating upon arrest of the non-citizen or issuance
of the Order to Show Cause or Notice to Appear by the I.N.S. In
addition, certain nationalities will be treated more favorably based
on the NACARA.
a. Statute
I.N.A § 244(a) (1995) [8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1995)]
Adjustment of status for permanent residence; con-
tents [suspension of deportation]
As hereinafter prescribed in this section, the Attorney
General may, in his discretion, suspend deportation and
adjust the status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence, in the case of an alien (other than an
alien described in section 241(a)(4)(D)) who applies to the
Attorney General for suspension of deportation and-
(1) is deportable under any law of the United States ex-
cept the provisions specified in paragraph (2) of this subsec-
tion; has been physically present in the United States for a
continuous period of not less than seven years immediately
preceding the date of such application, and proves that dur-
ing all of such period he was and is a person of good moral
character; and is a person whose deportation would, in the
opinion of the Attorney General, result in extreme hardship
to the alien or to his spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen
of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for per-
manent residence;203
(2) is deportable under paragraph (2), (3) or (4) of sec-
203. For most non-citizens with potential suspension of deportation cases, the
following amendment by the Nicaragua Adjustment and Central American Relief
Act of 1997 applies:
(A) IN GENERAL.-Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), paragraphs (1)
and (2) of section 240A(d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (relating
to continuous residence or physical presence) shall apply to orders to show
cause (including those referred to in section 242B(a)(1) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act, as in effect before the title III-A effective date), is-
sued before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this Act.
111 Stat. 2160, 2196 (1997).
The entire NACARA is too long to reproduce here. For rules specifically affecting
Nicaraguans and Cubans who entered the United States on or before December 1,
1995 as well as Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and persons from the former Soviet
Union and eastern block countries who entered the United States prior to the end
of 1990 seeking refuge, see the NACARA or contact an immigration attorney.
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tion 241(a); has been physically present in the United States
for a continuous period of not less than 10 years immediately
following the commission of an act, or the assumption of a
status, constituting a ground for deportation, and proves that
during all of such period he has been and is a person of good
moral character; and is a person whose deportation would,
in the opinion of the Attorney General result in exceptional
and extremely unusual hardship to the alien or to his
spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States
or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence; or
(3) is deportable under any law of the United States ex-
cept section 241(a)(1)(G) and the provisions specified in
paragraph (2); has been physically present in the United
States for a continuous period of not less than 3 years im-
mediately preceding the date of such application; has been
battered or subjected to extreme cruelty in the United States
by a spouse or parent who is a United States citizen or law-
ful permanent resident (or is the parent of a child of a
United States citizen or lawful permanent resident and the
child has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty in
the United States by such citizen or permanent resident
parent); and proves that during all of such time in the
United States the alien was and is a person of good moral
character; and is a person whose deportation would, in the
opinion of the Attorney General, result in extreme hardship
to the alien or the alien's parent or child. [emphasis added]
b. Case Law
The standard for extreme hardship was defined by the Board
in In re Anderson, to include the age of the non-citizen, family ties
in the United States and abroad, the length of residence in the
United States, the non-citizen's health, conditions in the country to
which the non-citizen is deportable (including economic and politi-
cal conditions), the non-citizen's financial status (including em-
ployment and occupation), the possibility of other means of ad-
justment of status, whether the non-citizen is of special assistance
to the United States or community, her immigration history in the
United States (including immigration violations) and ties to the
United States community. 0 4
204. See In re Anderson, 16 I. & N. Dec. 596 (B.I.A. 1978).
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c. Application to Cases
Case of Ian from Ireland:
Ian entered the United States without inspection by canoeing
through the Boundary Waters in northern Minnesota in August
1985. He used a false green card to obtain employment on a con-
struction crew. In January 1997, he was arrested by the I.N.S.
during a raid on a construction site and was issued an Order to
Show Cause.
Analysis: Ian is statutorily eligible for suspension of deporta-
tion. He does not have a criminal record, has good moral character
and has been in the United States for more than seven years. He
will have to demonstrate extreme hardship to himself beyond the
normal consequences of deportation which may be difficult in his
case.
E. Mandatory Detention: Deprivation of Liberty at Its Best.
As of October 9, 1998, the I.N.S. must detain many categories
of non-citizens without bond, regardless of whether they are a
flight risk or pose a danger to the local community. Non-citizens
who are subject to mandatory detention include those non-citizens
who have been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude for
which they have been sentenced to one year or more, convicted of
an aggravated felony, convicted for possession or sale of a con-
trolled substance other than simple possession of thirty grams or
less of marijuana, or convicted of two or more crimes involving
moral turpitude, regardless of the length of the sentence, if any.205
Thus, a non-citizen with two misdemeanor shoplifting convictions
can be held in detention by the I.N.S. without bond.
For non-citizen clients from countries to which the United
States does not or cannot currently deport non-citizens, mandatory
detention can result in indefinite and even lifetime detention if the
non-citizen is not successful in gaining withholding of removal or
another form of immigration relief. There have been some success-
ful habeas corpus actions across the country requiring that a long-
term permanent resident be given a bond hearing and/or a bond.206
However, not every legal permanent resident may be successful in
obtaining such federal court relief. For this reason, it is critical to
investigate a non-citizen's past history, including any stay of adju-
205. See I.N.A. § 236(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
206. See, e.g., Cabreja-Roja v. Reno, 999 F. Supp. 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Morisath
v. Smith, No. C97-12392, (W.D. Wash. Apr. 13, 1998); Ekekhor v. Aljets, 979 F.
Supp. 640 (N.D. Ill. 1997); St. John v. McElroy, 917 F. Supp. 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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dication or deferred adjudication cases. A non-citizen who has
been convicted for one misdemeanor crime involving moral turpi-
tude and pleads guilty to a second misdemeanor crime involving
moral turpitude may find himself subject to mandatory detention
by the I.N.S. In order to avoid mandatory detention, you may be
able to convince a state court judge or prosecutor to allow your cli-
ent to plead to a crime that is not an aggravated felony and does
not involve moral turpitude.
In statutory rape cases where the relations were consensual,
it is critical that the non-citizen plead to a provision which will not
result in an aggravated felony conviction. For example, an eight-
een year old non-citizen who marries a sixteen year old in a
Hmong clan traditional marriage can be convicted for statutory
rape in Minnesota because Minnesota does not recognize common
law marriage where the relationship arises within the state of
Minnesota. In this case, the male non-citizen will have an aggra-
vated felony conviction and will be subject to mandatory detention
even though he is a valedictorian of his high school class and is
working to support his new wife.
F. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
The United States is a party to the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations. 20 7 As a treaty made under the authority of the
United States Constitution, the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations is a federal law and supreme law of the land.208 Under
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, a non-citizen who is
detained and/or charged with a crime must be informed of her
right to speak with a consular officer from her country. 209 Unfor-
tunately, few police departments or other law enforcement agen-
cies are even aware of the Vienna Convention on Consular Rela-
tions. Consulates of foreign countries can appear in criminal cases
207. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocols, art.
36(1)(b), Apr. 24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 262-512, ratified by the United States on No-
vember 21, 1969.
208. See U.S. CONST. art. VI.
209. Article 36(1)(b) provides:
If he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall,
without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its
consular district, a national of that State is arrested or committed to
prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner.
Any communication addressed to the consular post by the person ar-
rested, in prison, custody, or detention shall also be forwarded by the said
authorities without delay. The said authorities shall inform the person
concerned without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph.
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocols, art. 36(1)(b),
Apr. 24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 262-512.
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as amicus curiae. Consulates have an interest in ensuring that the
rights of their citizens be respected.
The lack of an advisal regarding the right to contact a consu-
late officer may be a ground under which a motion to suppress
statements given in violation of the Vienna Convention, to vacate a
conviction or to expunge a conviction can be brought. In the con-
text of a motion to suppress, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that where a non-citizen shows that the Vienna Convention
was violated by a failure of authorities to inform her of her right to
contact her consulate, the defendant non-citizen has the initial
burden in a criminal proceeding of producing evidence showing
prejudice from that violation.210 To establish prejudice, the defen-
dant non-citizen must show that she did not know of her right; she
would have availed herself of the right had she known of it; and
"there was a likelihood that the contact would have resulted in as-
sistance to [her] in resisting deportation."'2 11
Once the defendant non-citizen meets that burden, the gov-
ernment must rebut the showing of prejudice. 212 At the Minnesota
state level, a state court used the three step approach to determine
prejudice. 213 The state court held that where a non-citizen was
not advised of his right to contact a consulate officer upon his ar-
rest and charge in state court, the motion to vacate must be
granted and the conviction must be withdrawn based on the mani-
fest injustice resulting from the denial of his right to contact his
consulate.
G. Convention Against Torture
For non-citizens who face probable torture if returned to their
country of origin, a new form of relief from deportation or removal
may be available to them. The United States is a party to the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or De-
grading Treatment or Punishment (CAT).2 14 Under Article 3 of the
210. See United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 170 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 1999)
(case remanded for prejudice determination).
211. United States v. Villa-Fabela, 882 F.2d 434, 440 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting
United States v. Rangel-Gonzales, 617 F.2d 529, 533 (9th Cir. 1980)), overruled on
other grounds by United States v. Proa-Tovar, 975 F.2d 592, 594 (9th Cir. 1992).
212. See Lombera-Conorlinga, 170 F.3d 1241.
213. See, e.g., Ademodi v. State, No. 90063152 (Henn. Co., 4th Jud. Dist., Minn.
Dec. 21, 1998).
214. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CAT), G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp.
No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984), entered into force June 26, 1987 (entered into
force for the United States Nov. 20, 1994).
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CAT, the United States is prohibited from removing a non-citizen
to a country where there are substantial grounds for believing that
she would be in danger of being subjected to torture. 2 15 Torture
may be physical or mental.216
Thus, a non-citizen who is ineligible for asylum or withhold-
ing of removal may be eligible to have her removal deferred until a
time when he does not face the probability of torture in that coun-
try upon her return. Similar to withholding of removal, a grant of
deferral of removal will not lead to legal permanent residency.
Moreover, a grant of deferral of removal may not lead to release
from I.N.S. custody.217
H. Rule 15 Motions to Withdraw a Guilty Plea, Motions to
Reduce Sentences and Post-Conviction Petitions
In light of the Board of Immigration Appeal's decision in In re
Roldan expungements for crimes involving moral turpitude and
pleas under Minnesota Statute section 152.18 will no longer be
given effect in immigration proceedings. 218 However, a successful
direct appeal of a conviction based on the merits or on an under-
lying statutory or constitutional defect will be given effect in im-
migration proceedings. 219
1. Rule 15 Motions to Withdraw a Guilty Plea
In analyzing the options to reduce or alleviate the immigra-
tion consequences for non-citizens with convictions meeting the
immigration definition of conviction, defense attorneys may need
to file a motion to withdraw a guilty plea.220 Rule 15 Motions are
based on the "manifest injustice" standard. The lack of an advisal
regarding immigration consequences at the time of the plea alone
215. See § 242(a) of Pub. L. No. 105-227, reprinted in 144 CONG. REC. H11265
(daily ed. Oct. 19, 1998).
216. Torture has been defined as
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from
him or her or a third person information or a confession, punishing him or
her for an act he or she or a third person has committed or is suspected of
having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or her or a third per-
son, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such
pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent
or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official ca-
pacity.
8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a).
217. For further information, contact an immigration attorney in your area.
218. Int. Dec. 3377 (B.I.A. 1999).
219. See id.
220. See MINN. R. CRIM. PROC. 15.220.
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does not constitute "manifest injustice" as deportation and other
immigration consequences are merely collateral consequences. 221
Thus, in order to bring a Rule 15 motion, you will need to state a
statutory defect, a state constitutional defect, a federal statutory
defect, or a federal constitutional defect in the plea as the reason
for the existence of the manifest injustice.
Successful Rule 15 motions have been brought after Alanis v.
Minnesota. In one case, the state court judge held that the failure
of the prosecution to offer pretrial diversion was a state defect in
the plea process that combined with the harm that the defendant
would suffer if deported to Nigeria, his ties to the United States,
hardship to his family and lack of other criminal history, rose to
the level of manifest injustice and allowed the guilty plea to bur-
glary to be withdrawn.222 In another case, the state court allowed
a plea for sale of a controlled substance to be withdrawn where the
defendant was not advised of his right to contact his Nigerian con-
sular officer under the Vienna Convention on Consular Rela-
tions.223 In both cases, the defendants were long-term permanent
residents who were not advised of potential immigration conse-
quences prior to entering their pleas.
Non-citizens who do not speak English have the right to an
interpreter in their native language in court. The lack of an inter-
preter or a competent interpreter may be grounds to argue that a
plea was not knowing, voluntary or intelligent.
2. Rule 27 Motion to Reduce a Sentence
To avoid aggravated felony convictions and certain convic-
tions for crimes involving moral turpitude that bar admissibility,
you may need to bring a motion under Rule 27 to reduce a sen-
tence by a few days or even a few months. 224 For example, a non-
citizen who is sentenced to a year and a day (366 days) for theft
has an aggravated felony conviction. A successful motion to re-
duce the sentence to 364 days will mean that the non-citizen has
been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude but not of an
aggravated felony, thus possibly rendering the non-citizen eligible
for different forms of relief.
221. See Alanis v. Minnesota, 583 N.W.2d 573 (Minn. 1998); Berkow v. State,
583 N.W.2d 562 (Minn. 1998).
222. See Adegoke v. Minnesota, No. 90-01549 (2d Jud. Dist. Sept. 18, 1998).
223. See Ademodi v. Minnesota, No. 90063152 (4th Jud. Dist. Dec. 21, 1998).




Where a Rule 15 Motion is not successful, then post-
conviction relief should be considered under Minnesota Statute
section 590. If a motion for post-conviction relief is filed, then the
Minnesota Attorney General must also be served. Involving the
Attorney General can create difficulties in negotiations with the
prosecutor; for this reason, attorneys should first attempt a Rule
15 Motion.
4. Pardons
Under I.N.A. section 237(a)(2)(A)(v), a full and unconditional
pardon by the President of the United States or the governor of a
state will prevent deportation for a conviction for a crime involving
moral turpitude, an aggravated felony or high-speed flight near a
border.
Conclusion
Immigration consequences must be considered when repre-
senting non-citizens in the criminal justice system. Working with
non-citizen defendants to advise them of their rights and the im-
migration consequences for criminal behavior as well as with the
prosecutors and the courts can prevent the permanent destruction




Glossary of Immigration Terms and Abbreviations
Admissibility: To be admissible, a non-citizen must demonstrate
that he or she is not barred by one of the grounds of
inadmissibility in order to enter the United States as a visitor, a
legal permanent resident, to adjust his or her immigration status
to become a legal permanent resident or to return as a legal
permanent resident to the United States. Bars to inadmissibility
include lack of proof of vaccinations and certain criminal
convictions.
Admission/Admitted: The lawful entry of a non-citizen into the
United States after inspection and authorization by an
immigration officer.
Amnesty Program: Program created in the Immigration Reform
and Control Act of 1986 for non-citizens who were physically
present in the United States on or before January 1, 1982.
Amnesty applicants whose applications were approved became
legal permanent residents.
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA): Legislation enacted on April 24, 1996 that restricted
availability of waivers of deportation for legal permanent residents
convicted of certain crimes, including firearms and controlled
substance violations, and created new immigration provisions
relating to domestic and international terrorism.
Asylee: A non-citizen who has been granted asylum by an
immigration judge or an I.N.S. asylum officer.
Asylum Applicant: A non-citizen who has applied for political
asylum with an I.N.S. Asylum Office or with an immigration
judge. This non-citizen may have entered the country legally (i.e.
as a tourist or with a student visa) or without inspection.
Board of Immigration Appeals (B.I.A.): The federal
administrative law appellate board located in Falls Church,
Virginia that reviews decisions of the immigration judges.




the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled on the particular
issue in question. The B.I.A. is an administrative agency within
the Executive Office for Immigration Review in the Department of
Justice and separate from the Immigration and Naturalization
Service.
Border Crossing Identification Card: An identity document
issued to a non-citizen who is a legal permanent resident or who is
a resident in a foreign contiguous territory for the purpose of
crossing over the borders between the United States and the
foreign contiguous territory (i.e. Mexico or Canada).
Conditional Permanent Resident: A non-citizen who has been
granted conditional residency (conditional green card) for two
years based on marriage to a United States citizen. At the end of
the two year period, the non-citizen must apply to have the
conditions removed; once the conditions are removed, the non-
citizen is a legal permanent resident (green card holder).
Deportability: A non-citizen is deportable for having violated a
section of the Immigration and Nationality Act, such as having
overstayed the time allowed by a visitor's visa or having
committed certain crimes. The Immigration and Naturalization
Service serves a charging document with allegations of
deportability on a non-citizen. An immigration judge makes the
determination whether a non-citizen is deportable in deportation
or removal proceedings and whether a non-citizen has a defense to
deportation or removal from the United States.
Employment Authorization Document (EAD): Also known as
a work permit, the EAD provides evidence of eligibility to work in
the United States. A person with an EAD does not have
permanent status in the United States because he or she has a
pending application that has not yet been granted by the I.N.S. or
an immigration judge.
Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR): Federal
administrative agency in the Department of Justice, which
includes the Office of the Immigration Judge and the Board of
Immigration Appeals. The local immigration court is in




Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996 (IIRAIRA): Legislation enacted on September 30,
1996 that overhauled the immigration law, greatly expanding the
definition of aggravated felony, creating removal proceedings in
lieu of deportation/exclusion proceedings with different and yet
similar forms of relief from removal (deportation), and adding new
grounds of deportability and inadmissibility.
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990 (IMMACT 1990):
Legislation enacted in December 1990 that expanded the
definition of aggravated felony and created Temporary Protected
Status (TPS) as well as other major changes in immigration law.
Immigration and Naturalization Service (I.N.S.): Federal
administrative agency in the Department of Justice charged with
enforcing the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990 (as
amended). Local office in Bloomington, Minnesota. District covers
Minnesota, South Dakota, and North Dakota. Deportation office:
(612) 313-9060.
Lawful or Legal Permanent Resident (LPR): A non-citizen
who has been granted legal (lawful) permanent residence, also
known as a "green card."
Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of
1997 (NACARA): Legislation enacted at the end of November
1997 that allows Nicaraguans and Cubans present in the United
States on or before December 1, 1995 to apply for adjustment of
status to become legal permanent residents. NACARA also allows
Salvadorans and Guatemalans who entered the United States in
1990 (and meet other requirements), as well as persons from the
former Soviet Union and Eastern block countries who entered in
1990 and applied for asylum prior to December 1991, to apply for
cancellation of removal under the former standards of suspension
of deportation.
Notice to Appear (NTA): Charging document served by I.N.S.
on non-citizens to begin removal proceedings; may state a date at
which to appear before an immigration judge or may state that
notice of a hearing will be sent later. NTA's issued since April 1,




Order for Deportation/Deportation Order: An order issued by
an immigration judge to remove (deport) a non-citizen from the
United States at government expense where the charging
document was an Order to Show Cause.
Order for Removal/Removal Order: An order issued by an
immigration judge to remove (deport) a non-citizen from the
United States at government expense where the charging
document was a Notice to Appear.
Order of Release on Own Recognizance (OR): Order entered
by an I.N.S. officer or an immigration judge releasing a non-citizen
from detention by the I.N.S. without a bond.
Order to Show Cause (OSC): Charging document served by
I.N.S. on non-citizens to begin deportation proceedings; may state
a date at which to appear before an immigration judge or may
state that notice of a hearing will be sent later. OSC's issued prior
to April 1, 1997 place non-citizens in deportation proceedings.
Refugee: A non-citizen recognized overseas by the I.N.S. or
United States Embassy/Consulate as being a refugee under
immigration law; can apply after one year to become an LPR.
Special Agricultural Workers Program (SAW): Program
created by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 for
non-citizens who had worked in agriculture (i.e. farmworkers) for
ninety days between May 1985 and May 1986. Most SAW
applicants become legal permanent residents in December 1990 or
December 1991.
Temporary Protected Status (TPS): A non-citizen may have
been granted TPS, which is temporary permission to live and work
in the United States. The Attorney General has the authority to
designate the countries from which its nationals or citizens are
eligible for TPS based on a natural disaster or civil chaos. Such
designations last for one year and may be renewed by the Attorney
General. Some countries for which TPS status has been
designated in the past include Bosnia-Herzegovenia, Burundi, El
Salvador, Kosovo, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Montserrat,




United States Border Patrol: Federal administrative agency in
the Department of Justice that arrests non-citizens suspected of
having violated the immigration law; active in northern Minnesota
and North Dakota. Local headquarters in Grand Forks, North
Dakota.
Undocumented Non-Citizen: Non-citizen who entered the
United States without inspection (illegally) by a United States
official.
Voluntary Departure: A form of relief granted by an
immigration judge to a non-citizen who has the opportunity to
leave at his or her own expense in lieu of a deportation or removal
order. Failure to depart by the specified date may lead to a five
year bar from being able to adjust his or her status to become a
legal permanent resident as well as other forms of relief.
Voluntary Deportation: A non-citizen agrees to be deported by
the I.N.S. and waives his or her rights to a hearing before an
immigration judge.
Voluntary Return: A non-citizen agrees to voluntarily return to
Mexico at his or her own expense after being arrested by the




Minnesota Pleas and Sentencing Dispositions and the
Immigration Definition of Conviction
Type of Dispo- Admission of + Punishment, Pen- = Immigration
sition Facts alty or Restraint on Conviction?
Liberty1
Guilty plea Yes Yes Yes
Nolo Conten- Yes (taken as Yes Yes
dere plea guilty plea)
(federal court)
Alford plea Yes (taken as Yes Yes
guilty plea)










Suspended No Immaterial No
Prosecution
4
Stay of Adjudi- If yes, and Yes, then Yes
cation 5  If no, then Immaterial No
1. The form of punishment, penalty or restraint on liberty must be ordered by
a judge. A "penalty" includes fines. "Restraint on liberty" includes probation and
any term of imprisonment.
2. Continuance for Dismissal with Stipulated Facts: If there is not any ad-
mission of facts on record to get into pretrial diversion, then there will not be an
immigration conviction. De Novo (Hennepin County) and Project Remand (Ramsey
County) are examples of diversion programs.
3. Continuance for Dismissal without Stipulated Facts: If there is not any
admission of facts on record to get into pretrial diversion, then there will not be an
immigration conviction. If the defendant violates terms of probation, then the de-
fendant will return to court to enter plea of guilty or not guilty with subsequent
trial which may lead to an immigration conviction.
4. If probation violation, then the case goes to trial.
5. See State v. Foss, 556 N.W.2d 540 (Minn. 1996) (holding that a stay of ad-
judication over prosecutor's objection is not warranted where no special circum-
stances are present and trial court merely disagreed with prosecutor's exercise of
charging discretion in routine assault cases); State v. Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d 252
(Minn. 1996) (holding that a trial court may, under the doctrine of inherent judi-





Type of Plea Admission of + Punishment, = Immigra-
Facts Penalty or Re- tion Convic-
atraint on Lib- tion?
ertY
Stay of Imposition of Yes Yes Yes
Sentence (Plea of guilty
with stay of imposition






Stay of Imposition for Yes Yes Yes
Discharge (only proba-
tion gets discharged)
Stay of Execution of Yes Yes Yes
Sentence
Sentenced Imposed and Yes Yes Yes
Executed
Dismissal (by court, No No No
negotiated or after
trial)
Other Procedures Dis- Yes Yes Yes
charge of a Defendant
MINN. STAT. § 609.13(3)
Plea withdrawal Minn. No Yes No
R. Crim. P. 15.05
Dismissal in interest of No Immaterial No
justice MINN. STAT. §
631.21
Sentence pursuant to Yes Yes Yes
MINN. STAT. § 152.18
re: drug offenses
**Note: If admission of facts, punishment, penalty or restraint on liberty are
not found, then the non-citizen will not have a conviction for immigration pur-
poses.**
6. The form of punishment, penalty or restraint on liberty must be ordered by
a judge. A "penalty" includes fines. "Restraint on liberty" includes probation and
any term of imprisonment.
1999]
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Inunigration Law Resources in Minnesota
The following agencies have attorneys who are available to answer




Immigrant Law Center of Minnesota (a.k.a. Oficina Legal)
651/291-0110
Legal Assistance to Minnesota Prisoners (LAMP)
612/625-6336
Minnesota State Public Defender
612/627-6980
1999]
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Appendix E
QUESTIONS FOR CALLS REGARDING IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES
FOR NON-CITIZENS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
Non-Citizen Information
Name: Date of Birth:
Immigration Status: (Choose one)
Legal Permanent Resident Amnesty/Family Unity NIV Overstay
Refugee Visitor J-I/F-I/M-1 Stude




Date of first entry into U.S.:
Manner of entry: (Inspected or not inspected by U.S. Customs; Claimed U.S.
citizenship):
Date of last entry into U.S.:
Manner of entry: (Inspected or not inspected by U.S. Customs; Claimed U.S.
citizenship):
Family Members and Their Immigration Status in U.S.: __
If U.S. citizen parent(s), defendant's age when parent(s) natural-
ized:





Prior arrests & outcomes, including sentences:
nt
